International NGOs' Security Manager: Mindset, Attributes, Skills and Knowledge of Today's Humanitarian Security Professional

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Abstract:

Humanitarian security practitioners should be distinguished from their counterparts in other sectors. As they should manifest certain characteristics that reflect the ideology of 'humanitarianism' and address INGOs needs while maintaining the professional image of a security expert. However, INGOs literature suffers from a lack of focused research concerning Security Managers (SM). Hence, it was considered pivotal to attempt exploring the characteristics of SMs (or adviser, coordinator, officer), within INGOs delivering aid to beneficiaries in demanding environments plagued by a challenging and dynamic security landscape. This research was based on a qualitative approach starting with a review of literature then interviews guided by the Grounded Theory strategy, with four country directors, four security managers and one security focal point in the HQ, representing four major INGOs whom maintain operations in arguably high-risk location (e.g. conflict zones). The findings from this research provides evidence that majority of SMs within INGOs come from uniformed backgrounds. Hence, often judged from that stand and considered rigid, close-minded and lacking the intellect; "just hard security folks." On the other hand, security departments within INGOs are considerably novice, thus, not yet well-integrated as a function. Collectively, leading SMs to be considered as the obstacles for conducting activities (programmatic and recreational). Surprisingly, this issue is often attributed to the SMs themselves. Therefore, the main conclusion to be drawn from this work is that it is up to security managers themselves to change this pretext, through being well-versed and skilled around many disciplines also possessing the right mindset and manifest certain attributes that will enable them to do their work in INGOs. Collectively, the SMs that are valued the most by many INGOs are 'the jack of all trades and a master of one (not none).' Therefore, a detailed profile of a contemporary INGOs' SM is concluded that includes a summary of tasks and a framework reflecting INGOs SMs, in terms of mindset, attributes, skills and knowledge.

Keywords: INGOs, security managers, ex-uniformed, Grounded Theory, profiling security managers.

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Table of Contents

List of Tables

List of Figures

List of Abbreviations

CBHA: Consortium of British Humanitarian Agencies. Now Star Network

CD: Country Director

DG ECHO: The Directorate-General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations

ELRHA: Enhancing Learning and Research for Humanitarian Assistance

GPR8: Good Practice Review Number 8

GT: Grounded Theory

HPN: Humanitarian Practice Network

INGO: International Non-Governmental Organisation

OCHA: Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

ODI: Overseas Development Institute

SM: Security Manager

SFP: Security Focal Point

UN: United Nations

Chapter 1: Introduction

1.1 Background

The world is rapidly evolving and witnessing emerging threats and crises due to armed conflicts, terrorism, natural disasters, environmental changes, economic deficiencies, political instabilities and technological advancements. Consequently, humanitarian action is increasingly required to decrease the negative impacts on affected populations (Lawry, 2009; Szazi, 2012; UN, 1999). The perceptions that humanitarian aid organisations not being a target have profoundly changed since the 1990s, after some incidents deliberately targeting humanitarian staff and assets (Van Brabant, 2001, p. 16). Notably, according to the Aid Worker Security Database (2017), between the years 2000 to 2016, the number of incidents affecting the humanitarian agencies' staff (nationals and internationals) was 3939 in total, of which 1089 were kidnapped, 1413 wounded and 1437 killed. As a result, those organisations have modified the way they operate in the environments that are considered to enclose higher risks (DG ECHO, 2006). Therefore, security is considerably gaining a more central role within international non-governmental organisations [INGO] (Fast, Freeman, O'Neil & Rowley, 2013; Humanitarian Practice Network [HPN], 2010; Van Brabant, 2010).

