Safety and Access Review

Q2 2023

INSO
INTERNATIONAL NGO SAFETY ORGANISATION
Analysis & Advice for Humanitarians

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Introduction

Welcome to the Q2 2023 edition of the INSO Safety and Access Review (SAR), our flagship product designed specifically for NGO headquarters staff and decision-makers.

This report synthesises data and analysis from the Quarterly Reports produced by each of INSO's country programmes to create a convenient, comprehensive, strategic overview to support situational awareness, operational planning and policy development.

All the information contained in the SAR is sourced directly from our extensive network of platforms and subjected to multiple layers of review from field offices up to our global Analysis & Research Team, ensuring you receive reliable information and insightful perspectives.

In Q2, the Analysis & Research Team launched a suite of products to support NGO acute crisis response efforts in Sudan and the wider region and launched quarterly reporting in Haiti after a successful launch of the country programme. The team continues to elevate the perspectives of INSO's in-country staff to ensure our audience has access to the latest ground truths globally.

While our International Advisory Board will assist and contribute to the development of our global products over time, we very much appreciate your ongoing support, engagement and feedback.

Analysis & Research Team
INSO

Glossary

SECURITY INCIDENT refers to all "Theft", "Confine", Threat" and "Attack" events reported to INSO regardless of type, severity, perpetrator, intent or outcome. For instance, it includes all petty criminal robberies and threats as well as armed assaults and bombings. It includes all accidental involvement as well as all deliberate and targeted attacks. It includes all incidents in which no one was injured or hurt and all those in which someone was.

CONFLICT is a term divided into two recognised types by international humanitarian law: international armed conflict (IAC) and non-international armed conflict (NIAC). IAC exists whenever there is resort to armed force between two or more States whereas NIAC represents protracted armed confrontations between governmental armed forces and the forces of one or more armed groups, or between such groups arising on the territory of a State. For a situation to be classified as a non-international armed conflict, armed confrontation must reach a minimum level of intensity and the parties involved in the conflict must show a minimum of organisation. According to ICRC guidance, 'internationalised' armed conflicts occur between two different factions fighting internally but supported by two different states.

OAG indicates an 'Organised Armed Group'. Rather than adopt terms such as 'Irregular' or 'Opposition', which imply an identity motivated, mobilised and moulded in contradistinction to 'Regular' or 'State' forces, INSO applies OAG to encompass combatants, such as Al-Qaida or Islamic State, that neither perceive nor define themselves under state-centric parameters. According to International Humanitarian Law, an armed party to the conflict is one which fulfils the criteria of exhibiting a leadership structure, carrying arms openly, possessing a distinctive emblem and comprising internal disciplinary systems. The first two conditions refer to OAG characteristics while the latter two relate to determining prisoner-of-war status. Other 'organised' factors may include the existence of a headquarters, access to military equipment/training, the ability to plan, coordinate and implement military operations as well as negotiate agreements. For Mali, and to differentiate between the presence of diverse OAG interests and operations, INSO adopts the term 'proscribed OAG' to detail the activities of selected salafi-jihadi groups internationally designated as 'terrorist' organisations.

NGO is a 'Non-Governmental Organisation' legally established as a private, non-profit and tax-exempt organisation (i.e. a Charity in the UK; a 501(c) (3) in the USA; and an ASBL in Belgium). The organisation must be registered as a non-profit in both its home State and the country of operation. The definition does not include any UN Agency, Fund or Programme or any Private Development Contractors.

SERIOUS INCIDENT categorises any incident that caused the abduction, injury or killing of NGO staff. INSO makes this distinction to observe what percentage of all incidents result in these most serious outcomes. In this report, 'abducted' refers to the number of staff impacted by the incident, namely abductees, whereas the 'NGO Incidents by Type and Quarter' charts for each platform detail the number of abduction cases.

*INSO presently operates and provides services in Afghanistan, Burkina Faso, Cameroon (NWSW, Extrême-Nord), Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo, Iraq (suspended), Kenya, Mali, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, Somalia, South Sudan, Syria and Ukraine. Although INSO is only currently covering conflict-related hotspots in DRC (North and South Kivu, Ituri and Tanganyika), these will be addressed as areas within their respective countries as opposed to being categorised under geographically-specific regions.

DISCLAIMER: INSO exists to provide dedicated safety and security services to NGOs working in high risk countries. INSO and its partners and donors accept no liability whatsoever for claims that may result from the provision or utilisation of these free services. Whilst every effort is made to verify data, INSO cannot guarantee the accuracy of information provided.

SOURCES: Unless otherwise stated, all data, information and maps contained in this report are sourced from INSO. Maps use WGS 1984 Web Mercator Auxiliary Sphere Projection. Administrative boundaries: UNOCHA, Natural Earth. Security incidents: INSO Incident Database 2017-2018. Terrain Hillshade Service Layer credit: Source: Airbus, USGS, NGA, NASA, CGIAR, NLS, OS, NMA, Geodatastyrelsen, GSA, GSI and the GIS User Community.
The data, boundaries and names and the designations used in maps do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by INSO.

CHOROPLETH MAP METHODOLOGY: The heatmaps for each country section, produced by INSO specifically for this report, contain a graphical view of the aggregation of incident point data to a regularly shaped hexagon grid. The area of each individual hexagon unit is 500 km^2. This method is used to normalise geography for mapping and to mitigate the issues of using irregularly shaped polygons created by political processes, such as the demarcation of administrative boundaries. The hexbins colours in the heatmaps are categorised and visualised using the Manual Interval method. These classifications sort all incident values into eleven classes, distributed according to the incident quarterly (first 5 classes) and yearly (last 6 classes) average.

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CITATION: All rights are reserved. Citation is prohibited without the written permission of the INSO Director of Analysis & Research michael.walker@hq.ngosafety.org.

LEGAL INFORMATION: Stichting International NGO Safety Organisation (INSO) registered 17 January 2019, non-profit Foundation (ANBI) in the Netherlands, KvK 73728489 at Grote Marktstraat 43-C, 2511BH, Den Haag, The Netherlands.

