

## GISF Research and Guides





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#### Cover photo

Florence Muthiani and her neighbour's son after they have sorted onions Florence and members of her community have harvested. Florence lives in the Kitui district in eastern Kenya, a semi-arid region that has been suffering the impacts of the climate crisis.

Christian Aid is a member of GISF. In 2016, Christian Aid partners, ADSE built an earth dam 30 minutes from Florence's home. Before the earth dam Florence had to walk 10km away to collect water on rough terrain. "I am very happy now. I have strength and power. I have learned to depend on myself."

Design and artwork : www.wave.coop

## GISF improves humanitarian security risk management to protect aid workers and achieve sustainable access for populations in need

#### About the Global Interagency Security Forum (GISF)

- GISF is a peer-to-peer network of security focal points who represent over 100 humanitarian organisations operating internationally.
- It is committed to improving the safety and security of operations and staff by strengthening humanitarian security risk management (HSRM).
- As an NGO-led forum, GISF harnesses the collective knowledge of its members to drive change in the HSRM sector through original research, events and more.

## For GISF, **humanitarian** refers to not-for-profit activities that seek to improve lives and reduce suffering.

GISF facilitates exchange between member organisations and other bodies such as the UN, institutional donors, academic and research institutions, the private sector and a broad range of international non-governmental organisations (INGOs). GISF strives to improve practice by producing original research and practical guides that fill knowledge gaps across the sector. The forum invests in capacity building by promoting learning through training and events, an online resource hub, and a renowned research programme.

#### **GISF's values are:**

#### Inclusivity

We don't believe in 'one-size-fits-all' security. We take a holistic approach to HSRM, and recognise that different staff face different risks based on the diversity of their profiles, their context and their role and organisation.

#### Collaboration

We believe that breaking down siloes and pooling expertise from a variety of sectors is crucial for improving HSRM.

#### Innovation

In a rapidly changing humanitarian landscape, we value the importance of continuous innovation and adaptation.

### **GISF Resource Hub**

At GISF, all of our activities are grounded in the practicalities faced by members when implementing programmes across the globe. The pool of experience and knowledge represented in our network makes us the go-to place for HSRM expertise.

#### www.gisf.ngo

The GISF website provides a virtual learning hub for security-minded organisations. As well as housing our catalogue of original publications, the vast collection of NGOfocused resources available in our e-library promotes continuous improvement in HSRM, including:

- easy-to-use tools and training materials;
- useful links;
- topical blogs and briefings;
- upcoming events and conferences;
- training courses, and;
- vacancies and consultancies in HSRM.

GISF members can also access our tailored members' area and online chat, providing ample opportunities for direct peer-to-peer support.

In addition to membership, we offer engagement routes for a broad range of stakeholders - from our non-profit members to our strategic business partners. If you'd like to join the GISF network, get in touch or visit www.gisf.ngo/get-involved.

#### Be the first to hear about our upcoming research and events by subscribing to our monthly newsletters.

www.gisf.ngo/subscribe

## **GISF** Publications

#### GISF Briefing Papers and Reports

**GISF Briefing Papers and Reports** investigate some of the key conceptual issues facing NGOs and security risk managers in humanitarian operations. The papers aim to consolidate theory in practice; many contain practical tools through which the evidence researched can be applied. Written by sector experts, the GISF Secretariat and GISF members, GISF research is conducted using participatory action research methods. This fosters a collective approach by the humanitarian community for the humanitarian community, to reflect on the ways in which security risk management issues are addressed.

As a member-led forum, research topics are identified by members and developed by experts and the Secretariat using member input through consultations and working groups.











**Briefing papers in Spanish** 

### **GISF Guide Series**

GISF good practice guides are intended as tools for both managers and practitioners. They provide easy-to-follow checklists and adaptable procedural frameworks through which security managers can draw conclusions, apply their own experience and make decisions regarding security risk management for their own organisations and their specific operating contexts. The contents of the documents are purposefully generic; they should be adapted to an agency's needs and circumstances and may be used as a checklist.

Guides also contain useful editable tools, which can be downloaded from the GISF website. Guides are authored by sector experts with the input of the GISF Secretariat. GISF members and external contributors review and input into the guides' content via working groups.

	Guides in English
	Guides in French
	Guides in Spanish
	Guides in Arabic
<u>S</u>	Tools

If you would like to get involved in GISF research projects, please get in touch with the Research Advisor (gisf-research@gisf.ngo).

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## The Security Risk Management Context

In the evolving contexts in which humanitarian action takes place, SRM must reflect changes in the sector and in operating environments in order to sustain safe access for programmes being implemented.

The GISF papers detailed in this section explore global issues affecting humanitarian security risk management, thus helping organisations to anticipate changes and prepare.

Among the topics covered are duty of care towards staff, security risk management in local-international NGO partnerships and acceptance.

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## The Future of Humanitarian Security in Fragile Contexts: An analysis of transformational factors affecting humanitarian action in the coming decade



The transformation of the humanitarian landscape has already made a significant impact on the operational security of INGOs and other humanitarian actors. Moreover, as contexts defined as 'fragile' increasingly draw the attention of the international community, humanitarian actors will need to give careful consideration to the impact of changes unfolding in fragile contexts on their operations.

GISF and the Humanitarian Futures Programme (HFP) have responded to this need with this report, which serves to inform strategic policy priorities and approaches to security risk management planning and coordination, and addresses three main questions:

- What are the emerging trends, developments and drivers of change that are likely to affect or change security issues and considerations in the humanitarian environment of the future?
- How will the humanitarian sector need to adapt in order to continue to deliver programmes within this changing operational context?
- How prepared are organisations for this future, and what might they need to do differently in order to be prepared?

#### Suggested citation:

Armstrong, J. (2013) *The Future of Humanitarian Security in Fragile Contexts*. European Interagency Security Forum (EISF)

Find this briefing paper on our website: www.gisf.ngo/resource/the-future-of-humanitarian-security-in-fragile-contexts

## Duty of Care: A review of the Dennis v Norwegian Refugee Council ruling and its implications ()



On 29 June 2012, Steve Dennis, an employee of the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), was injured and kidnapped, along with three other colleagues, following an attack during a VIP visit to the IFO II refugee camp in Dadaab, Kenya. Four days later the hostages were set free during an armed rescue operation carried out by Kenyan authorities and local militia. Three years later, Dennis submitted a claim at the Oslo District Court against his former employer, the NRC, for compensation for economic and non-economic loss following the kidnapping. The Court concluded that the NRC acted with gross negligence in relation to this incident and found the NRC to be liable for compensation towards Dennis.

