



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Humanitarian Risk Initiatives: Index Report December 2009

Author **Chris Finucane** Editor **Madeleine Kingston**





Introduction

Acknowledgements

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Christopher Finucane

Editor

Madeleine Kingston, EISF

Contributors

This report contains open-source information or extracts and transcriptions from reference documents provided by persons directly involved with the projects. EISF would like to thank the following people for their written contributions to this report:

Chris Barron
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Janaki Kuhanendran
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Kiruja Micheni
Michael O'Neill
Elizabeth Rowley
Catherine Russ
John Schafer
Abby Stoddard
Christina Wille.

This report provides an index of various initiatives related to safety and security of aid agencies and their staff. The purpose of this report is to inform readers of the projects themselves, who is responsible for or participating in each project, and how people and initiatives relate to each other (see Figure 1). The report covers ongoing projects commencing since the year 2000. It is acknowledged that not all initiatives may have been identified and included in this report.

Initiatives are categorized into three main groups: (1) Academic research; (2) Professional Development and Policy; and (3) Online Projects, Social Networks & Blogs. Some of the initiatives cut across these groups. These are indicated with an asterisk beside the project tag¹ (Eg. AR1*). Internal organizational projects are listed under the Professional Development and Policy group.

Humanitarian safety and security training courses or training providers are not included in this report. The report is not intended to assess individual projects, and does not provide any opinion on their effectiveness or benefit to aid agencies.

¹Each project has a unique tag designator. Academic research project tags begin with AR followed by a number. Professional development projects begin with PD followed by a number. Online projects are not tagged.



Academic Research

Collaborative Learning Approach to NGO Security Management (AR1*)

Responsible person/s and organization:

Michael O'Neill, Save the Children, MOneill@savechildren.org or Larissa Fast, Kroc Institute, University of Notre Dame, lfast@nd.edu

Other participating individuals or organizations:

Elizabeth Rowley, erowley@jhsp.h.edu, Centre for Refugee and Disaster Response, Bloomberg School of Public Health, Johns Hopkins University; EISF, www.eisf.eu

Funding: This project is subject to funding.

Commenced: To be advised. Anticipated to start in March 2010.

Reason for establishing the research/project/initiative:

This project seeks to generate a common understanding of acceptance as a concept and practical approach to security management, as well as document the specific ways in which acceptance and other security approaches affect national staff.

Specific Objectives: The goal and objectives of this proposal will be accomplished through successful implementation of international and regional coordination meetings, Collaborative Learning Team activities, and the production of three key documents: (1) an acceptance current practices White Paper; (2) an acceptance assessment 'toolkit' designed to measure and evaluate levels and aspects of consent and acceptance of NGOs in a variety of operational environments; and (3) a policy-focused document and summary of research findings to support humanitarian organizations' efforts to adopt more effective security management strategies.

Location: The project will be managed from the USA, but have a global scope with initial focus on Uganda, Sudan, and Kenya.

Website: Not applicable.

Monitoring attacks on humanitarian personnel (AR2*)

Responsible person/s and/or organization:

Christina Wille, Insecurity Insight, Christina.Wille@insecurityinsight.org

Other participating individuals or organizations:

Nathan Taback, Insecurity Insight; Larissa Fast, Kroc Institute, University of Notre Dame, lfast@nd.edu

Funding: This project is subject to funding.

Commenced: Established 2008. Prospective and retrospective database.

Reason for establishing the research/project/initiative:

The purpose of the database is to profile patterns of threat and vulnerability in order to allow agencies to identify evidence-based entry points to improve security management.

Specific Objectives:

- a) Provide online access to summary information on location and characteristics while maintaining agency and individual confidentiality. Project partners will be able to query the online database for various types of information, such as number of events by context, location or date to look up broad trends. Access to this information will help to raise awareness of the extent to which security incidents affect aid workers. Such information provides useful background data for country briefings or funding proposals.
- b) The database is set up to generate information on the patterns and characteristics of security incidents to help identify entry points for practical security measures. While the database can be used to look up recorded global figures or incident rates, its main aim is not to generate an understanding of the magnitude of the global problem but to provide insight into the nature of incidents and therefore how to prevent them or minimize their impact.