Key Developments

MALI

JNIM sought to fortify its physical control over Mopti and Segou. As a result the quarter marked over a year of increasing conflict activity. Intra-OAG conflict and OAG targeting of government forces will contribute to deteriorating access while OAG accusations of politicisation of aid op-erations in areas of Mopti will require NGOs reinforce their distinction from political actors.

BURKINA FASO

The government continued to rely on Russia and China as security partners while several population centres with acute humanitarian needs were isolated due to OAG sieges and spread of militarised zones. In-transit risk including access denials and IED use will shape mobility while continued distancing from France and UN security assistance may impact perceptions of NGOs.

NIGER

OAG perpetrated IED incidents spiked in Tillabéry and Tahou were rival OAGs JNIM and EIS sought to maintain control over supply routes and areas of influence; in Diffa abduction incidents remained disproportionately high amid continued JAS presence. Rapid political change subsequent to the reporting period will have a defining impact on NGO safety and access in the coming quarter.

UKRAINE

Russian military forces deployed more advanced weapon systems while Ukrainian forces launched a counteroffensive that resulted in limited territorial gains. Collateral risk, particularly in frontline areas remained high amid emerging reporting on other forms of access constraints and risk including increased scrutiny of aid activity and common criminality.

CAMEROON

The Far North and NWSW remained distinct crises with the former defined by criminality and JAS/ISWAP activity while the latter saw reduced but still considerable deployment of IEDs against government forces. Route assessment and road safety will be of increasing importance to NGOs in NWSW as IEDs are an established feature of the operating environment for the foreseeable future.

NIGERIA

OAG-perpetrated abduction of NGO staff this quarter signalled continued willing-ness among OAGs to target humanitar-ians thus NGOs must maintain strong security risk management practices and ensure that contingency plans are up to date. Looking ahead, while the ongoing rain will stymie conflict activity in the coming period, bureaucratic restrictions can also impede NGO operations.

CAR

Amid continued CPC activity and displacement into the east by civilians impacted by the Sudan conflict, the emergence of AAKG and MSRT further fragmented the actor map. This and increased government activity contributed to a near doubling of NGO incidents as agencies are preparing to confront constrained access coinciding with increased need.

SOUTH SUDAN

INSO's programme in South Sudan is currently working towards re-registration. We expect to begin services again soon.

SYRIA

The February earthquakes accelerated a downward trend of security incidents resulting in the lowest conflict levels since 2014. Nonetheless, humanitarian need has grown with aid agencies facing perceptions of inadequate response while the expiration of the cross-border mechanism in the north will serve as an obstacle to principled and sustainable activity.

DRC

UPRDC, ADF and M23 activity intersected with crime to drive high levels of violence in the con-text. This greatly restricted access for NGOs and requires NGOs to prioritise programme critical-ity within their assessments while robust contingency planning is fundamental to maintain ac-ceptable levels of risk.

SOMALIA

Somalian forces and allies paused operations against AS, prompting AS attempts to regain the initiative through counteroffensives. However, access to areas taken by Somalian forces is constrained due to in-transit risk driven by AS activity. Meanwhile, access was also blocked to Somaliland in attempt to instrumentalise aid during conflict between local conflict actors.

HAITI

Organised criminal groups held de-facto control of significant swaths of territory and engaged in violent competition further de-stabilising the country. Granular knowledge of criminal group territorial influence remains an essential minimum to operate in the context, and even so, access is set to remain restricted and localised for the majority of humanitarian actors.

AFGHANISTAN

Government intent to control private and public activity continued to define the context. This included a ban on INGO interventions in education in yet another example of policy that disproportionally impacts women and girls. This dynamic will continue to shape NGO activity and will be exacerbated by ambiguous central government policy that allows for interpretation by local authorities.

IRAQ

INSO's Iraq programme is currently suspended.

MOZAMBIQUE

OAGs adopted a strategy aimed at cultivating positive perceptions within local communities while government forces with support of the Rwandan military accelerated operations in Cabo Delgado. Amid this more assertive posture, the potential imposition of armed escorts calls for humanitarians to establish and a maintain common and principled position on their use.

Advanced incident density visualisation

Each of these customised maps groups the nearby incident points into discrete equal-area hexagons (1000 km²) and visualises the hexbins by the volume of incidents with a standardised colour scale for the polygons across all countries. Since all hexbins are the same shape and size, this enables comparative analyses of locations both within and across different countries.

72,074
Total security incidents in 2023

697
Total NGO incidents in 2023

Global security incident volume Q2 2023

1-20 | 21-50 | 51-100 | 101-250 | 251-500 | 501-1000 | 1001-1500 | >1500

Percentage change from Q1 to Q2 2023

≤ -10% | ≤ -5% | < 0% | NO CHANGE | > 0% | ≥ 5% | ≥ 10%

DECREASE ⟷ INCREASE



Afghanistan

Security incident density overlaid with NGO incident density



1 January to 30 June 2023

Total NGO incidents in 2023	86
Killed	1
Injured	14
Abducted	0

Serious incidents by NGO incident ratio

8 out of every **50** NGO incidents

NGO by security incident ratio*

5 NGO incidents out of every **500** security incidents

*each circle represents 5 incidents.

Total security incidents by month



Security incidents by perpetrator



Security incident volumes by area and quarter



NGO incidents by type and quarter



	ATTACK	CONFINE	THEFT	THREAT
2023 Q2	5	14	9	3
2023 Q1	5	27	18	5
2022 Q4	4	38	15	9
2022 Q3	10	35	22	6

Conflict activity by perpetrator and quarter



Conflict Activity Hindsight

- Security incidents increased marginally while underlying dynamics went largely unchanged, with government actors and criminals responsible for over 90% of incidents.
- IEA security operations contained OAG activity preventing a surge in conflict traditionally witnessed in the spring.
- IEA launched a nationwide anti-narcotics campaign in April, this served to drive tensions with rural communities involved in opium production.
- IEA law enforcement focused on upholding strict, gender-based regulations, and enforced social controls especially during Ramadan, sometimes using violence.

NGO Incident Insight

- NGO incidents nearly reduced by half, reaching the lowest levels in nearly six years, however crime caused the single NGO fatality which occurred in Farah province.
- The IEA issued a ban on INGO education projects in May, although the timeline, enforcement and precise scope of prohibited activities remains unclear.
- IEA interference in programming and aid diversion continued, most acutely in Ghor Province where all NGO activity was suspended.
- IEA extended the ban on Afghan women workplace participation to UN agencies; 20% of NGO incidents involved the enforcement of gendered restrictions.