This paper reflects on the court case and what lessons can be drawn from the Court's ruling for the international aid sector. In order to achieve this, the paper reviews the Court's legal reasoning and highlights the interrelation between the ruling, the concept of legal duty of care and security risk management. The paper concludes by providing an overview of some of the wider implications this case has for the international aid sector.

#### Suggested citation:

Merkelbach, M. and Kemp, E. (2016) *Duty of Care: A review of the Dennis v Norwegian Refugee Council ruling and its implications.* European Interagency Security Forum (EISF)

Find this article on our website:

www.gisf.ngo/resource/review-of-the-dennis-v-norwegian-refugee-council-ruling

# Managing Aid Agency Security in an Evolving World: The larger challenge 🔋



This paper considers security management by international aid agencies against the realities of an evolving wider world. It describes the broad challenge of 'acceptance' that stretches far beyond the management capacity of security personnel, and thus requires a deep internal questioning within each aid organisation.

The past decade has seen impressive growth in investment and advances in operational security management by and for international aid agencies. This article takes a cursory look at these developments, recognising the progress made, whilst

highlighting some persistent challenges. It is suggested that the undeniable progress in security risk management needs to be examined against a seemingly deteriorating wider 'security environment' in which aid agencies are operating. The article reflects on some of the apparent drivers of this deterioration, and looks ahead to the next 10-15 years.

#### Suggested citation:

Van Brabant, K. (2010) *Managing Aid Agency Security in an Evolving World: The larger challenge*. European Interagency Security Forum (EISF)

Find this briefing paper on our website: www.gisf.ngo/resource/managing-aid-agency-security-in-an-evolving-world

## Security Management and Capacity Development: International agencies working with local partners ()



International agencies are continually reviewing the way they work with their local partners, most recently in response to changing security dynamics and an increasing awareness of security risks. However, their desire to support local partners can be hampered by cost implications, limited resources, over-reliance on local knowledge and skills and a partial understanding of the needs of partner organisations. This is compounded by confusion over the degree of responsibility international agencies bear towards their local partners.

This paper has two broad objectives. First, it aims to provide a better understanding of issues related to security risk management and the responsibility of INGOs to ensure the safety and security of their local partners. Secondly, it provides insights into strategies for INGOs to provide support to their local partners in terms of security risk management. These strategies are based on those of agencies already implementing differing levels of support to their local partners for security management.

#### Suggested citation:

Singh, I. et al. (2011) Security Management and Capacity Development: International agencies working with local partners. European Interagency Security Forum (EISF)

Find this briefing paper on our website: www.gisf.ngo/resource/international-agencies-working-with-local-partners

## Partnerships and Security Risk Management: from the local partner's perspective 🔋 🔋



This research paper complements GISF's 2012 report *Security Management and Capacity Development: international agencies working with local partners.* This first analysis brought key insights into partnership dynamics, including strengths and weaknesses from the INGO perspective. The latest research builds on this work by dedicating similar attention to the perspectives of local and national NGOs (L/NNGOs).

The security risks that L/NNGOs face, and their management of them, aren't sufficiently addressed in their partnerships with INGOs. Besides a lack of systematised collaboration and

support within partnerships, there is an absence of conversation. Because issues aren't voiced – or sufficiently listened to – security risks remain under-prioritised and poorly addressed. Open discussion between partners is necessary to collectively progress on the issue. This research project makes initial steps in this direction by deconstructing obstacles to honest conversations on security risks and investigating the perspectives of L/NNGOs on both their partnerships with international agencies and the management of security risks.

#### Suggested citation:

GISF. (2020) Partnerships and Security Risk Management: from the local partner's perspective. Global Interagency Security Forum (GISF)

Find this guide on our website: www.gisf.ngo/resource/partnerships-and-security-risk-management-from-thelocal-partners-perspective/

Partenariados y gestión de riesgos de seguridad: desde la perspectiva de la coparte local

## Achieving Safe Operations through Acceptance: challenges and opportunities for security risk management ()



Acceptance is one of the three pillars of humanitarian SRM strategies to ensure both access to populations affected by conflict and disaster and the safety of their staff and programmes.

The articles that comprise this publication present diverging, and in some cases contradictory, viewpoints. Depending on their specific experiences, the article's authors provide different interpretations of why acceptance sometimes fails and recommendations and strategies for addressing current challenges. They represent a diversity of perspectives and, we hope, help to facilitate dialogue on these important issues and implicitly acknowledge that there is neither a single way to view nor to 'do' acceptance.

#### Suggested citation:

GISF. (2021) Achieving Safe Operations through Acceptance: challenges and opportunities for security risk management. Global Interagency Security Forum (GISF)

Find this article on our website: www.gisf.ngo/resource/achieving-safe-operations-through-acceptance

## **Policy and Practice**

NGOs in the humanitarian sector have different experiences of, and subsequently different policies and practices for, security risk management. Good practice for managing security risks will not be the same for all organisations; it is dependent on the NGO's mandate and capacity. GISF research provides an opportunity for sharing and cross-learning on good practice between organisations and other experts, pulling together different examples along with key principles that should be considered when an organisation develops its own security risk management approach.

The resources in this section look at organisational policy issues such as determining an appropriate risk threshold, completing a security audit, budgeting for security and engaging private security providers.

# Security Risk Management: A basic guide for smaller NGOs 1 1 1



This guide aims to be a simple, easy-to-use security resource to help smaller NGOs demystify security risk management. By setting out the elements of a basic security risk management framework, this guide aims to support NGOs in translating their duty of care obligations into key processes and actions that will not only enhance their national and international staff security but also improve their organisation's reputation and credibility.

Although the guide is intended to be applicable to both national and international NGOs, some elements may be more relevant to one or the other.

This guide complements other essential guides, such as GISF's *Security to Go: A risk management toolkit for humanitarian aid agencies*, which focuses on security management systems in a particular context or location; however, this guide provides a broader perspective on the overarching framework an organisation should aim to have in place in order to improve its security risk management. This guide also aims to complement the GISF Security Audits guide, which enables organisations to take stock of what they have in terms of staff security and what needs to be improved.