Location: Geneva (Switzerland)

Website: <http://www.insecurityinsight.org>

Aid in Insecure Environments (AR3*)

Responsible person/s and/or organization:

Abby Stoddard - Humanitarian Outcomes, Adele Harmer - Humanitarian Outcomes.

Other participating individuals or organizations:

Katherine Haver, Humanitarian Outcomes; Victoria DiDomenico, Center on International Cooperation, vicki.cic@nyu.edu, Humanitarian Policy Group, Overseas Development Institute, hpgadmin@odi.org.uk/hpg

Funding: Initial funding (2004-2009) through HPG. Subsequent funding from the Government of Canada, DFAIT.

Commenced: Project started in 2004 with first publication in September 2006. Retrospective database containing incidents from 1997 onwards.

Reason for establishing the research/project/initiative:

Despite widespread perceptions of mounting threats to aid worker security, the lack of hard data made it impossible to determine whether in fact violence against aid workers had increased relative to their numbers in the field. This gap in knowledge meant that impressions and anecdotal evidence were driving operational security policy overlooking significant trends. The Aid in Insecure Environments project was developed to address this issue and provide quantitative analysis of the changing security environment for civilian operations, and to examine the related trends in security policy and operations.

Specific Objectives:

[Aid Worker Security Database](#)
(Humanitarian Outcomes, forthcoming 2010)

[Providing Aid in Insecure Environments 2009 Update: Trends in violence against aid workers and the operational response](#)
(HPG Policy Brief 34, ODI, April 2009)

[Private Security Contracting in Humanitarian Operations](#) (HPG Policy Brief 33, January 2009)

[The Use of Private Security Providers and Services in Humanitarian Operations](#)
(HPG Report 27, ODI, September 2008)

[Providing Aid in Insecure Environments: Trends in Policy and Operations](#) (HPG Report 23, ODI/CIC, September 2006) FULL REPORT

[Providing Aid in Insecure Environments: Trends in Policy and Operations](#) (HPG Briefing Paper 24, ODI/CIC, September 2006) BRIEFING PAPER

Outputs from the Aid in Insecure Environments project are based on data from the Aid Worker Security Database (AWSD), created as part of an independent research project jointly conducted by the Overseas Development Institute in London and the Center on International Cooperation in New York, and kept current since then. The research team also conducted interviews with humanitarian program and security professionals and drew upon recent additions to the literature. Starting in 2006, the AWSD has also documented instances when insecurity has restricted access to populations in need of assistance. The incidents recorded in the AWSD were compiled from systematic monitoring of public reports, augmented and verified by information provided directly from organizations and field-level security consortia. They comprise major security incidents affecting the staff of aid organizations working in humanitarian relief, defined as killings, kidnaps and attacks resulting in serious injury. For each incident recorded from 1997 to date, the dataset includes the number of aid workers affected (victims); their institutional affiliation (UN/Red Cross/NGO/other [donor government, international financial institute]); their nationality (national/international staff); the outcome of the incident (number of victims killed/injured/kidnapped); the tactic or means of violence (ambush/armed incursion, etc.); and the country or emergency in which the incident took place. Where possible, the motive for the incident was also recorded as it related to the victim's status as an aid worker (i.e., if the attack was purely economic or opportunistic in nature, whether political motivations were a factor, or if the victim's status as an aid worker was incidental or irrelevant to the violence, as in a crossfire or landmine incident). In addition, the study benefited from extensive research to quantify the population of aid workers in the field over time. By calculating a reasonable estimate of this humanitarian 'denominator', the study has, for the first time, been able to show the relative rates of aid worker attacks, and track changes year to year. Drawing on the findings of the initial 2006 report the research team identified additional policy gaps specifically regarding the extent and nature of usage of private security providers in humanitarian contexts. Using both field and desk research, the project sought to identify areas of good practice and promotes greater transparency and accountability in future engagement of private security providers.

Location: New York (USA)

Website: www.humanitarianoutcomes.org

NGO Security Guidance Review (AR4)

Responsible person/s and/or organization:

Elizabeth Rowley, Center for Refugee and Disaster Response, Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health, erowley@jhsph.edu

Other participating individuals or organizations:

20 international NGOs.

Funding: International Medical Center of Japan.

Commenced: January 2009.

Reason for establishing the research/project/initiative:

To document current security measures communicated by international NGOs to staff through security policies, manuals, and training materials.