INSO Operational Foresight

- Conflict-related risks will remain localised as OAG activity is unlikely to rebound, however NGOs should review mitigation measures against criminality both in-transit and at premises.
- NGOs should anticipate the education ban to be implemented inconsistently and collectively advocate with IEA at multiple levels for clear guidance.
- In light of harassment and aid diversion at multiple levels of the IEA hierarchy NGOs should review programme criticality accordingly.
- The extension of the gendered ban to UN agencies illustrates the urgency and importance of collective advocacy to enable principled humanitarian aid programming.

Burkina Faso

Security incident density overlaid with NGO incident density



1 January to 30 June 2023

Total NGO incidents in 2023	28
Killed	2
Injured	1
Abducted	0

Serious incidents by NGO incident ratio

0 out of every **50** NGO incidents

NGO by security incident ratio*

4 NGO incidents out of every **500** security incidents

*each circle represents 5 incidents.

Total security incidents by month



Security incidents by perpetrator



Security incident volumes by area and quarter



NGO incidents by type and quarter



	ATTACK	CONFINE	THEFT	THREAT
2023 Q2	1	3	5	0
2023 Q1	1	7	10	1
2022 Q4	3	12	6	0
2022 Q3	1	8	8	0

Conflict activity by perpetrator and quarter



Conflict Activity Hindsight

- Security incidents fell slightly in Q2, but conflict actors increased activity along main routes, perpetrating access denials, temporary detentions and thefts.
- OAG activity grew around militarised zones including targeting of communication infrastructure to hamper communications.
- OAG IED use increased by more than 30% from Q1, primarily targeting FAR movements and isolating communities in the Centre-North, East, and Hauts Bassins.
- The government continued to express frustration with historic allies and their supposed unwillingness to offer adequate support, while turning to Russia, China and other non-traditional partners.

NGO Incident Insight

- NGO incidents fell by more than half from Q1 to Q2, however this did not reflect an improvement in safety conditions, but reduced humanitarian access and exposure.
- Militarised zones and associated conflict have curtailed access to populations in need, while attacks on infrastructure negatively impacted communications with field staff.
- Although no IEDs directly impacted NGOs, these devices added to threats facing humanitarians along key routes, worsening access constraints and limiting NGO movements.
- Conflict actors increasingly stigmatised humanitarian aid; the government forces indicated a clear mistrust of NGOs, although they perpetrated only one NGO incident.

INSO Operational Foresight

- This trend shows the importance of building a strong security information system. CMCoord should increase efforts to become a key actor.
- Security and operational plans must prioritise backup communication systems to ensure staff tracking and crisis management remain robust.
- NGOs should sensitise their staff regarding IEDs, avoid roads with regular military presence and areas after OAG incursions and seek advice from specialist agencies where necessary.
- This stigmatisation implies increased safety risks for NGO staff and humanitarian access, common advocacy through relevant actors remains essential.

Cameroon

Security incident density overlaid with NGO incident density



1 January to 30 June 2023

Total NGO incidents in 2023	22
Killed	0
Injured	2
Abducted	7

Serious incidents by NGO incident ratio

17 out of every **50** NGO incidents

NGO by security incident ratio*

4 NGO incidents out of every **500** security incidents

*each circle represents 5 incidents.

Total security incidents by month



Security incidents by perpetrator



Security incident volumes by area and quarter



NGO incidents by type and quarter



	ATTACK	CONFINE	THEFT	THREAT
2023 Q2	0	2	4	3
2023 Q1	2	6	4	1
2022 Q4	1	10	2	4
2022 Q3	1	10	4	2

Conflict activity by perpetrator and quarter



Conflict Activity Hindsight

- Incident volumes increased by 15% driven by OAG incidents-against civilians and a spike in criminal activity.
- The Far North region saw OAGs increase their use of IEDs against GOV forces, attacks on military positions and looting of civilian possessions.
- OAGs in NWSW continued to dispute government authority through lockdown orders and roadblocks.
- In NWSW OAGs' use of IED persisted albeit at a lower rate with 41 incidents recorded in Q2 compared to 56 in the previous quarter primarily against GOV forces.

NGO Incident Insight

- NGOs incidents fell by 25% as increased OAG and criminal activity limited NGO movements and prompted robust mitigation strategies.
- NGO incidents in the Far North were limited to three incidents of thefts, one of which injured a staff member.
- The continued prevalence of lockdown orders were accompanied by more VCPs that hampered NGO movement and activity.
- While GOV forces were the primary targets of IEDs, two incidents saw OAGs use IEDs against civilians as reprisals increasing collateral exposure to NGOs.

INSO Operational Foresight

- Despite reduced figures, NGOs should maintain robust mitigation efforts to limit the impact of continued OAG activity in the NWSW and in the Far North.
- Continued OAG presence in the region coupled with inter-OAG clashes will likely persist albeit at a reduced rate; NGOs should maintain robust mitigation measures.
- Instrumentalistion will persist requiring that access negotiations emphasise humanitarian neutrality and independence with all actors.
- Further group fractionalisation signals IED use will persist, staff should revisit IED mitigation measures and avoid proximity to typical targets.

Central African Republic

Security incident density overlaid with NGO incident density



1 January to 30 June 2023

Total NGO incidents in 2023	79
Killed	2
Injured	10
Abducted	1

Serious incidents by NGO incident ratio

5 out of every **50** NGO incidents

NGO by security incident ratio*

18 NGO incidents out of every **500** security incidents

*each circle represents 5 incidents.