Consequently, it can be argued that INGOs have made a noticeable advance in the way that they perceive and react to safety and security issues (Beerli & Weissman, 2016). Hence, currently the majority of INGOs (if not all) have

created, developed and adopted security policies and procedures; furthermore, some are employing experts to address their safety and security concerns (Nakano, Arnold & Lawry, 2009; Van Brabant, 2010). Since security and its practitioners are considered relatively recent in INGOs, thus, often misperceived or not accepted as aid workers (Renouf, 2011; Van Brabant, 2010); what can be worse, security practitioners sharing the same perception and having the 'us versus them' mentality. On that note, Button (2008, p. 89) stated that there was a common perception about security professionals that are (or should be) ex-armed forces. Likewise, aid organisations may prioritise recruiting professionals with police or military backgrounds, to undertake security positions (Bollettino, 2008; Nakano et al., 2009). However, it should be noted that INGOs' form an independent sector which should be set apart from the public and private (for-profit) sectors (Anheier, 2014; Worth, 2009). As a result, humanitarian security practitioners should be distinguished from their counterparts in other sectors. As they should manifest certain characteristics that reflect the ideology of 'humanitarianism' and address INGOs' needs while maintaining the professional image of a security expert.

1.2 Research Focus

It can be argued that there has been a considerable amount of literature covering security management, in contrast to security managers (SM) themselves (Button, 2008). Similarly, human factor within security remains under-researched, whereas "people are the foundation of any organization, network, or system, and the success or failure of a Security Risk Management program is largely

dependent on people who design, implement, manage, use and work with the processes and technologies" (Talbot & Jakeman, 2009, p. 71). Hence, personality, skills and knowledge maintain a considerable impact on performance in any role (Comfort & Franklin, 2011; Quinn, 2015). Besides, different people behave differently to similar situations (McKenzie, Petty & Catanzaro, 2003, p. 83). Yet, INGOs literature suffers from the lack of focused research concerning SMs. Hence, it is considered pivotal to attempt exploring the characteristics of INGOs' security professionals (be it a manager, adviser, coordinator or officer), in terms of mindset, attributes, skills and knowledge. Specifically, within INGOs delivering aid to beneficiaries in demanding environments plagued by a challenging and dynamic security landscape. The findings may help in identifying some of the characteristics that can be adopted or developed by people who are currently or seeking to become security practitioners in INGOs. Which in total may add to the literature and shed light on what aspects should be improved. Consequently, training and certification courses might be developed accordingly, to educate future security professionals.

1.3 Aim and Objectives

The purpose of this study is to *attempt exploring what would constitute a competent, effective and efficient SM, specifically within INGOs operating in demanding environments plagued by a challenging and dynamic security landscape*. This aim will be fulfilled through attaining the following objectives:

1. Conceptualise INGOs' role in the delivery of aid to outline the (in)security status quo that led to systematising security risk management.
2. Observe the dilemmas surrounding security and SMs.
3. Highlight the core competencies of aid workers as well as the SMs.
4. Determine the role of security and SMs within INGOs at the field level.
5. Explore the main characteristics of a contemporary INGOs' security professional.

1.4 Research parameters

It is seen required to set some parameters for this research considering the magnitude of the proposed topic. Although, the research will raise some of key issues and challenges faced by INGOs' SMs, however, it will not propose nor prioritise any approaches to security management. Worth noting, this research acknowledges that people also organisations are different; thus, there is no such thing as 'one size fits all.' In addition, this research will not synthesise the structure of security practitioners' personality or analyse their behaviour by regarding 'why they behave in the way they do.' Rather, it will remain persistent to attempt fulfilling the proposed aim and objectives. On the other hand, it cannot be guaranteed that this research will not be somehow influenced by the preconceived knowledge as well as perceptions gained during personal experience and education, however, it will be ensured to remain impartial and objective throughout the research.

1.5 Dissertation Structure

Chapter One introduces the study through providing a brief background of the proposed topic, stating why the research is worth doing and highlighting the overall aim and objectives while setting parameters to the research. Chapter two (next chapter) is the literature review, which looks at the relevant literature to provide an overall background on humanitarian action and INGOs in general, to contextually highlight the characteristics of aid workers. Then, general literature concerning the SMs in other sectors will be highlighted, considering the lack of research regarding INGO's SMs, which this research attempts to tackle. Chapter Three, details why a qualitative approach was selected and Grounded Theory was deemed to be the most suitable strategy to guide data collection and analysis. Chapter Four discusses the findings concerning the results of interviews with the country directors (CDs) and SMs from four different major INGOs operating around the globe. Chapter Five expands on the theoretical category that emerged from the data analysis and attempts to suggest a profile for today's humanitarian SM including a job description and a framework that encapsulates mindset, attributes, skills and knowledge. Finally, Chapter six presents the conclusion and recommendations.