Specific Objectives: The review had three main objectives: (1) Identify the most and least commonly cited security management messages NGOs are communicating to their field staff; (2) Determine the types of documentation NGOs most often use to communicate key security messages; (3) Distinguish the points of commonality and divergence across organizations in the content of key security messages. A research paper will be due for publication by end of 2009 or early 2010.

Location: Baltimore (USA)

Website: http://www.jhsph.edu/refugee/publications_tools/index.html

Understanding Humanitarian Risk Management: An Analysis of Security System Design & Function. (AR5)

Responsible person/s and/or organization:

Christopher Finucane, Humanitarian Policy, cfinucane@humanitarianpolicy.org

Other participating individuals or organizations:

The research will be conducted in cooperation with the Security Management Initiative and the Centre for Refugee and Disaster Response, Bloomberg School of Public Health, Johns Hopkins University. International NGOs, international organizations and aid institutions will be invited to participate.

Funding: This project is subject to funding.

Commenced: Planning mid-2009. The research is planned to commence early 2010 and last for approximately 6 to 12 months.

Reason for establishing the initiative: In order to examine the current state-of-play of humanitarian security and the impact of good practice on humanitarian action, this research proposes an analysis of humanitarian security systems. The research is intended to further our understanding of the international community's responses to humanitarian security challenges. This study will encompass the widest cross-section of the international aid sector and provide evidence-based analysis directly relevant to, and for the benefit of international aid agencies, policy makers, donors and other stakeholders. It is anticipated that the research will support policy developments, increase the available evidence-base for humanitarian security, demonstrate the need for resource strategies, improve monitoring and evaluation of risk management training and development strategies, and improve the overall global awareness of humanitarian risk challenges.

Specific Objectives: The research aims to provide evidenced-based analysis from which the following questions may be answered: (1) What is the current status quo of humanitarian security management systems?; (2) Do common systems exist across the different agencies?; (3) To what extent do current systems reflect national and international risk management industry standards?; (4) What are the strengths and weaknesses of current humanitarian security systems?; (5) Do current systems demonstrate duty of care?; (6) How do these systems develop and influence staff behavior and attitudes towards safety and security management? A research paper is anticipated for publication late 2010.

Location: London (United Kingdom), with partners in Geneva (Switzerland) and Baltimore (USA).

Website: www.humanitarianpolicy.org (Projects page)

Achieving Policy Coherence in Challenging Environments: Risk Management and Aid Culture in Sudan and Afghanistan (AR6)

Responsible person/s and/or organization:

Professor Mark Duffield, Global Insecurities Centre (GIC), Politics Department, University of Bristol.

Other participating individuals or organizations:

Dr Sarah Collinson, Humanitarian Policy Group (HPG), Overseas Development Institute (ODI); s.collinson@odi.org.uk

Funding: This project is subject to funding.

Commenced: Proposed October 2010; 2 year duration.

Reason for establishing the initiative: The research is concerned with aid agencies and aid policy in conflict affected fragile states. Since the 1990s, aid agencies working in war-affected fragile states have been involved in ambitious programs of social and political transformation. To achieve these far-reaching aims, policy makers have encouraged the integration of international aid and political activities to create 'comprehensive' multi-agency policy environments. While there has been some debate on the consequences of raising the political profile of aid work in this way, there is little research on how aid agencies are actually responding to the increased security risks they now face. What evidence exists suggests an expansion of field-security and risk-awareness training, a growing influence of security experts in program design, and increased institutional risk-aversion including insurance-based restrictions on movement and residence. The research concerns the implications for comprehensive programming in fragile states of enhanced risk management among UN agencies and international NGOs.

Specific Objectives: The primary objective of this research is to delineate the extent to which risk management and enhanced threat awareness among UN agencies and international NGOs challenge their ability to achieve ambitious and transformational policy goals in conflict-affected fragile states.

Location: London (United Kingdom). The case studies are in South Sudan and Afghanistan.

Website: Not applicable.

How to manage high performance and change in extreme contexts (AR7)

Responsible person/s and/or organization:
David Denyer, Senior Lecturer in Organization Studies at Cranfield School of Management,
david.denyer@cranfield.ac.uk

Other participating individuals or organizations:
Sellafield Ltd, Luton and Bedfordshire Combined Fire and Rescue Service, Addenbrooke's Hospital, EDS, others to be confirmed; Dr Colin Pilbeam and Dr Clare Kelliher.