Total security incidents by month



Security incidents by perpetrator



Security incident volumes by area and quarter



NGO incidents by type and quarter



	ATTACK	CONFINE	THEFT	THREAT
2023 Q2	2	17	27	1
2023 Q1	2	6	23	1
2022 Q4	1	14	26	0
2022 Q3	1	20	33	4

Conflict activity by perpetrator and quarter



Conflict Activity Hindsight

- Overall security incidents rose slightly in Q2, driven by OAGs while criminal and government actors each accounted for 25% of the total incident count.
- New OAGs emerged in Q2, including AAKG in the southeast and MRST in the northwest, which have served to drive local tensions with both security forces and other OAGs.
- Although OAGs accounted for the greatest share of incidents the majority of these were criminally motivated, and conflict activity remained limited.
- Security forces and Russian PMC allies adopted a largely passive posture, however events in Russia have drove uncertainty over PMC presence in CAR.

NGO Incident Insight

- NGO incidents nearly doubled, representing the highest total since mid-2022, as the number perpetrated by government forces rose significantly.
- The quarter's single NGO fatality was due to collateral involvement in a 3R attack on a checkpoint in Ouham-Pendé.
- The CPC was responsible for 13 of the 14 NGO incidents perpetrated by OAGs, all of which were thefts.
- Security forces and PMCs were responsible for over twice the number of NGO incidents in Q2 than in Q1, as they increasingly sought to harass and extort NGO staff.

INSO Operational Foresight

- NGOs should ensure adequate contingency plans are in place for the period during and after the upcoming constitutional referendum, which may be accompanied by unrest.
- NGOs seeking to expand their aid provision to refugees in Vakaga must ensure they do so in a conflict sensitive manner that does not raise tensions among communities.
- Accurate mapping of CPC-influenced areas and routes is essential to mitigate risk to staff movement; INSO data can inform local area assessments.
- NGOs should maximise their use of CMCoord channels and carry appropriate documentation while advocating for respect of the humanitarian space by all actors.

Democratic Republic of Congo

Security incident density overlaid with NGO incident density



1 January to 30 June 2023

Total NGO incidents in 2023	162
Killed	3
Injured	12
Abducted	15

Serious incidents by NGO incident ratio

9 out of every **50** NGO incidents

NGO by security incident ratio*

6 NGO incidents out of every **500** security incidents

*each circle represents 5 incidents.

Total security incidents by month



Security incidents by perpetrator



Security incident volumes by area and quarter



NGO incidents by type and quarter



	ATTACK	CONFINE	THEFT	THREAT
2023 Q2	7	19	34	15
2023 Q1	9	13	60	5
2022 Q4	10	18	42	12
2022 Q3	11	14	45	4

Conflict activity by perpetrator and quarter



Conflict Activity Hindsight

- The security incident count reached the highest in three years with incident frequency increasing for the fourth consecutive quarter.
- While criminality overtook OAG activity in Q2, armed communal groups remained active across North Kivu and Ituri violating ceasefires from mid-2022.
- M23 activity continued to define the security environment in North Kivu despite the group's with-drawal from several territories.
- Flooding around Kalehe killed an estimated 400 people and displaced 15,000, driving humanitarian need amid intensifying armed group activity.

NGO Incident Insight

- NGO incidents fell slightly from a three-year high in Q1, with 80 recorded in Q2, however this remains higher than quarterly averages since 2020, as threats to NGOs intensify.
- CMC killed an NGO staff member, who was accused of affiliation with M23 in Rutshuru due to her ethnic identity.
- Ten NGO staff were abducted through Q2, with Mai-Mai militia groups responsible for most of the incidents, which were largely resolved through intercession of community leaders.
- Amid natural hazards and an array of active OAGs, an NGO staff member was killed during a robbery in Nord Kivu.

INSO Operational Foresight

- NGOs will be exposed to sustained high levels of conflict activity in Ituri and Nord Kivu, with reviews of programme criticality likely required in some affected areas.
- NGOs should ensure mitigation measures are in place for vulnerable individuals, particularly the Banyamu-lenge community and Rwandan staff.
- NGOs should continue to cultivate strong relations with all relevant actors to limit the impact of abductions when they occur.
- Physical access barriers may ease until the rains begin in September; however, NGOs should ensure all route assessments reflect the latest data from INSO.

Haiti

Security incident density overlaid with NGO incident density

1 January to 30 June 2023

Total NGO incidents in 2023	21
Killed	0
Injured	1
Abducted	2



Serious incidents by NGO incident ratio

7 out of every **50** NGO incidents

NGO by security incident ratio*

8 NGO incidents out of every **500** security incidents

*each circle represents 5 incidents.

Total security incidents by month



Security incidents by perpetrator



Security incident volumes by area and quarter



NGO incidents by type and quarter



	ATTACK	CONFINE	THEFT	THREAT
2023 Q2	3	1	3	0
2023 Q1	4	5	4	1
2022 Q4	0	1	1	1
2022 Q3	0	1	5	0

Conflict activity by perpetrator and quarter



Conflict Activity Hindsight

- 500 security incidents were recorded as the community developed its reporting capacity further establishing essential baseline incident data.
- OCGs were responsible for approximately 25% of security incidents as gangs increased attacks against civilians and police, especially kidnappings.
- Indicators suggested that vigilante group activity significantly accelerated in response to the prevalence of OCGs particularly in Petion-Ville.
- The government claimed it will move forward with elections despite endemic insecurity and reiterated the need for an international military deployment.

NGO Incident Insight

- NGO incidents in Q2 were broadly consistent with established trends with 11 recorded, most of which were perpetrated by individual criminals.
- OCGs abducted three NGO staff, however none of these deliberately targeted NGOs and all were resolved quickly.
- Vigilante groups perpetrated three NGO incidents; two extortion attempts, the third a physical assault on a contractor for alleged OCG involvement.
- Access remained highly constrained due to violence between OCGs, checkpoints on key routes and a lack of viable alternatives to road travel.

INSO Operational Foresight

- Threats to NGOs will be largely unchanged in the coming months, and partners should regularly review physical security measures at premesis and route assessments.
- NGOs operating in the context should ensure they possess the resources and technical capacity to respond to abduction incidents.
- NGOs should prepare for changes in areas of influence and conduct regular actor mapping exercises, ensuring these are reflected in movement plans.
- NGOs should prepare for additional physical hazards during the upcoming hurricane season and integrate limitations on physical access into their plans.

Nigeria

Security incident density overlaid with NGO incident density



1 January to 30 June 2023

Total NGO incidents in 2023	28
Killed	1
Injured	4
Abducted	3

Serious incidents by NGO incident ratio

8 out of every **50** NGO incidents

NGO by security incident ratio*

6 NGO incidents out of every **500** security incidents

*each circle represents 5 incidents.