#### **Suggested citation:**

Bickley, S. (2017) *Security Risk Management: A basic guide for smaller NGOs.* European Interagency Security Forum (EISF)

Find this guide on our website:

www.gisf.ngo/resource/security-risk-management-a-basic-guide-for-smaller-ngos/

- **J** Gestion du risque sécurité : Manuel de référence à l'attention des petites ONG
- J Gestión de riesgos de seguridad: Una guía básica para las ONG pequeñas
- إدارة المخاطر الأمنية: دليل أساسي للمنظمات غير الحكومية الأصغر حجماً 🔳

### Risk Thresholds in Humanitarian Assistance 💷



*Risk Thresholds in Humanitarian Assistance* is concerned with security risk management within humanitarian programmes, assessing how agencies define and express their attitude to risk, with consideration for how organisational and operational priorities might be better integrated. The study is addressed to senior management as well as security specialists. *Risk Thresholds in Humanitarian Assistance* suggests that an integrated approach to risk management can maximise programme resilience and thus achieve greater humanitarian impact. Throughout, the paper draws on the experience of GISF members, who are security practitioners working for

humanitarian organisations, as well as risk management knowledge from other sectors.


**Section 1** of *Risk Thresholds in Humanitarian Assistance* reviews the risk management process, considering roles and responsibilities at both organisational and operational levels, with **section 2** exploring how organisations establish risk thresholds, distinguishing 'proportional risk' from 'security thresholds'. **Section 3** goes on to consider how an organisation's attitude to risk can be put into practice and managed at all levels, whilst **section 4** concludes with recommendations for examining and improving the risk management process within humanitarian organisations.

#### Suggested citation:

Behn, O and Kingston, M. (2010) *Risk Thresholds in Humanitarian Assistance*. European Interagency Security Forum (EISF)

Find this briefing paper on our website: www.gisf.ngo/resource/risk-thresholds-in-humanitarian-assistance

### Security Audits 🗐 🗐 🗐



This guide can be used to examine the security management system of an organisation. A security management system (SMS) audit is an evidence-based review of the system's structure and functions and a test of the system's purpose. Auditing provides managers and their staff with essential information from which to identify system strengths and weaknesses, allowing resources to be focused where most needed.

*Security Audits* is designed for use by any staff member, including non-security specialists. It can be applied to the organisation as a whole, to headquarters, or to a country office.

#### Security Audits' associated tools can be downloaded in an editable format in English, French and Spanish via the GISF website.

The tools include:

- System reference
- Document register template
- Document review checklist
- Developing interview questions
- Online survey question example
- SMS Audit worksheet template

#### **Suggested citation:**

Finucane, C. (2013) Security Audits. European Interagency Security Forum (EISF)


Find this guide on our website: www.gisf.ngo/resource/security-audits





Auditorías de seguridad

# The Cost of Security Risk Management for NGOs <a>[]</a>



This paper explores the costs related to safety and security management for aid programmes. Aid organisations must strive to achieve value for money while at the same time meeting humanitarian needs with limited resources, ensuring fiscal accountability, and meeting their duty of care to staff working in the field. This report considers how organisations can meet these challenges, and justify their expenditure to donors, the public and their beneficiaries.

The Cost of Security Risk Management for NGOs aims to assist all aid practitioners to determine their risk management

expenditure more accurately, and demonstrate an evidence-based approach when presenting this information to donors. The paper is particularly relevant to those responsible for programme planning and management, donor proposal writing, as well as safety and security risk management. Aid donors may also find this text useful, as it proposes methods and approaches for organisations to communicate and justify clearly their risk management resource needs.

# *The Cost of SRM for NGOs* contains one major tool, the Risk Management Expense Portfolio (RMEP), downloadable in an editable format via the GISF website.

The tool is mainly designed for proposal writers, programme and security managers. It aims to:

- Clarify estimation and recording of a programme's safety and/or security costs
- Reflect tangible and intangible or marginal costs
- Determine clusters (salaries, training, assets)

#### Suggested citation:

Finucane, C. (2015) *The Cost of Security Risk Management for NGOs*. European Interagency Security Forum (EISF)

Find this briefing paper on our website: www.gisf.ngo/resource/the-cost-of-srm-for-ngos

# Engaging Private Security Providers: A guideline for non-governmental organisations [] []



Over the past decade humanitarian agencies have increasingly made use of Private Security Providers (PSPs) to support their security requirements. The initial apprehension felt towards a largely unregulated sector has given way to silent utilisation. The reasons for increased use relate to higher (perceived) levels of insecurity, harsher operational environments and a growing awareness of the duty of care. PSPs provide services ranging from 'soft' services such as training, vetting and analysis to highly visible 'hard' activities, such as armed protection for convoys.

*Engaging Private Security Providers: A guideline for non-governmental organisations* provides guidance which can assist humanitarian NGOs to reach an informed decision about when, how and under what conditions to seek PSP services.

#### (i) Corrections and updates

An update of the briefing paper was published in June 2015. This document reflects the most important developments in the sector since the paper was published in 2011, in addition to correcting mistakes in the initial document.

#### Suggested citation:

Glaser, M. (2011) *Engaging Private Security Providers: A guideline for nongovernmental organisations.* European Interagency Security Forum (EISF)

Find this briefing paper and the corrections on the GISF website: www.gisf.ngo/resource/engaging-private-security-providers

Engager les services d'Entreprises de sécurité privées: Orientations à l'intention des organisations non gouvernementales

## Joint NGO Safety and Security Training 🗐



Humanitarian agencies are increasingly aware of the centrality of security-related training to strategies for ensuring the safety of aid workers whilst maintaining access to crisis-affected populations. In a survey conducted by the International Medical Corps (IMC) during the first half of 2009, training was identified as the highest priority for NGO security expenditure for headquarters and field staff. However, no readily available, collective evidence base exists, from which NGOs can advocate for the provision of adequate funding, influence the development of course options specific to humanitarian mandates and operating contexts, and drive interagency training initiatives.

*Joint NGO Safety and Security Training* therefore builds upon a gap in previous research in the field of humanitarian security, to determine the size of the NGO market for security training by quantifying and qualifying collective needs at all training levels.

In conducting this research, GISF made use of participatory action research methods, fostering a collective approach by the humanitarian community to reflect on the way security issues are addressed, and to devise effective solutions.