Chapter 2: Literature Review

2.1 Introduction

This chapter expands on what has been already stated in the previous chapter to fulfil the objectives one, two and three; that will add into the overall aim. Therefore, it starts with providing a background on humanitarian action and conceptualises INGOs in the process of the delivery of aid, to put this research in context. Then it goes to highlight the current (in)security status of INGOs' and aid workers in general, which arguably influenced the establishment of dedicated security departments. From there, it goes to highlight the publications that address the systematisation of security risk management in the humanitarian aid sector. Thereafter, it will discuss some of the fallacies that are attached to security and its managers in general. Then, it will highlight the competencies of aid workers, which should also be possessed by INGOs' SM, after all, they are aid workers too. Finally, it will illustrate the competencies of private sector's SMs because of the scarcity of research specific concerning INGOs' SMs, of which this research attempts to tackle.

2.2 Conceptualising INGOs Within Humanitarian Action

Historians, economists, political scientists and scholars in various disciplines have illustrated many theories that attempt to analyse the emergence of the humanitarian action (Anheier, 2014; Worth, 2009). However, the theories of government failure and market failure purport to justify the interventions (Anheier,

2014; Barr & Fafchamps, 2006; Weisbrod, 1988; Worth, 2009); besides, they are often referred to, to substantiate the international humanitarian intervention (General Assembly Resolution A/RES/46/182, 1991, para. 5 & 10). Nonetheless, it should be noted that most of the theories commonly define humanitarian action in relation to the concepts of 'human rights' and 'morality' (Ayoob, 2002; Baer, 2011; Bellamy, 2003; Gomes, 2010; Spalding, 2013). That is maybe why, seventeen major donor states have endorsed that:

> the objectives of humanitarian action are to save lives, alleviate suffering and maintain human dignity during and in the aftermath of man-made crises and natural disasters, as well as to prevent and strengthen preparedness for the occurrence of such situations.
>
> (Good Humanitarian Donorship, 2003)

On the other hand, contradicting opinions may arise, based on realism and neo-realism theories, relating to the claims that not all interventions are driven by humanitarian aims and principles, rather oriented by states' interests (Yoshida, 2013). Perhaps because many different actors are involved directly and indirectly in the process of delivery of aid (Stoddard, Harmer, Haver, Taylor & Harvey, 2015, p. 19). It can be argued that amongst those actors, INGOs maintain the highest impact regarding humanitarian relief due to the immediate field response, overall budget and the number of staff (Harvey, Stoddard, Harmer, & Taylor, 2010, p. 18).

It should be noted that there are different types of INGOs providing various types of services, therefore, an internationally agreed and applicable definition may not yet exist (Anheier, 2014; Lawry, 2009; Worth, 2009). Still, concerning

humanitarian action, INGOs can be generally characterised as: civilian, non-profit, in country registered legal entities, reliant on donations, however, independent from governments and political groups, established voluntarily by citizens, whose transnational aims and peaceful operations have international utility also maintain conformity with the spirit, purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations (Lawry, 2009; Szazi, 2012). Furthermore, INGOs can (ideally should) be distinguished from other humanitarian actors, the public and for-profit (private) sectors (Anheier, 2014; Worth, 2009). Through their core idealistic principles 'humanity', 'neutrality', 'impartiality' and 'independence' which are strongly manifested in their Code of Conduct (Mackintosh, 2000; UNOCHA, 2012). However, the principles and the characterisations might be considered somehow fading, as a result of: donors' political pressure, denied or limited access to beneficiaries, blurred distinction between military assistance versus humanitarian assistance provided by INGOs, violence targeting INGOs and corrupt officials and warlords (Global Policy Forum, n.d.). Worth highlighting that this argument may also feed into the claims based on realism and neo-realism theories. Therefore, the dilemma of the motivations behind humanitarian work and donations remain in question. Furthermore, those factors can be considered as supplementary influences behind the increased insecurity facing humanitarian organisations (Beerli & Weissman, 2016; Duffield, 2010, p. 453).