Total security incidents by month



Security incidents by perpetrator



Security incident volumes by area and quarter



NGO incidents by type and quarter



	ATTACK	CONFINE	THEFT	THREAT
2023 Q2	2	4	7	0
2023 Q1	3	3	9	0
2022 Q4	4	0	11	1
2022 Q3	2	1	10	0

Conflict activity by perpetrator and quarter



Conflict Activity Hindsight

- There was a 9% drop in security incidents recorded this quarter; with incidents primarily perpetrated by criminal individuals and OAGs.
- OAG activity dropped by 5% from the previous quar-ter as did clashes amongst OAGs, meanwhile GOV forces slightly increased anti-OAG activity.
- Fuel subsidy cuts and a cash liquidity crisis worsened economic conditions and contributed to criminals perpetrating the largest portion of incidents for the third consecutive quarter.
- Political violence dropped following elections, meanwhile the new administration's security policy is marked by continuity with prior strategies.

NGO Incident Insight

- NGO incidents remained constant despite the slight downturn in overall incidents indicating that despite fluctuations in incident volumes, NGO exposure re-mains consistent.
- Despite decreased activity,OAGs still posed a direct threat to NGO staff as illustrated by ISWAP's abduction of three NGO staff and two guards in N'gala LGA in April.
- In Q2, five NGO incidents were thefts perpetrated by armed criminals at NGO residences or along the road in Maiduguri and in one case an educational facility in Monguno.
- A state-wide election-related movement ban in Ad-amawa was lifted after the election period; nevertheless, access in the northeast remains constrained due to insecurity.

INSO Operational Foresight

- Heavy rains between May and September worsens mobility likely suppressing conflict activity; nevertheless, NGOs should maintain robust security risk management practices.
- OAGs in the region, such as ISWAP, still consider humanitarians as targets, NGOs must keep staff aware of security conditions and ensure contingency measures remain relevant.
- NGO targeting by opportunistic criminals often relates to perceived wealth; maintaining a low profile, investing in acceptance, and reviewing site security can reduce exposure.
- While conflict drivers OAG activity and humanitarian needs persist, a political drive to minimise the continued impact of the insurgency will contribute to bureaucratic impediments.

Mali

Security incident density overlaid with NGO incident density



1 January to 30 June 2023

Total NGO incidents in 2023	69
Killed	0
Injured	3
Abducted	4

Serious incidents by NGO incident ratio

4 out of every **50** NGO incidents

NGO by security incident ratio*

9 NGO incidents out of every **500** security incidents

*each circle represents 5 incidents.

Total security incidents by month



Security incidents by perpetrator



Security incident volumes by area and quarter



NGO incidents by type and quarter



	ATTACK	CONFINE	THEFT	THREAT
2023 Q2	1	3	18	2
2023 Q1	2	10	32	1
2022 Q4	3	18	24	0
2022 Q3	1	6	26	2

Conflict activity by perpetrator and quarter



Conflict Activity Hindsight

- Security incidents rose for the fifth consecutive quarter, with OAG-perpetrated incidents increasing by nearly 20% from Q1 to Q2.
- The volume of attacks involving IEDs and mines re-mains high, with attacks occurring mainly in the Centre, but for the first time an IED was recorded in Kayes Region.
- Upon request by the Malian Minister of Foreign Affairs, the UN terminated the current MINUSMA mandate; with the withdrawal process to be completed by the end of 2023.
- JNIM continued to assert territorial influence in the Centre and South as its activity especially in Ségou increased from Q1 and the group seeks to move closer to Bamako.

NGO Incident Insight

- While humanitarian workers are not generally targeted, the increase of incidents perpetrated by JNIM, particularly in the Centre (46%), drove collateral risk for NGO staff.
- Only two of the 28 NGO incidents in Q2 were attacks and neither involved an IED, however the proliferation of these devices is adversely affecting access conditions.
- MINUSMA's departure is exacerbating current tensions between the GOV and signatory armed groups in the north, which may impact access conditions in the Kidal Region.
- JNIM published several messages warning the population about the instrumentalisation of NGOs and aid activities by the state, in particular regarding NGO activities the Boni area.

INSO Operational Foresight

- NGOs should avoid travelling to areas with recent clashes, due to the risk of reprisals in the following days; INSO's data can enable appropriate planning.
- NGOs should sensitise their staff regarding the dangers related to IEDs and monitor closely the incidents involving IEDs in order to plan their movements accordingly.
- NGOs should review their security plans and operational planning, particularly in the north of the country, to anticipate the consequences of MINUSMA's departure.
- NGOs should review mitigation measures for staff in Boni and consider reducing exposure in the short term, as well as engaging with local actors regarding NGO activities.

Mozambique

Security incident density overlaid with NGO incident density



1 January to 30 June 2023

Total NGO incidents in 2023	19
Killed	1
Injured	2
Abducted	0

Serious incidents by NGO incident ratio

5 out of every **50** NGO incidents

NGO by security incident ratio*

47 NGO incidents out of every **500** security incidents

*each circle represents 5 incidents.

Total security incidents by month



Security incidents by perpetrator



Security incident volumes by area and quarter



NGO incidents by type and quarter



	ATTACK	CONFINE	THEFT	THREAT
2023 Q2	1	0	9	1
2023 Q1	2	1	4	1
2022 Q4	3	12	6	2
2022 Q3	0	1	0	0

Conflict activity by perpetrator and quarter



Conflict Activity Hindsight

- Overall security incidents increased by roughly 30% in Q2 and concentrated in the northern districts of Cabo Delgado, primarily Macomia and Muidumbe.
- OAG attacks fell in Q2, with OAGs instead seeking to build acceptance among coastal communities, primarily in Macomia district, in an apparent shift in strategy.
- OAGs increasing interest in community engagement coincided with greater public discontent with intrusive government security operations.
- Security forces perpetrated twice as many incidents in Q2 comapred to Q1, which largely sought to counter OAG expansion.