#### Suggested citation:

Kingston, M. (2010) *Joint NGO Safety and Security Training*. European Interagency Security Forum (EISF)

Find this briefing paper on our website: www.gisf.ngo/resource/joint-ngo-safety-and-security-training

## NGO Safety and Security Training Project: How to create effective security training for NGOs <sup>[]</sup>



This is a joint project undertaken by InterAction and GISF and targets humanitarian and development NGOs that operate in various security risk contexts all over the world. It provides a baseline of good practice for NGO security training that must be informed by, and adapted to, each organisation, their needs, profile of management, operations, working environments and personnel.

The NGO Safety and Security Training Project: How to create effective security training for NGOs provides a narrative of the

research findings, an updated curriculum, and guidance tools for training. It is based on extensive research and interviews with members of the NGO community. The report draws upon existing training materials, community consultations, survey responses, job descriptions, as well as relevant trends in humanitarian and development practice. It captures good practice and global understanding in regard to quality and consistency of NGO security training.

#### Suggested citation:

Persaud, C. (2014) *NGO Safety and Security Training Project: How to create effective security training for NGOs.* InterAction and the European Interagency Security Forum (EISF)

Find this paper on our website: www.gisf.ngo/resource/ngo-safety-and-security-training-project

## Duty of Care under Swiss Law: How to improve your safety and security risk management processes []



GISF collaborated with cinfo and the Swiss Security Network on a research study exploring duty of care obligations under Swiss law.

This study resulted in the development of a maturity model learning tool for Swiss NGOs active in international cooperation to understand and assess what safety and security risk management processes should be taken so that organisations can improve their duty of care towards employees working outside of headquarters (i.e. those travelling or based overseas).

Please note that this study focuses primarily on the Swiss legal context; however, contributors to the report included non-Swiss NGOs and the contents of this document can, therefore, also be of interest to NGOs operating outside of the Swiss legal framework.

#### Find associated tools:

- The Duty of Care Maturity Model Matrix Tool
- http://dutyofcare.cinfo.ch/
- The Duty of Care Maturity Model Matrix Annex
- www.gisf.ngo/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/ Duty-of-Care-Maturity-Matrix.pdf

#### **Suggested citation:**

CINFO (2018) Duty of Care under Swiss Law: How to improve your safety and security risk management processes? CINFO

Find this study on our website: www.gisf.ngo/resource/duty-of-care-under-swiss-law

## Partnerships and Security Risk Management: a joint action guide for local and international aid organisations **1 1**



Since attacks on aid workers have been recorded, L/NNGO aid workers worldwide have been the most exposed to security risks. As efforts to 'localise' aid carry on and with it, partnerships multiply, we must ensure that INGOs and L/NNGOs address these risks within their partnerships.

This guide aims to support L/NNGOs and INGOs in the aid sector to better manage and share responsibility for security risks in partnerships. It builds on findings from the GISF briefing paper, Security Management and Capacity Development: international agencies working with local

*partners*, (2012) and the GISF research paper, *Partnerships and Security Risk Management: from the local partner's perspective* (2020). Addressing key challenges identified in this research, this guide offers tools and guidance on improving partnerships' structure and supporting better access to SRM resources for local NGOs in the humanitarian space, including advocacy.

#### Suggested citation:

GISF. (2021) Partnerships and Security Risk Management: a joint action guide for local and international aid organisations. Global Interagency Security Forum (GISF)

Find this guide on our website:

www.gisf.ngo/resource/partnerships-and-security-risk-management-a-joint-actionguide-for-local-and-international-aid-organisations/

- Partenariats et gestion du risque sécurité : guide d'action conjointe pour les organisations humanitaires locales et internationales
- Partenariados y gestión de riesgos de seguridad: Guía de acción conjunta para organizaciones de ayuda locales e internacionales

## Policy and Practice

## Security and Safety Training Pack 🥑



Training is a vital part of improving the security awareness and management capacity of staff. Many NGOs understand the importance of security training; in practice, however, the cost, time and capacity of security staff to deliver training remain significant barriers to organisations implementing and sustaining security training for staff at the local and national levels. Smaller NGOs, in particular, with limited resources and security capacity, can struggle to provide much needed security training to staff.

While security staff are keen to establish and provide security training to staff, they are often time constrained or have limited training experience. Therefore, developing training materials, and considering which topics to cover and how, can be an additional barrier, especially in an emergency setting when there is a need to quickly provide training to large groups of staff across many different locations.

This tool provides security staff with training material that can be understood and improved upon.

#### **Suggested citation:**

GISF. (2022) *Security and Safety Training Pack*. Global Interagency Security Forum (GISF)

Find this guide on our website: www./gisf.ngo/long-read/security-safety-training-pack

# Keeping up with COVID-19: essential guidance for NGO security risk managers **1**



The COVID-19 pandemic continues to impact not only the security risks that NGOs face, but also the way risk treatment measures are developed, implemented, and communicated to staff. As we get used to new ways of working with COVID-19, and the focus is, rightly, on the pandemic and its impacts, we must ensure that we do not lose sight of ongoing, as well as new security situations and issues.

This guidance document is for staff with SRM responsibilities and is presented in a series of modules that look at how SRM

is impacted by COVID-19. The guidance is divided into three parts (A) Policy and Planning, (B) Operational Security and (C) Staff Support.

#### **Suggested citation:**

GISF. (2021) *Keeping up with COVID-19: essential guidance for NGO security risk managers*. Global Interagency Security Forum (GISF)

Find this guide on our website: www.gisf.ngo/resource/c12-human-resources-2

### NGO Security Collaboration Guide 🤳



The GISF NGO Security Collaboration Guide provides NGO security staff with advice and practical resources to support them in facilitating effective security collaboration with other organisations operating in the same context. The guide highlights the different models and options for organisational collaboration, suggests how they can be established and maintained, and examines potential activities and support they can provide to humanitarian organisations.

GISF has developed this guide as a web-based resource. To get the most out of this resource, it should be viewed online.

#### Suggested citation:

GISF. (2022) *NGO Security Collaboration Guide*. Global Interagency Security Forum (GISF)

Find this guide on our website: www.gisf.ngo/long-read/ngo-security-collaboration-guide/

## Diversity and Safeguarding

An organisation's workforce is made up of staff with a diverse range of profiles, which affects the risks that they face. Besides external threats, recent scandals have highlighted the importance of protecting both recipients of aid and aid workers from harmful conduct within organisations.

To adequately fulfil duty of care obligations, organisations must take into account how aid workers' personal characteristics (such as sex, gender, ethnicity, religious identity, cognitive and physical abilities and sexual orientation) intersect to generate different vulnerabilities, and address both context-based and organisational risks.