Irrespectively, INGOs have witnessed a significant proliferation (Salamon, 2010) as humanitarian relief is increasingly required to decrease the negative impacts of human-made crises and natural disasters on affected populations (Lawry, 2009; Szazi, 2012; UN, 1999; UNOCHA, 2011). Humanitarian assistance at the

field level delivered by INGOs may include (but not limited): food security; non-food items; health; shelter; water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH); protection; child protection; livelihoods; mine action; camp coordination and management; education (Financial Tracking Service, 2017). Considering that INGOs deal with populations who are the most vulnerable, their services should reflect and address professional, moral and ethical dimensions (Camburn, 2011). Therefore, to deliver their services, different INGOs adopt different approaches to management. Whereas, Anheier (2014) has identified four main approaches to INGOs' management: holistic conception, normative dimension, strategic-development dimension and operative dimension. However, he also noted that none of these approaches fully apply to an individual organisation, as each INGO tend to adopt centralised or decentralised approaches depending on the operational context. As a result, INGOs are increasingly focusing on strategic and change management similar to the for-profit sector, although the aims might not be to increase the profits rather formulate a new mission and objectives (Anheier, 2014). Subsequently, INGOs employee professionals from various disciplines, cultures and educational backgrounds, to address their contextual, operational and programmatic needs (Lawry, 2009; UN, 1999; UNOCHA, 2011).

2.3 INGOs' (In)Security Status Quo

The perception that humanitarian aid organisations (INGOs included) not being a target has profoundly changed since the 1990s, after some serious incidents deliberately targeting humanitarian aid workers and assets (Van Brabant, 2001). Furthermore, "by nature, humanitarian action is undertaken in insecure, complex,

and rapidly changing environments" (UNOCHA, 2011, p. 11). Correspondingly, the excess of the humanitarian assistance operations leading to the substantial increase in the number of aid personnel (Lawry, 2009; Szazi, 2012; UN, 1999; UNOCHA, 2011) justifies the insecurity facing aid organisations from a quantitative standpoint (Neuman & Weissman, 2016). Consequently, security is considerably gaining a more central role within INGOs, as an ethical and moral commitment but more critically as a legal obligation *de facto* of 'the Duty of Care' (Fast et al., 2013; HPN, 2010; Van Brabant, 2010). Hence, currently, the majority of INGOs (if not all) have created, developed and or adopted security policies and procedures (Nakano et al., 2009; Van Brabant, 2010). Acknowledging the increased insecurity facing humanitarians, influenced a group of INGOs, International Organisations and the UN to initiate and endorse the Saving Lives Together framework in 2006, then updating it in 2015, in a view to further enhance security collaboration through a systematic implementation of security arrangements (Inter-Agency Standing Committee, 2015).

One of the most significant deviations in humanitarian security thinking is the 'enabling approach,' as to think 'how to stay' rather than 'when to leave' (UNOCHA, 2011, p. 8); ultimately, to maintain access and the delivery of aid where it is most needed. Correspondingly, INGOs have modified the way they operate in the environments that are considered to enclose higher levels of risk (DG ECHO, 2006). Subsequently, the conceptual approaches and systems that guide humanitarian security management practices have witnessed dignified modifications (HPN, 2010; Schneiker, 2013; UNOCHA, 2011, p. 7; Van Brabant, 2010;). Although, safety and security remain an 'add-on' to the logistician's terms

of references for many INGOs (Neuman & Weissman, 2016; Van Brabant, 2010). It should be highlighted that the number of Security Advisers, Security Officers, Risk Managers and similar roles are increasing in the INGOs (Van Brabant, 2010, p. 5), which can be considered as an indicator of the professionalisation of security risk management in humanitarian aid sector (Beerli & Weissman, 2016; Renouf, 2011).