Funding: The project is funded by the Advanced Institute for Management (AIM) and Economic and Social Research Council

Commenced: Proposed October 2009; 2 year duration.

Reason for establishing the initiative: A study of the role of management practices and effective organisation in trapping, mitigating and avoiding serious untoward events and preventing recurrence.

Specific Objectives: The project will produce six in-depth case studies and a systematic review of the latest research on high reliability organizations, resilience, mindfulness, patient safety, Normal Accident Theory, Human Factors, Man-made disasters, Organisational change and Leadership.

Website: www.managingextremechange.com



Professional Development and Policy

Security Collaboration Good Practices (PD1)

Responsible person/s and/or organization:

John Schafer, Director of Security InterAction, jschafer@interAction.org

Other participating individuals/organizations:

InterAction Security Advisory Group, & UNDSS.
Funding: OFDA

Commenced: Planning mid-2009. Will be completed Feb 2010.

Reason for establishing the initiative: This paper will analyze security collaboration mechanisms output [dissemination]; visually map their processes and categorize them into either an informal, intermediate, or full-spectrum type of mechanism. It is very difficult to provide informative analysis of security situations without the systematic collection and management of relevant information. It is even more difficult, and possibly impossible to do it without a dedicated resource or focal point, who is solely responsible for facilitating the process. Collaboration efforts often appear to produce an unregulated, high volume of intersecting data. The focal point of collaboration becomes the "traffic light" of the information management process. The intersection is comprised of information flowing on the horizontal and vertical planes which stakeholders may be plugged into. The collaboration mechanism should provide more focused analysis, effective training and advice. The end-user will then have a greater ability to interpret and compare the analysis to their individual Security Risk Assessment in order to adjust program activities. Organizations participating in the collaborative effort should value the products provided as equally as it values vertical and horizontal sharing of information. When a stakeholder in a region desires broader analysis, then a focal point of can be attached to the network enhancing the overall analysis of the security situation. The intent of a security collaboration mechanism is to enhance sharing of relevant safety and security information. For this enhancement to take place the collective community

or participants must identify and breakdown the natural barriers that block vertical and horizontal communication within and outside the stakeholders. The most expeditious means of accomplishing this goal is to establish security collaboration mechanisms for those operating in environments of elevated risk or in complex emergencies.

Specific Objectives: Published report to assist establishing good practices on the NGO approach to safety and security information collaboration.

Location: Washington DC (USA)

Website: www.interaction.org

NGO Security Risk Management (SRM); Recommended Guidance (PD2)

Responsible person/s and/or organization:

John Schafer, Director of Security InterAction, jschafer@interAction.org

Other participating individuals or organizations:

To be advised.

Funding: OFDA

Commenced: Planning mid-2009. Will be completed December 2009.

Reason for establishing the initiative: The Security Advisory Group, representing 180 NGOs, identified the vulnerability that NGOs share by having different security management methodologies that are confusing to national staff. The effort recommends a standard terminology and method for identifying and managing risk. Overall responsibility for the safety and security of NGO staff rests with the host government. However, accountability rests with managers at all levels, not only with their security focal points. Security focal points must provide the technical security inputs and advice that allows management officials to make informed decisions for managing security risks. Security risk

management therefore requires good teamwork between those who plan and direct NGO operations and those who advise on the security measures that enable them. These instructions better describe the SRM process, provide enhanced descriptions, updated definitions, procedures and incorporate lessons learned and best practices developed by security officers in the field and at headquarters and in cooperation of the InterAction Security Unit, the InterAction SAG, and the UNDSS through Saving Lives Together. This effort clarifies definitions, makes the current processes easy to understand and share, and provides detailed instructions on preparing critical components of the Security Risk Assessment (SRA).

Specific Objectives: Published guidelines that promote a NGO method of risk assessments.

Location: Washington DC (USA)

Website: www.interaction.org

International NGO Safety and Security Association (INSSA) (PD3)

Responsible person/s and/or organization: John Schafer, Director of Security InterAction, jschafer@interAction.org

Other participating individuals or organizations: An advisory board representative of USA and European NGOs, academia and international organizations, including the UN.