The resources in this section investigate both internal and external threats affecting aid workers, such as sexual violence. The papers analyse how the intersection of identity, role, organisation and context, generate different risks for both individuals and organisations.

26

# Security Risk Management and Religion: Faith and secularism in humanitarian assistance 🔋



This briefing paper examines the impact that religion has on security risk management for humanitarian agencies, and considers whether a better understanding of religion can improve the security of organisations and individuals in the field.

The paper gives an overview of the role of religion in humanitarian assistance and studies how religion and secularism can impact and influence the identity and practices of an organisation. The study examines differing opinions, approaches and vulnerabilities between secular and faithbased agencies and assesses how understanding the religious

dynamic can assist with the selection of an appropriate security strategy, in particular with regard to the development of an effective acceptance strategy. This document also provides practical tools and guidelines for integrating religion into security risk management.

The study is designed to be of interest to faith-based and secular humanitarian agencies alike. It references ways to increase debate and dialogue within the sector to improve understanding of religion and secularism and its impact on risk management for all agencies.

#### Suggested citation:

Hodgson, L. et al. (2014) Security Risk Management and Religion: Faith and secularism in humanitarian assistance. European Interagency Security Forum (EISF)

Find this briefing paper on our website: www.gisf.ngo/resource/religion-and-security-risk-management

## Gender and Security: Guidelines for mainstreaming gender in security risk management [] [] []



Gender and security is a complex issue, and this research found that there are different levels of comprehension of what it means in humanitarian and development assistance practice. The differences in gendered behaviour, bias, and learning have a direct impact on the security of the individual and the agency team. Specifically, the way in which staff perceive, understand and accept security informs how they can become exposed and how they may react in various situations.

The aims of Gender and Security: Guidelines for Mainstreaming Gender in Security Risk Management are twofold: to raise

general awareness about gender and how it relates to security risk management, and to provide practical tools for effective integration of gender-specific considerations to the existing security management practices. **Section 1** of the paper therefore provides a comprehensive overview of conceptual and theoretical themes relevant to establishing a common understanding of gender considerations in security risk management. **Section 2** comprises practical tools and guidance for implementing gendered security risk management, bringing policy into practice.

#### **Suggested citation:**

Persaud, C. (2012) Gender and Security: Guidelines for mainstreaming gender in security risk management. European Interagency Security Forum (EISF)

- Find this briefing paper on our website: www.gisf.ngo/resource/gender-and-security
- Genre et Sécurité : Orientations pour l'intégration du genre à la gestion des risques de sécurité
- Género y Seguridad: Directrices para la transversalización del género en la gestión de riesgos de seguridad

# Managing the Security of Aid Workers with Diverse Profiles 🔋 🗐 🗊



When personal identity characteristics interact with both the context and the aid worker's role and organisation, NGOs have a duty of care to inform staff of any resulting risk and to put in place measures to mitigate and respond to these risks. The failure to understand how personal profile characteristics impact personal security can have implications for the security of both the team as a whole and for the individual aid worker, as well as causing serious security, legal and reputational issues for employing organisations.

The paper uncovers challenges that arise for aid organisations when trying to support the security of staff with diverse profiles while endeavouring to meet legal and moral obligations related to equality, diversity and inclusion. It focuses particularly on ethnicity, disability and sexual orientation, gender identity and gender expression. The paper identifies examples of good practice and provides guidance on how to balance staff security and duty of care obligations while still respecting employees' rights to privacy, equality and non-discrimination.


This research paper is targeted at staff members within NGOs who have a responsibility for ensuring the security and wellbeing of staff members – for example, security focal points, human resources specialists, and senior managers.

#### Suggested citation:

EISF. (2018) Managing the Security of Aid Workers with Diverse Profiles. European Interagency Security Forum. European Interagency Security Forum (EISF)

- Find this research paper on our websit: www.gisf.ngo/resource/gender-and-security
- Genre et Sécurité : Orientations pour l'intégration du genre à la gestion des risques de sécurité
- Género y Seguridad: Directrices para la transversalización del género en la gestión de riesgos de seguridad
  - Running out of time? Have a look at the seven-page summary brief, also available on our website.

## Managing Sexual Violence against Aid Workers: Prevention, preparedness, response and aftercare 1 1



Sexual violence in all its forms is a violation of human rights. Incidents of this kind are deeply distressing for the survivor, their family, their colleagues and the whole aid community. Sexual violence incidents also have the potential to leave survivors with lifelong physical and mental health problems.

Managing Sexual Violence against Aid Workers aims to support aid agencies in preventing, being prepared for and responding to incidents of sexual violence against their staff. It is intended as a good practice guide to help strengthen existing processes and support organisations as they set up their own protocols.

This guide is aimed at anyone with a responsibility for staff care, safety and security, as well as anyone involved in processes aimed at preventing or responding to incidents of sexual violence against staff, such as security focal points, HR staff, project and programmes staff, and first responders to incidents of sexual violence within an aid organisation.

*Managing Sexual Violence against Aid Workers'* associated tools can be downloaded in an editable format via the GISF website.

The tools include:

- Scenarios for senior leadership
- Bystander intervention
- Legal environment questionnaire
- Sexual violence response task list
- Guidelines for a survivor supporter
- Preserving physical evidence
- Conducting an investigation

#### Suggested citation:

EISF. (2019) Managing Sexual Violence against Aid Workers: Prevention, preparedness, response and aftercare. European Interagency Security Forum (EISF)

 Find this guide on our website: www.gisf.ngo/resource/managing-sexual-violence-against-aid-workers/
 Gérer la Violence Sexuelle à l'encontre du Personnel Humanitaire : prévention, préparation, réponse et suivi
 Gestión de la Violencia Sexual contra el Personal Humanitario: prevención, preparación, respuesta y atención posterior
 Running out of time? Have a look at the summary brief, also available on our website.
 Additional article: Nobert, M. (2019) Safeguarding Aid Workers. European Interagency Security Forum (EISF)

## Toward Inclusive Security: the impact of 'race', ethnicity and nationality on aid workers' security <sup>[]</sup>

Toward Inclusive Security Risk Management: the impact of 'race', ethnicity and nationality on aid workers' security Tara Arthur and Léa Moutard			
Executive Summary Trace, dentify and rule and any large large strategy and the study of all pushes, the designment of the study of all pushes, the designment of the study of all pushes the study of the study on the study of the study of the study of the study of the study on the study of the study of the study of the study of the study on the study of the	I channel out als developed as the second second second second second second developed as a second second second second developed as a second second second second developed as a second second second second second developed developed as a second second second developed developed as a second second second developed developed as a second developed developed developed developed as a second developed developed developed as a second developed developed developed developed as a second developed		
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'Race', ethnicity and nationality have a significant impact on the security of aid workers. However, this impact has been insufficiently explored, with conversations often remaining sensitive, if not taboo. While organisations have begun to use staff profiles to better understand the risks individuals face, they often don't mitigate these specific risks. Based on interviews with humanitarians across a range of roles and regions, this article highlights some of the key security issues that organisations must consider to fulfil their Duty of Care toward aid workers of colour.