NGO Incident Insight

- NGO incidents rose from nine to 14 from Q1 to Q2, with half of these being perpetrated by criminals, security forces and affiliated OAGs also sought to financially exploit NGOs.
- OAGs perpetrated only one of the 14 NGO incidents in Q2, which saw an NGO worker robbed during an attack on a village in Mocimboa da Praia district.
- Two of the three NGO incidents perpetrated by government forces or affiliates were efforts at extortion and fraud, illustrating criminal threats arise from a range of actors.
- VCPs impacting NGOs have declined over the last two quarters as conflict has shifted to the north of Cabo Delgado where armed escorts have been imposed on certain routes.

INSO Operational Foresight

- NGOs should review physical security measures in Pemba due to the ongoing threat of criminality in the city, which will likley persist.
- OAGs acceptance-building may impact access conditions; NGOs should share information on current dynamics in appropriate fora and review mitigation measures accordingly.
- NGOs should collectively advocate with government au-thorities for unfettered access and appropriate action against units that exploit humanitarians.
- NGOs should ensure they make informed policy choices on issues such as armed escorts, which have clear impact on neutrality and security given OAGs' targeting of GOV forces.

Niger

Security incident density overlaid with NGO incident density



1 January to 30 June 2023

Total NGO incidents in 2023	58
Killed	1
Injured	3
Abducted	2

Serious incidents by NGO incident ratio

6 out of every **50** NGO incidents

NGO by security incident ratio*

24 NGO incidents out of every **500** security incidents

*each circle represents 5 incidents.

Total security incidents by month



Security incidents by perpetrator



Security incident volumes by area and quarter



NGO incidents by type and quarter



	ATTACK	CONFINE	THEFT	THREAT
2023 Q2	1	3	28	0
2023 Q1	1	5	20	0
2022 Q4	0	2	7	0
2022 Q3	1	3	7	1

Conflict activity by perpetrator and quarter



Conflict Activity Hindsight

- Incidents rose by 18%, driven primarily by OAG activity linked with the Sahel crisis in the southwest and the Lake Chad Basin crisis in the southeast.
- The actor map remained acutely complex with EIS influential in Tillabéry and Tahoua. JAS and ISWAP in Diffa, and JNIM various areas in the south-west.
- IED use shifted from mostly JNIM emplacement in Tillabéry to ISWAP and EIS deployment in Diffa increasing fatalities from one to 29.
- GOV attempted to simultaneously contain both crises and responded with increased militarisation that impacted civilians.

NGO Incident Insight

- NGO incidents increased by nearly 25% with all but 3 of the 31 incidents perpetrated by including the murder of a staff member under unclear circum-stances.
- Both OAG related NGO incidents occurred in Tillabéry, a capture and release of a driver and another release of an aid worker after an extended abduction.
- IEDs posed significant risk to NGOs shaping move-ment planning however no IED related NGO incidents were noted during the period.
- GOV perpetrated an access denial in Tillabéry and also issued a decree fixing the price of armed escorts.

INSO Operational Foresight

- NGOs should reinforce active and passive measures to secure facilities while ensuring staff understand basic response to incidents of thefts and armed robberies.
- NGOs should ensure engagement strategies reflect the fragmented actor map of OAG influence and differing postures of each toward aid actors.
- NGOs should adapt their movement SOPs, monitor IED incidents and plan their movements accordingly, and sensitise their staff regarding the dangers related to IEDs.
- NGO should maintain a common position on armed escorts as a last resort measure for the most critical of programming.

Somalia

Security incident density overlaid with NGO incident density



1 January to 30 June 2023

Total NGO incidents in 2023	26
Killed	1
Injured	1
Abducted	5

Serious incidents by NGO incident ratio

10 out of every **50** NGO incidents

NGO by security incident ratio*

6 NGO incidents out of every **500** security incidents

*each circle represents 5 incidents.

Total security incidents by month



Security incidents by perpetrator



Security incident volumes by area and quarter



NGO incidents by type and quarter



	ATTACK	CONFINE	THEFT	THREAT
2023 Q2	3	4	2	1
2023 Q1	10	2	3	1
2022 Q4	9	5	0	5
2022 Q3	10	5	0	4

Conflict activity by perpetrator and quarter



Conflict Activity Hindsight

- Total security incidents fell by 10% from Q1 to Q2, likely due to reduced GOV activity against AS in central Somalia in-preparation for GOV operations in the south.
- AS exploited the operational lull to launch counter-attacks against security forces, including an assault on an African Union base that killed 50 Ugandan soldiers.
- Overall, however, the anti-AS operations since late last year have proved effective, as total AS activity has fallen consistently over the last three quarters.
- Conflict escalated in Las Canood between the Somaliland military and SSC militia, while tensions also rose ahead of the Somaliland elections.

NGO Incident Insight

- NGO incidents fell by 30% in Q2, reaching the lowest levels since last year, likely due to reduced exposure amid greater access challenges and a slight reduction in conflict.
- Five NGO staff were abducted by AS in an incident near Beled Weyne, in an area where neither AS nor security forces have full control; the staff were released unharmed after 12 days.
- Access in areas retaken from AS continues to be challenging as the group reinfiltrated and periodically launched attacks along key routes, with NGOs exposed while in transit.
- Partly motivated by the conflict in Las Canood, SSC elders imposed a ban on trade and humanitarian access from Somaliland, insisting aid must come via Puntland.

INSO Operational Foresight

- Conflict is set to increase in the coming quarter as security forces prepare for renewed anti-AS operations, NGOs should prepare contingency plans for access disruption.
- NGOs should ensure route assessments are reviewed prior to travel in areas supposedly retaken from AS, while making use of CMCoord channels to better understand local threats.
- NGOs need to assess the viability of local airports regularly, as several have become the focus of localised conflict, such as in Gedo and Beled Weyne.
- NGOs should collectively advocate for the lifting of access restrictions in SSC, while making contingency plans to sustain supply chains via Puntland for the coming period.

Syria

Security incident density overlaid with NGO incident density



1 January to 30 June 2023

Total NGO incidents in 2023	45
Killed	0
Injured	3
Abducted	0

Serious incidents by NGO incident ratio

8 out of every **50** NGO incidents

NGO by security incident ratio*

1 NGO incident out of every **500** security incidents

*each circle represents 5 incidents.