Funding: OFDA

Commenced: Planning mid-2009 Will be completed December 2009.

Reason for establishing the initiative: To improve the safety and security of NGO's by providing good practices and resources for individual NGO Security Focal Points.

Specific Objectives: An association for security professionals would: (1) Create a multi-tiered certification regime for security professionals; (2) Provide criterion for the training of humanitarian security professionals; (3) Create a career path for humanitarian professionals; (4) Provide human resources guidance to NGOs seeking to hire security professionals; (5) Create a code of conduct for humanitarian security professionals; (6) Bridge the gap between U.S. and non-U.S. security

professionals (membership would be open to both); (7) Create formal relationships with educational institutions through shared training curricula; and (8) Offer independent post-incident investigations.

Location: Washington DC (USA)

Website: www.interaction.org

Development of a Risk Ranking Tool for Global Security Managers (PD4)

Responsible person/s and/or organization: Oliver Behn, EISF, eisf-coordinator@eisf.eu.

Other participating individuals or organizations: Pete Buth, independent consultant; participating EISF member organizations.

Funding: Internal EISF.

Commenced: November 2009.

Reason for establishing the initiative: To provide Global Security Managers with an easy to implement, practical and objective tool to support the overall the risk management process.

Specific Objectives: A summary report will feed into a tool allowing for comparative risk mapping between projects or countries. This will aid global security advisors in setting minimum organizational standards; allocating resources according to need and efficacy; monitoring risk trends and determining the organizational risk profile in order to raise awareness within the organization, particularly amongst senior management teams. Final report expected in April 2010.

Location: London (UK)

Website: www.eisf.eu

Determining and Implementing Risk Thresholds: a case study (PD5)

Responsible person/s and/or organization:
Madeleine Kingston, EISF, eisf-research@eisf.eu.

Other participating individuals or organizations:
Participating EISF member organizations; others to be advised.

Funding: Internal EISF.

Commenced: November 2009.

Reason for establishing the initiative: To support the risk management process by documenting how agencies with varying operating models define risk tolerance, and surveying challenges encountered when setting and adhering to risk thresholds.

Specific Objectives: Research products to include a retrospective case study of risk threshold management within a gradually deteriorating security environment, linked to a study of an environment that is expected to deteriorate. The research will focus on the process of determining and implementing risk thresholds, and the role of senior management within this process. The phenomenon of "risk creep" experienced by some agencies will be a central concern. First report to be published in February 2010.

Location: London (UK)

Website: www.eisf.eu

Security Management Initiative (SMI) (PD6)

Responsible person/s and/or organization:
Maarten Merkelbach, Project Director, SMI,
Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP),
merkelbach.smi@gcsp.ch

Other participating individuals or organizations:
Various NGOs, UN agencies, Government bodies, academic institutions, international organizations.

Funding: Since its inception, the SMI has received funding from the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, Political Affairs Division IV, the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida), and the Swiss Expert Pool for Civilian Peace-building (SEP) of the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, Political Affairs Division IV - Human Security.

Commenced: November 2004 by the Program on Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research (HPCR) at Harvard University. From 1 August 2009, the SMI transitioned to the Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP).

Reason for establishing the initiative: SMI was launched as a follow-up to enquiries that highlighted serious security challenges facing humanitarian, development and peace-building organizations in dangerous conflict and post-conflict environments.

Specific Objectives: SMI aims to serve the international aid community and its national and international staff to operate safely and securely across the insecure environments in which they work. SMI strives to contribute to reducing the human and program costs of agencies operating in these environments, thereby enabling agencies to better fulfill their mission. The SMI provides research and professional development briefs and convenes high-level discussion forums for aid professionals.

Location: Geneva (Switzerland)

Website: <http://www.securitymanagementinitiative.org>

WFP: Strengthening staff security with our partners (PD7)

Responsible person/s and/or organization:
Chris Barron, World Food Program,
Chris.Barron@wfp.org

Other participating individuals or organizations:
WFP field and head office security officers, with the intention to roll out to WFP implementing partner NGOs.
Funding: Internal UN WFP funding.

Commenced: Internal WFP workshops commenced October 2009. External workshops to include non-WFP representatives anticipated during 2010.