The article also provides recommendations for organisations to improve their SRM practices in the short-term, and also to create long-term organisational and cultural change that enables inclusive security.

#### Suggested citation:

GISF. (2022) Toward inclusive security risk management: the impact of 'race', ethnicity and nationality on aid workers' security. Global Interagency Security Forum (GISF)

Find this briefing paper on our website: www.gisf.ngo/resource/toward-inclusive-security-the-impact-of-race-ethnicityand-nationality-on-aid-workers-security/


## **Crisis Management**

Whilst NGOs are working to improve their crisis management capacity, in the past, this has been an area where organisations have been reluctant to share policies and experiences with the wider sector. As a result, organisations had to develop their own procedures without the ideas, advice or experience of their counterparts. Through GISF's capacity to act as a conduit for sensitive information, the guides and papers in this section have been developed using learnings from organisations that have dealt with the worst-case scenarios. Where appropriate, the documents also bring in guidance from external experts, such as the police, which is adjusted to the needs of the NGO sector.

Whilst family support and media management in a crisis are often considered when developing abduction management procedures, the guides in this section are equally applicable for all crisis response planning.

The GISF guides and papers do not instruct NGOs on the best course of action; rather they provide background information for good practice, identifying the questions that an organisation needs to answer when developing their own policies and procedures.

## Crisis Management of Critical Incidents 🖲



Aid workers operate in areas where the risk of critical incidents cannot be eliminated. Agencies must form and maintain robust crisis response mechanisms, from incident reporting processes through to post-crisis reviews and lessons learned.

The GISF *Crisis Management of Critical Incidents* briefing paper seeks to outline the requirements of crisis management structures, providing a general guideline for crisis management planning, crisis management teams (CMTs) and post-crisis follow-up. The paper is a tool by which agencies can review and strengthen their crisis management mechanisms, to ensure effective responses to critical incidents.


Good practice in crisis management constantly evolves in response to the changing humanitarian environment. Whilst intended for those involved in the management of critical incident and crisis management mechanisms within humanitarian agencies, all organisations deploying and contracting employees in environments where the infrastructure to deal with critical incidents is limited or unreliable, should find this paper valuable. The paper benefits from the knowledge and experience of a wide range of contributors including organisations, experts and survivors of critical incidents.

#### Suggested citation:

Buth, P. (2010) *Crisis Management of Critical Incidents*. European Interagency Security Forum (EISF)

Find this briefing paper on our website: www.gisf.ngo/resource/crisis-management-of-critical-incidents/

### Abduction and Kidnap Risk Management 🤳



Abductions are the most complex and challenging type of critical incident an organisation can face, so it is vital to be prepared for them. Despite the many important variations, some principles and practices apply to almost all abduction management scenarios.

Abduction has emerged as a real risk in an increasing number of contexts in which NGOs are operating. Therefore, building or strengthening appropriate abduction management capacity is regarded as a priority by many aid agencies implementing programmes in these areas.

This guide is designed to provide a concise summary of key information for organisations facing the threat of a potential or actual abduction of one of their staff members or other individuals under their responsibility, for example, consultants or volunteers.

Abduction and Kidnap Risk Management builds on the GISF briefing papers Crisis Management of Critical Incidents and Abduction Management, and should be read in conjunction with the GISF guides Managing the Message: Communication and Media Management in a Crisis and Family First: Liaison and Support During a Crisis.

Abduction and Kidnap Risk Management features a set of eleven useful tools. The tools include:

- Case management information checklist
- Daily summary log
- Post-release hostage debrief checklist
- Post-crisis analysis report template

### **Suggested citation:**

EISF. (2017) Abduction and Kidnap Risk Management. European Interagency Security Forum (EISF)

GISF members can find this guide on our website: www.gisf.ngo/resource/abduction-and-kidnap-risk-management (members must log in αs this resource is not open source)

# Family First: Liaison and support during a crisis 1



This guide addresses the stages of planning, delivery and review of family support by an NGO during a crisis. This guide is intended for crisis and incident management team staff who must support the family liaison process, as well as being an aid to the family liaison staff in their role.

Providing family support can be vital in the resolution of a crisis, ensuring that the organisation can lead a coordinated response, that information is effectively managed, and that the agency's duty of care obligations to the staff member and their family are fulfilled. Well-managed family support during a crisis can not

only mitigate the trauma to the family, but is important in maintaining strong relations of trust and cooperation between the family and the organisation, which can assist in the resolution of the crisis.

### The guide's associated tools can be downloaded in both English and French in an editable format. The tools include:

- Policy and Procedure: some issues to consider
- Sample information for a personal file
- Proof of Life
- Some dos and don'ts for a Family Liaison Officer

### **Suggested citation:**

Davidson, S. (2012) *Family First: Liaison and support during a crisis.* European Interagency Security Forum (EISF)

Find this guide on our website: www.gisf.ngo/resource/family-first

La Famille avant tout: Soutien et liaison en situation de crise

# Managing the Message: Communication and media management in a security crisis **1**



This guide offers information on communication and media management following a critical incident involving one or more members of national or international staff. Communication and media management refers to the monitoring and management of internal and external messages about an agency's work via conventional news media, public relations channels, personal communication and social media networks. The guide is aimed at those in headquarters, regional and field offices who are likely to be involved in the planning, response and review of crisis management or communication and media management before, during and after a critical incident.