Total security incidents by month



Security incidents by perpetrator



Security incident volumes by area and quarter



NGO incidents by type and quarter



	ATTACK	CONFINE	THEFT	THREAT
2023 Q2	2	1	1	2
2023 Q1	7	3	12	17
2022 Q4	3	2	5	10
2022 Q3	7	5	7	5

Conflict activity by perpetrator and quarter



Conflict Activity Hindsight

- The February earthquakes continued to shape conflict activity as levels were reduced within a multiyear trend of lower incident volume.
- The earthquakes have had a lasting impact on the context as parties to the conflict have prioritised emergency response operations or refrained from escalations.
- Despite the decline, incidents nevertheless began to recover later in Q2, with airstrikes by Syrian, Russian, Turkish and Israeli forces, and tribal violence in the South.
- Negotiations in late Q2 to renew the UN cross-border access mechanism from Turkey failed, as western powers and Russia vetoed each other's proposals.

NGO Incident Insight

- There was also a major reduction in NGO incidents following the earthquakes, falling from 42 in Q1 to just seven in Q2, the lowest figure since 2014.
- Escalating humanitarian needs have driven higher demand from IDPs and vulnerable populations, creating tensions with aid agencies over perceived inadequacy of assistance.
- Despite the limited NGO incidents, humanitarians faced challenges to acceptance among beneficiaries and collateral risks from conflict activity that may both escalate.
- The cross-border mechanism enabled aid provision to around four million people in northwest Syria and the end of UN support will significantly obstruct NGO's activities there.

INSO Operational Foresight

- Conflict is set to return to normal levels as the impact of the earthquakes begins to subside through Q3, NGOs should anticipate a resurgence of collateral risks in frontline areas.
- NGOs must implement acceptance-building and engage-ment strategies among vulnerable populations, communicating the targeting criteria and constraints on available assistance.
- Access constraints due to the end of the cross-border mechanism will intensify in the northwest; NGOs should prepare contingency plans especially for last-mile deliveries.
- Counterproposals by the Syrian GOV, alongside negotiations at the UN, suggest the cross-border deal could be revived, NGOs must continue to advocate for this with all parties.

Ukraine

Security incident density overlaid with NGO incident density



1 January to 30 June 2023

Total NGO incidents in 2023	22
Killed	1
Injured	4
Abducted	0

Serious incidents by NGO incident ratio

8 out of every **50** NGO incidents

NGO by security incident ratio*

0 NGO incidents out of every **500** security incidents

*each circle represents 5 incidents.

Total security incidents by month



Security incidents by perpetrator



Security incident volumes by area and quarter



NGO incidents by type and quarter



	ATTACK	CONFINE	THEFT	THREAT
2023 Q2	8	1	4	0
2023 Q1	7	1	1	0
2022 Q4	3	0	1	0
2022 Q3	5	6	0	1

Conflict activity by perpetrator and quarter



Conflict Activity Hindsight

- Russian army attacks progressively increased in both frequency and intensity throughout Q2, with artillery still dominant, but loitering munitions on the increase.
- Additionally, RA attacks increasingly targeted mili-tarily positions including in cities, with May seeing at least 20 nation-wide air attacks of increased complexity.
- Meanwhile, as counter-offensive operations gained momentum, Ukrainian GOV remained on high alert throughout the period.
- The breach of the Kakhovka dam on 6 June caused extensive flooding and associated humanitarian need.

NGO Incident Insight

- Risks of collateral damage and casualties remain high for NGOs especially in frontline areas, and Russian border areas and those exposed to long range attacks.
- RA artillery and missile attacks collaterally damaged NGO storage sites and residences in key cities including Zaporizka and Kyiv in multiple incidents injuring at least one NGO staff.
- Ukraine GOV increasingly scrutinised NGO staff, one incident saw GOV forces temporarily detain an NGO staff for lacking a permission letter.
- The destruction of the dam temporarily restricted access, posed long-term hazards to civilians and NGOs, and saw Russia backtrack from using the HNS notification mechanism.

INSO Operational Foresight

- Prior to scaling operations near frontline areas and recently recovered territories NGOs should conduct thorough risk assessments and ensure contingency measures are tailored.
- To maintain low exposure, NGOs must maintain robust contingency planning while ensuring movements in conflict hotpots are coordinated with CMCoord channels.
- Given the conflict shows no signs of abating, NGOs should ensure staff possess relevant identification documents, mission orders and permission letters to facilitate access.
- NGOs should resist pressure to rapidly deploy to front-line areas as additional hazards rose from UXO/ERW washed downstream.

Monitoring: Kenya

INSO Monitoring Overview

1 April to 30 June 2023

Continued increase in incident counts

In Kenya, incident volumes increased steadily this quarter, with criminal incidents predominately contributing to the increase. A resurgence in Al-Shabab activity in counties bordering Somalia and persistent bouts of intercommunal violence additionally restricted NGO access.

Intercommunal and roadside violence results in access challenges

NGOs proactively managed collateral exposure to intercommunal violence by limiting movement during bouts of violence. Communal violence flared in traditional hotspots, particularly in Samburu, Turkana, West Pokot, Baringo, and Marsabit countries. Additionally, in June, livestock raids resurged in Igembe region, Meru country, and unresolved land-based disputes triggered clashes in Narok County. NGOs should continuously monitor triggers for intercommunal violence within their early systems and ensure contingency measures incorporate personal staff profile-based risks. In addition, NGOs should maintain their strong movement SOPs during active conflict to mitigate against collateral threat.

Roadside insecurity also worsened, particularly in the Rift Valley region along the Kitale-Lodwar highway spanning several counties; additional incidents were recorded along key axis between West Pokot County and Turkana South. While this did not contribute to NGO incidents this quarter, a roadside robbery incident along the Kitale-Lodwar highway resulted in the injury of an NGO driver. NGOs should continuously monitor similar incidents, particularly given declining economic conditions

Widespread civil unrest

Meanwhile, widespread civil unrest was triggered in June as the Azimio La Umoja-One Kenya coalition held a rally in Nairobi on 27 June to protest financial policies they allege have aggravated the high cost-of-living crisis. The opposition further announced a nationwide mass protest on 7 July, a date associated with the - pro-democracy movement in 1990 and withdrew from bipartisan talks. Protests, which became increasingly violent, have already resulted in multiple fatalities, and are expected to increase in both intensity and frequency. NGOs should avoid impromptu large gatherings, engaging in partisan political rhetoric, and limit movements during bouts of unrest.