Specific Objectives: Strengthen the Saving Lives Together initiative by establishing a formal set of protocols to improve security cooperation between WFP and its implementing partners (NGOs). The project outlines implementable options that require further discussion between WFP security, the security advisers of its NGO Cooperating Partners and other interested parties. This will then lead to the drafting of a formal project proposal in order to strengthen security with our partners in the field. The objective is not to supersede or override current efforts related to the

Saving Lives Together and IASC initiatives to enhance security, but to improve practical methods of implementing these initiatives. An opportunity exists to explore options for WFP and its partners and therefore enhance staff security while being able to actively participate in the development of the future initiatives of the IASC SGS.

Reason for establishing the initiative: Address challenges related to implementing the Saving Lives Together initiative.

Location: Rome (Italy)

Website: Not applicable.

Saving Lives Together (SLT): A Review of Security Collaboration between the UN and Humanitarian Actors on the Ground (PD8)

Responsible person/s and/or organization:
Kiruja Micheni, Christian Aid, kmicheni@christian-aid.org

Other participating individuals or organizations:
Janaki Kuhanendran, Christian Aid, JKuhanendran@christian-aid.org, and Madeleine Kingston, EISF, eisf-research@eisf.eu.

Funding: Internal.

Commenced: September 2009. Final report to be published by end 2009.

Reason for establishing the initiative: Produce a baseline of data to empirically test common assumptions about the SLT Framework and NGO security arrangements.

Specific Objective: Measure the level of knowledge of SLT by NGOs and provoke informed discussion of the extent to which coordination between UN and NGO security mechanisms is functioning. Final report to be published late 2009.

Location: London (United Kingdom)

Website: Not applicable.

Revision of the Good Practice Review Number 8; Operational Security Management in Violent Environments (PD9)

Responsible person/s and/or organization:
Program Management Team: Abby Stoddard and Adele Harmer of Humanitarian Outcomes, and Koenraad Van Brabant of Interpeace. Publication managed by the Humanitarian Practice Network, Overseas Development Institute.

Other participating individuals or organizations:
An advisory board comprises of representatives from INGOs, donor organizations, and international organizations.

Funding: Internal ODI.

Commenced: October 2008.

Reason for establishing the initiative: Current GPR8 print run was due. Given the original publication date was June 2000, a review of content was considered appropriate prior to printing additional copies. Specific Objective: Produce an updated edition of the GPR8. Revised edition due for publication June 2010.

Location: Project management based in New York (USA)

Website: www.odi.org.uk

Risk-specific edition of ODI's Humanitarian Exchange journal (PD10)

Responsible person/s and/or organization:
Maarten Merkelbach, Security Management Initiative, merkelbach.smi@gcsp.ch

Other participating individuals or organizations:
A joint project between the Security Management Initiative (SMI) of the Geneva Centre for Security Policy, and the Humanitarian Practice Network (HPN) of the Overseas Development Institute (ODI). ODI representative is Wendy Fenton, HPN Coordinator, w.fenton@odi.org.uk. Project Manager and Guest Editor is Christopher Finucane, Humanitarian Policy.

Funding: Internal ODI and SMI-sourced donor funds.

Commenced: Mid-2009 with formal agreement between ODI and SMI reached October 2009. Publication is June 2010.

Reason for establishing the initiative: The June edition of Humanitarian Exchange will focus on humanitarian safety and security. The edition, timed to coincide with the publication of the revised Good Practice Review 8 on Operational Security Management in Violent Environments, is intended to stimulate further debate around issues related to improving risk management practices, and as such theoretical perspectives should be presented with a practical application.

Specific Objectives: The aim of this project is to increase the level of general knowledge and awareness of humanitarian risk management by providing a wide range of articles that illustrate the broad scope of security considerations for aid workers.

Location: London (United Kingdom) and Geneva (Switzerland)

Website: <http://www.odihpn.org/>

Dilemmas and Principles of Humanitarian Action in Situations of Conflict: Supporting Decision-Making in Practice (PD11)

Responsible person/s and/or organization:
Dr Sarah Collinson, Humanitarian Policy Group (HPG), Overseas Development Institute (ODI); s.collinson@odi.org.uk

Other participating individuals or organizations:
Samir Elhawary, Humanitarian Policy Group, Overseas Development Institute; and representatives from the following agencies: British Red Cross, CARE International, Concern, DFID, ICRC, ICVA – International Council of Voluntary Agencies, Merlin, MSF-Operational Centre Amsterdam, Muslim Aid, Norwegian Refugee Council, OCHA, Save the Children-UK, UNICEF, VOICE – Voluntary Organizations in Cooperation in Emergencies, World Vision UK, World Vision International, and World Food Program.