Managing the Message: Communication and media management in a security crisis includes a useful set of associated tools, available in both English and French, which can be downloaded in an editable format. The tools include:

- Social media policy and guidelines
- Checklist for a crisis communication and media plan
- Holding statement template
- Press release template
- Preparing for interviews possible questions
- Monitoring and removing social media messages

#### Suggested citation:

Davidson, S. (2013) *Managing the Message: Communication and media management in α security crisis.* European Interagency Security Forum (EISF)

Find this guide on our website: www.gisf.ngo/resource/managing-the-message

Gérer le message: Gestion de la communication et des médias en cas de crise de sécurité

## Communications and Information Security

Information and communications management are decisive elements for the successful conduct of humanitarian operations. Thanks to technological advances, staff and decision-makers are able to access and exchange more and more information, faster than ever.

Communications and information technologies revolutionise the way security risk management functions, opening great opportunities for improvement, but generating equally important risks. The digital presence of organisations, staff, governments, groups, and aid recipients generate new risks for NGOs, that feed into broader issues of surveillance, independence and acceptance.

From general information on security management to handling incident information, the resources in this section provide guidance and tools to support good practice among NGOs. Other articles analyse emerging digital threats, exploring the security impact of communications technology on humanitarian delivery and providing advice on the use of various technological tools.

## The Information Management Challenge: A briefing on information security for humanitarian non-governmental organisations in the field



This GISF briefing paper investigates challenges around ensuring the security of sensitive information at the field office level, where the risk of surveillance can exist. The paper suggests various risk mitigation measures to ensure consistent application of information security procedures.

The paper also outlines the framework for an information management policy, identifying potential risks and possible responses.

The Information Management Challenge: A briefing on information security for humanitarian non-governmental

*organisations in the field* contends that good information security requires more than simply a 'technical policy' or input from IT departments. Rather, it argues that an 'information management culture', matching technical solutions to consistent observance and awareness amongst all staff and managers, is necessary in good humanitarian security risk management practice.

#### **Suggested citation:**

Ayre, R. (2010) The Information Management Challenge: A briefing on information security for humanitarian non-governmental organisations in the field. European Interagency Security Forum (EISF)

Find this briefing paper on our website: www.gisf.ngo/resource/the-information-management-challenge

## Security Incident Information Management Handbook



Security incident information management (SIIM) designates the collection, reporting, recording, analysis, sharing and use of information (including data) linked to a security incident. This handbook is the result of collaboration between Insecurity Insight, RedR UK and GISF. Security incident information management is a key part of an organisation's broader security risk management, which aims to support organisational security in order to ultimately improve access to populations in need.

This *SIIM Handbook* seeks to make an important contribution in advancing practices related to security incident information

management within NGOs. The handbook is intended to support users in establishing and developing effective information management for security event reporting and monitoring systems, both internally and externally, across the organisation and the sector.

### <mark>پر</mark>

The Security Incident Information Management Handbook includes a useful set of tools. The tools include:


- SIIM self-assesment grid
- Typology of incidents
- Incident reporting template
- Incident analysis grids
- How to conduct a factual debrief
- Good practice in gender-sensitive incident reporting and complaints mechanisms for reporting sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA)

#### **Suggested citation:**

Insecurity Insight, Redr UK and EISF. (2017) *Security incident Information Management Handbook*. Insecurity Insight, Redr UK and European Interagency Security Forum (EISF).

Find this handbook on our website: www.gisf.ngo/resource/security-incident-information-management-handbook

# Incident Statistics in Aid Worker Safety and Security Management



The past decades have seen a growth in circulation of safety and security incident-related numbers and statistics. Incident statistics on safety and security are useful tools for organisations, providing information on the changing nature of threats, how incidents impact their organisation and how well they are managing the risks to which they are exposed. However, many organisations have difficulties with obtaining accurate and reliable incident information to enable statistics to be developed.

The purpose of this article is to provide guidance on how to use and produce incident statistics and analysis.

*Incident Statistics in Aid Worker Safety and Security Management* addresses three main questions:

- Why are incident statistics on safety and security important for aid organisations?
- What should aid organisations keep in mind when considering and comparing different statistics?
- Can aid agencies produce and contribute to relevant and good statistics, and if so, how?

### Suggested citation:

Van Brabant, K. (2012) *Incident Statistics in Aid Worker Safety and Security Management*. European Interagency Security Forum (EISF)

Find this briefing paper on our website: www.gisf.ngo/resource/incident-statistics-in-aid-worker-safety-and-securitymanagement

Interested in finding out more about aid worker security statistics?

- Visit Insecurity Insight's Security in Numbers database: www.insecurityinsight.org/aidindanger
- Visit the Aid Worker Security Database: aidworkersecurity.org

## Communications Technology and Humanitarian Delivery: Challenges and opportunities for security risk management <sup>3</sup>



"The editors and contributors of this volume are to be congratulated on a practical text that pushes forwards our knowledge and understanding of the virtual space that now surrounds humanitarian operations, and which can have such a physical impact upon them. I encourage you to read it. The articles that follow have certainly brought me up to speed"

Hugo Slim – Senior Research Fellow, Oxford Institute for Ethics, Law and Armed Conflict (ELAC), University of Oxford.

[Extract from the foreword of Communications Technology and Humanitarian Delivery: Challenges and opportunities for security risk management.]

The articles contained in this publication are dispatches from a new frontline in humanitarian action: the digital frontier. All are written by those observing, experiencing and attempting to respond to the challenges created by the digital revolution, and the very real threats it is creating for humanitarian operations

**Section 1** of the paper, entitled 'Understanding the Operational Environment', focuses on the ways in which communications technology is changing the places in which we work, particularly conflict environments. **Section 2**, 'Communications Technology and its Impact on Humanitarian Programmes' looks at first hand experiences in the use of communications technology at field level for humanitarian programming. **Section 3**, 'Using Communications Technology For Security Risk Management' provides humanitarian organisations with practical tools that can help mitigate security risks, both digital and physical.

### Suggested citation:

Vazquez Llorente, R. and Wall, I. (eds.) (2016) *Communications Technology and Humanitarian Delivery: Challenges and Opportunities for Security Risk Management.* European Interagency Security Forum (EISF)

Find this briefing paper on our website: www.gisf.ngo/resource/communications-technology-and-security-risk-management

### Additional articles available on our website: December 2017 Digital Security for LGBTQI Aid Workers: Awareness and Response (Kumar, M) March 2018 Managing Security-Related Information: A Closer Look at Incident Reporting Systems and Software (de Palacios, G)

## Country and Field Office Support

Although GISF works primarily at the global and strategic level for humanitarian security risk management, we strive to work as inclusively as possible. This section therefore responds to a growing demand for guides that provide practical information for the development of appropriate practices in country and field offices.