Crisis Monitoring: Sudan

INSO Acute Crisis Monitoring Overview

1 April to 30 June 2023

Fragmentation poses new challenges for NGOs

The ongoing crisis has lethally impacted aid workers, with at least 15 humanitarian staff killed. Drivers of deadly risk ranged from attacks during widespread intercommunal violence to collateral involvement in intense conflict in population centres. Furthermore, looting was endemic with the overwhelming majority of NGOs reporting thefts of equipment and supplies at their facilities, particularly in Khartoum. The conflict between the SAF and RSF, officially a component of the armed forces, erupted on 15 April and shows no sign of slowing. Indeed, early negotiations in Jeddah brokered by the US and Saudi Arabia did not yield meaningful results, with even short-term ceasefirse repeatedly broken and having little to no impact on the course of the fighting. Over the last month, the conflict has become increasingly fragmented as other armed actors entered the conflict. These include the SPLA/N (Hilu), SLA (Minni Minnawi) Central Reserve Police and other militia groups, some of which are aligned with RSF or SAF and others that operate independently.

Darfur proved a conflict hotspot

The most intense conflict has been in the Darfur region, a collection of states in western Sudan that have witnessed repeated intercommunal tensions and violence for several decades. Widespread attacks against civilians, including NGO staff, across Darfur was often allegedly perpetrated by militias aligned with RSF characterised the region, however confirmation of circumstances was difficult due to the scale and tempo violence, in addition to communication challenges as infrastructure was impacted by conflict. Moreover, approximately 300,000 people have been displaced from Sudan into neighbouring Chad according to IOM, while humanitarian access to the worst affected areas has been highly constrained by insecurity and bureaucratic and administrative impediments.

Government restrictions will remain a key challenge

Looking forward, NGOs will continue to contend with government restrictions, primarily on visas, that will stymie efforts to scale-up the response in line with escalating needs. Moreover, the disconnect between the national Humanitarian Aid Commission and its counterparts at the state level is disrupting the movement of staff and aid. NGOs need to ensure they have adequate contingency plans in case further staff evacuations are needed, including from apparently secure locations, such as Port Sudan.



States graded by incident count as reported by INSOs network.

ABBREVIATIONS & ACRONYMS

AAKG	Alliance for the Restoration of Democracy and Justice
ADF	The Allied Democratic Forces
AS	Al-Shabaab
CAR	Central African Republic
CHDC	Conflict & Humanitarian Data Centre
CMCoord	Civilian-Military Coordination
CPC	Coalition des patriotes pour le changement
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
ERW,UXO	Explosive Remnants of War/ Unexploded Ordinance
FAR	Forces Armées Régulières
FDS	Defence and Security Forces
GOV	Government forces
IEA	Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan
IED	Improvised Explosive Device
IHL	International Humanitarian Law
ISWAP	Islamic State in West Africa Province
JAS	Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'adati wal-Jihad
JNIM	Jama'at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin
LGA	Local Government Area
MINUSMA	Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali
MRST	Movement for Salvation and Renewal
M23	Mouvement du 23 Mars
NWSW	North-West/South-West
OAG	Organised Armed Group
OCG	Organised Criminal Group
PMC	Private Military Company
RA	Russian Army
RSF	Rapid Support Forces
SAF	Small Arms Fire
SSC	Unity and Salvation Authority of the SSC regions of Somalia
UN	United Nations
ZNPP	Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant

INTERNATIONAL NGO SAFETY ORGANISATION
Analysis & Advice for Humanitarians

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About INSO:

The International NGO Safety Organisation (INSO) is an international charity that supports the safety of aid workers in high risk contexts.

INSO provides registered NGOs with a range of free services including real-time incident tracking, analytical reports, safety related data and mapping, crisis management support, staff orientations and training.

INSO services help NGOs with their day-to-day risk management responsibilities and improve their overall situational awareness to support evidence-based humanitarian access decisions.

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Upcoming INSO Training

Course Name	Afghani-stan	Burkina Faso	CAR	Came-roon	DRC	Haiti	Mali	Mozam-bique	Niger	Nigeria	Somalia	Syria	Ukraine
Advanced NGO Security Management	Aug, Sep, Oct		Aug, Sep		Sep			Oct	Sep	Aug, Oct	Aug	Sep	Sep
Basic Security for Guards	Sep, Oct												
Crisis Management							Sep	Aug		Sep	Aug	Sep, Oct	Oct
Essentials of NGO Security Management	Sep, Oct	Sep	Aug		Aug, Sep	Aug	Aug, Sep		Aug, Oct	Oct	Aug	Aug, Sep	
Fire Safety													
Humanitarian Environment First Aid Training	Aug	Sep					Aug, Sep						Aug, Sep, Oct
Humanitarian Environment Individual Safety Training		Oct					Oct			Sep	Aug, Sep		
Humanitarian Negociations	Sep, Oct	Sep				Oct			Oct	Aug, Oct	Oct		
Humanitarian Negociations for Field Aid Workers		Sep, Oct	Sep, Oct		Aug, Sep, Oct		Sep	Aug	Aug	Aug		Sep, Oct	Sep, Oct
Induction to Safety and Security	Sep, Oct		Sep, Oct		Aug, Oct	Aug, Sep	Aug, Sep, Oct	Sep	Aug, Sep, Oct	Aug		Sep	Aug, Sep, Oct
Training of Trainers - Induction to Safety and Security													
NGO Security Management Small Private Online Course												Aug, Oct	
Humanitarian Personal Safety	Aug, Sep, Oct				Sep	Aug, Sep	Aug, Sep	Aug, Sep	Sep, Oct		Oct		Aug, Oct
Training of Trainers for Guards	Sept												
Travel Safety		Oct	Sep		Aug, Sep, Oct	Aug, Sep, Oct	Aug, Sep					Aug, Sep, Oct	

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