Funding: This project is subject to funding.

Commenced: The pilot phase of this project will commence in November 2009.

Reason for establishing the initiative: This project is designed in response to a clear call from a number of humanitarian organizations at a recent HPG 'Principles in Practice' workshop for an initiative that could provide direct, practical and ongoing support to humanitarian decision-making in difficult operational environments.

Specific Objectives: This collaborative project led by the Humanitarian Policy Group (HPG) will directly enhance strategic analysis, decision-making and associated activities of humanitarian actors currently experiencing severe operational challenges in conflict-affected countries. This will be carried out through: (i) a close investigation of factors currently affecting 'humanitarian space' and the broader challenges to effective humanitarian action; and (ii) the development and application of a practical decision-making approach designed in close collaboration with humanitarian organizations to assist them to address more strategically the multiple policy and operational dilemmas associated with principles-based humanitarian action in complex environments.

Location: London (United Kingdom) with case study planned for Pakistan.

Website: <http://www.odihpn.org/>

Enhancing Learning and Research for Humanitarian Assistance project - Professionalizing the Humanitarian Sector: Scoping Study (PD12)

Responsible person/s and/or organization:
Peter Walker, Feinstein International Center, Tufts University, peter.walker@tufts.edu and Catherine Russ, RedR UK, catherine.russ@redr.org.uk

Other participating individuals or organizations:
Catherine Russ, RedR; Jess Camburn, ELRHA Project Manager, Save the Children.

Funding: Higher Education Funding Councils for the UK. Reason for establishing the initiative: Following a decade in which the humanitarian sector has sought to develop global standards, codes, and representative bodies, there is growing momentum to explore the potential for creating a unified system of professional development, accreditation and association, which could increase accountability, raise the quality and consistency of humanitarian service, open up the profession to talented new recruits, and raise the status of the humanitarian service provider to a level on a par with other professional groups.

Specific Objectives: (1) Identify an agreed set of core competencies for the humanitarian worker. These must incorporate both the minimum knowledge and skills required, but also the behavior and the moral and

ethical motivation that should be present for an individual to be considered 'competent' to work in the humanitarian sector; (2) Develop a certification system which will create a scale of recognized professional qualifications from entry level through skills certificates to professional Masters applicable in the UK but sufficiently generic that it can be adapted and adopted by other countries. (3) Explore the potential for additional professional structures such as a professional association for humanitarian workers, an academic studies association, and an association of humanitarian organizations, which could institutionally support and legitimize individual professional accreditation; and (4) Provide a road map whereby the above three issues might be carried forward in the UK and internationally.

Location: Cambridge (USA) and London (United Kingdom)

Website: www.elrha.org

United Nations DSS IO/IGO/NGO Liaison capacity (PD13)

Responsible person/s and/or organization:

Robert Painter, Senior Security Specialist: NGO Liaison, Division of Regional Operations, United Nations Department of Safety and Security, painter@un.org

Other Participating individuals or organizations: UN System and the IASC NGO Consortia (ICVA, InterAction, SCHR); United Nations INGO Partners (and indirectly their beneficiaries)

Funding: The Project has been operational since 2005. In accordance with General Assembly guidance, the Department's engagement with NGOs is contingent upon extra-budgetary contributions, thus the period of the program is indefinite. Unfortunately, the project has never been fully funded, has not been able to achieve its objectives and to date consists of a single individual.

Commenced: 2005

Reason for establishing the research/project/initiative:

The project seeks to implement Operational Paragraph 26 (below) of General Assembly Resolution 60 123 of 24 March 2006, titled Safety and security of humanitarian personnel and protection of United Nations Personnel, with a particular emphasis on the implementation of the framework for enhancing UN and NGO collaboration on security matters, known as "Saving Lives Together" (SLT) developed by the United Nations

Inter-agency Standing Committee, in consultation with DSS and which has been endorsed by the IASMN and the HLCM:

Paragraph 26: recognizes the need for continued efforts to enhance coordination and cooperation, both at the headquarters and the field levels, between the United Nations and other humanitarian and non-governmental organizations on matters relating to the safety and security of humanitarian personnel and United Nations and associated personnel, with a view to addressing mutual security concerns in the field; and United Nations staff and their NGO partners engaged in humanitarian operations are often exposed to significant and varied security risks and mental health hazards from continued operations in the affected areas.