This section includes practical guides covering topics such as office opening and closure. It also contains GISF's *Security to Go* guide, a toolkit for security and non-security staff, that provides accessible guidance on establishing basic security risk management systems. The toolkit continues to expand with new modules added to respond to the evolving needs of the sector.

# Security to Go: a risk management toolkit for humanitarian aid agencies 1 1



Security to Go, a risk management toolkit for humanitarian aid agencies is intended to provide a simple, easy-to-use guide for non-security staff to quickly set up basic security, safety and risk management systems in new contexts or rapid onset emergency response situations. This guide is applicable to both international organisations and national agencies moving into new regions and/or setting up new programmes; it is especially applicable to environments where the risk levels have changed due to human or natural causes.

The contents of this guide are the result of a collaboration between a number of different organisations, individuals and consulting agencies that focus on safety and security issues for international humanitarian organisations. The topics selected for inclusion in this guide represent many key areas, and it is anticipated that additional modules will be added or updated in the future as organisations develop and share their lessons learned in various contexts.

As of August 2022 there are fourteen modules in total, including:

- Security risk management process
- Actor mapping and context analysis
- Communications and information security
- Medical support and evacuation
- People management

Each of the 14 modules can be downloaded individually from the GISF website.

### Suggested citation:

GISF. (2020) Security to Go: a risk management toolkit for humanitarian aid agencies. Global Interagency Security Forum (GISF)

Find this guide on our website: www.ngo/resource/security-to-go/

- La sécurité en pratique : Boîte à outils de gestion des risques à l'attention des agences humanitaires
- Seguridad en práctica: herramientas de gestión de riesgos para organizaciones de ayuda humanitaria

# Office Opening: A guide for non-governmental organisations **I** 🗊



A well-planned and transparent approach to opening an office will mitigate many of the risks involved. The process is not linear and every situation will have different requirements. However, by applying a logical and organised process, setting up an office and finding accommodation is possible in most locations across the globe. This guide provides an easy-to-follow process detailing the recommended steps when opening an office where the property market may be complex and/or ambiguous. While the guide refers to an 'office', the process is equally relevant to any building, including accommodation, hospitals or warehouses.

It is recognised that in different situations organisations may have more time (e.g. setting up a regional office) or less time (e.g. rapid response programme office) to plan and implement the full suite of options identified in this guide. Regardless, this guide can be applied to all office openings, as the actions generally remain the same. Only the timeframe and the details of the preparation process may change depending on the urgency.

Office Opening: A guide for non-governmental organisations' associated tools can be downloaded in an editable format in both English and French from the GISF website. The tools include:

- Agency needs form
- Longlist template
- Longlist map
- Property analysis template
- Building lease terms

- Key lease terms
- Letter of intent template
- Building risk assessment checklist
- Utilities checklist

### Suggested citation:

Source8. (2015) *Office Opening: A Guide for Non-Governmental Organisations*. European Interagency Security Forum (EISF)

- Find this guide on our website: www.gisf.ngo/resource/office-opening
  - Ouvrir un nouveau bureau : Manuel à l'attention des organisations non-gouvernementales

### Office Closure **1**



This guide considers the processes required to close an office or programme while minimising risks to staff, the organisation, and programmes. This guide is intended for use in either a planned closure, or a closure which is forced by contextual factors.

Regardless of the reason for closure, the hazards of not approaching the process in a considered and organised way remain the same. Of primary concern are the security risks that can arise. How stakeholders are made aware of the closure, and are supported during the preparation for departure, will be crucial in minimising these risks.

Failing to manage the closure process appropriately can leave the organisation vulnerable to abuse of or violence against staff, theft of resources, reputational damage, and ill-feeling, which may extend to the humanitarian community in general, putting other organisations' programmes and staff at risk.

A well-planned and transparent approach to office closure can avoid many of these hazards, and this guide aims to help organisations to plan, coordinate and implement a successful, safe closure.

*Office Office Closure* has fourteen editable tools which can be downloaded from the GISF website. Examples of tools include:

- Planning checklist template
- TOR for Exit Programme Manager
- Closure risk analysis
- Example communications plan
- Example asset transfer memorandum of understanding

#### **Suggested citation:**

Safer Edge. (2012) Office Closure. European Interagency Security Forum (EISF)

Find this guide on our website: www.gisf.ngo/resource/office-closure

### NGO Security Toolbox 🗐



The GISF NGO Security Toolbox provides easily accessible guidance, resources and tools to help NGOs integrate good SRM practices into their operations in-country during humanitarian responses. The toolbox enables both security specialists and non-security staff to access practical resources and tools on the go and helps them put in place basic safety and security measures quickly, without having to start from scratch.

The resources within the toolbox are drawn from GISF's own guides, research papers and articles, together with leading guidance within the sector, and valuable examples and templates shared by GISF's members. All resources in the toolbox are free to use and can be adapted to suit your organisation or your operational context.

#### Suggested citation:

GISF. (2022) NGO Security Toolbox. Global Interagency Security Forum (GISF)

Find this resource on our website: www.gisf.ngo/resource/gisf-ngo-security-toolbox/

## **Collaborate with us**

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At GISF, one of our core values is collaboration. We are always open to working with actors from both within and beyond the humanitarian sector (academics, businesses, think tanks, humanitarian practitioners and others).

We welcome a range of contributions for our research and online blog – don't hesitate to share your ideas with us by contacting **gisf-research@gisf.ngo**.

We are always looking for allies to contribute to new translations of our resources. If you would like to help us improve access to our materials, get in touch.

## Want to utilise our expertise for a lecture, article or comment piece?

The GISF Secretariat also writes for external publications and supports research across the sector. Visit **gisf.ngo/gisf-expertise** to learn more. If you would benefit from insights and analysis on humanitarian security risk management, contact us.

## **Upcoming GISF Projects**

### Security in a Digital World

GISF is currently undertaking a new research project looking at how an increasingly digitalised world impacts SRM for aid and human rights NGOs. The project aims to enhance our understanding of a variety of issues: from strengthening our capacity to assess how digital, physical and personal security risks intersect to looking at how geopolitical trends in a digitalised world impact humanitarian action and the safety and security of NGO staff. This project will be composed of several research products, with the first two being scheduled for release in spring 2023.

Find out more. Email: gisf-research@gisf.ngo



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