Specific Objectives: The project seeks to enhance the safety and security of UN and NGO partners' staff working in humanitarian operations, through the provision of services, including coordination, planning and advice to DSS and UN and INGO security managers on SLT initiatives and UN NGO Liaison on security matters. The following activities will enable the Department to enhance security collaboration with INGOs through advocacy, coordination and planning assistance of SLT based initiatives.

In particular to provide strategic guidance and support to DSS and UN Country Teams with the aim of ensuring:

- 01) NGO collaboration with the UN Security Management Teams
- 02) Broad-based forums for field security collaboration convened
- 03) Inclusion staff security concerns in the Consolidated Appeals
- 04) Common, security-related needs addressed & resources shared
- 05) Effective inter-agency telecommunications for security
- 06) Collaboration and consultation in security training
- 07) Maintenance of HQ based systems for sharing security information
- 08) Identification and promotion of minimum security standards
- 09) Adherence to common humanitarian ground-rules

In addition, the Unit shall:

- 10) Maintain constant liaison between the United Nations and NGOs on security matters
- 11) Undertake SLT implementation, oversight and assistance Missions (minimum 6 months of missions per year per FSCO LNO Officer)

- 12) Develop proposals, seek funding for and implement Workshops and seminars to promote and further elaborate SLT.
- 13) In pursuit of the above, the project will seek to foster greater collaboration at the technical level, in particular, between the United Nations Security Cell(s) and UN and NGO projects managers in the planning and execution of humanitarian interventions
- 14) Collect and disseminate best practices in security management for humanitarian organisations
- 15) Establish Global linkages with security conscious NGOs to liaise at strategic level

Location: Headquartered at DSS in New York, with a global focus.

Website: Not Applicable.

MSF Switzerland Study: Perception of Humanitarian action and Perception of MSF CH in the field (PD14)

Responsible person/s and/or organization:
Caroline Abu-Sada, MSF CH, Caroline.Abu-Sada@geneva.msf.org.

Other participating individuals or organizations:
MSF CH field and headquarter offices.

Funding: Internal MSF CH

Commenced: June 2007.

Specific Objectives: Research paper due for publication in February 2011 (publisher to be advised).

Location: Geneva (Switzerland)

Website: Not applicable.



Online Projects, Social Networks and Blogs

Initiative Name: Safety & Security Resources for Humanitarian Organizations.

Website: <http://ngosecurity.googlepages.com/home>

Responsible person/s and/or organization: Unknown.

Initiative Name: Aid Workers Network

Website: <http://www.aidworkers.net/?q=advice/security>

Responsible person/s and/or organization: Volunteer board members listed on the website.

Initiative Name: Blog published through Change.org

Website: http://war.change.org/blog/view/how_many_aid_workers_receive_security_trainings?

Responsible person/s and/or organization: Michael Bear

Initiative Name: Patronus Analytical

Website: <http://www.patronusanalytical.com/>

Responsible person/s and/or organization: Kevin Toomer

Initiative Name: NGO Security

Website: <http://ngosecurity.blogspot.com/>

Responsible person/s and/or organization: Unknown.

Initiative Name: LinkedIn Group: NGO Security Network.

Website: http://www.linkedin.com/groups?gid=1794539&trk=myg_ugrp_ovr

Responsible person/s and/or organization: Amaury Cooper.

Other: Created February 2009 and has over 260 members.

Initiative Name: LinkedIn Group: Humanitarian Relief Security.

Website: http://www.linkedin.com/groups?about=&gid=739817&trk=anet_ug_grppro

Responsible person/s and/or organization: Brett Page.


Other: Created August 2008 and has 20 members.

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
Professional Network Analysis

Several projects are linked through key individuals who are involved with both academic research and professional development initiatives. These links are illustrated in Figure 1.

Figure 1: **Project and Key Contact Relationships**



eisf



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