2.4 Systemising Humanitarian Security Risk Management

The first attempts to conceptualise humanitarian security were conducted through developing security training modules as well as publishing personal safety and security guidelines during the 1990s by a handful number of organisations (Beerli & Weissman, 2016). These initiatives have resulted in giving birth to the first embodiment of systemising security from a management standpoint—the Good Practice Review Number Eight (GPR8), edited by Koenraad Van Brabant in 2000 published by the HPN at the Overseas Development Institute (ODI) (Beerli & Weissman, 2016). Van Brabant (2000) claimed (on the back cover): “the GPR[8] should [can] serve as a practical reference tool. [as] It offers a systematic step-by-step approach to security management starting from context analysis and threat and risk assessment, to security strategy choice and security planning.” After that, a revised version of GPR8 was published in 2010 with input from more than 30 experts representing INGOs, UN agencies, institutional donors and private companies (Beerli & Weissman, 2016). The GPR8 can be considered “seminal document in humanitarian operational security management” (HPN, 2010, p. 1), thus, often

referred to as the “bible” of humanitarian security (Beerli & Weissman, 2016, p.72).

Consequently, both versions of GPR8 have influenced the mushrooming of security risk management manuals and guidelines published by aid organisations, donors and professional networks of security experts (Beerli & Weissman, 2016, p.72). On that note, there are some publicly available products that can be considered seminal publications, attempting to tackle this topic from a wider perspective. For example, Van Brabant (2001) through ODI; European Commission Humanitarian Aid Department (2004) [currently DG ECHO]; Roberts (2005), through International Committee of Red Crescent; DG ECHO (2006); Berghof Foundation for Peace Support (2008); People in Aid (2008); Bickley (2010), commissioned by Save the Children UK; InterAction (2010); Egeland, Harmer and Stoddard (2011), commissioned by UN OCHA; Stoddard, Harmer and Haver (2011), serves as an annex to the previous publication also commissioned by UN OCHA; International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (2009) and (2011); Irish Aid (2013); Finucane (2013) published by European Interagency Security Forum (EISF); Davis et al. (2017), published by EISF; Bickley (2017), published by EISF. Worth highlighting that individual organisations may or do possess their internal security risk management frameworks, although, it can be argued that they are influenced by those publications one way or another. Not to ignore, the ISO 31000:2009: Risk Management–Principles and guidelines (2009) by the International Organisation for Standardisation. Collectively, what all these products may have in common is that they are structured as general guidelines to address the design, application

and implementation of security policies and procedures of security risk management in the humanitarian realm.

2.5 Stereotyping (or Stigmatising) Security and Its Managers

Security is a broad, diverse and multidimensional concept, which is difficult to define unless contextualised (Smith & Brooks, 2013). Thus, a consistent definition does not yet exist, and debatably may never do (Manunta & Manunta, 2006). Zedner (2003, pp. 154-155) argues that "security is a slippery concept. Its meanings are multiple and without clarity about which meaning is intended (or understood)… Security is both a state of being and a means to that end." As a result, security might be conceived differently by different people within various industries and contexts, even security practitioners themselves may have different opinions of what does security mean to them (Gill, Taylor, Bourne & Keats, 2008). In an attempt to clarify this ambiguity, a seminal work was carried out by Baldwin (1997, pp. 13-17), that has identified seven dimensions that may influence national security policies and named them 'security problematique,' comprising: "Security for whom? Security for which values? How much security? From what threats? By what means? At what cost? In what time period?" Whereas, these dimensions are indeed interrelated, and describe the different aspects that may influence security (ibid.), *yet, the issue remains that there still no comprehensive formula that can calculate how the variation of each dimension may impact the others and the overall security status*. That is maybe why these dimensions were not originally visualised into a heptagon shape, as *none of these dimensions is ever static. Hence, a metamorphose of security's*

dimensions is constantly occurring. Nevertheless, it should be noted that security as a concept but also as a function continuously embodies these seven dimensions and other dimensions if existed or emerge.

Irrespectively, the term security is generally understood by the public to be "synonymous with the accumulation of power" (Schäfer, 2013, p. 6). Hence, security is a commodity and the means which ought to defend and protect from threats, challenges, vulnerabilities and risks (ibid.). That is maybe why, security and its practitioners might often be represented and perceived in comparison to uniformed backgrounds (e.g. military, police) in terms of functions and personal characteristics (Nalla & Newman, 2012), who's ultimate duty is to protect, defend and restore order. As a result, SMs probably get misconceived as the guardians—who are often neglected, but it is assumed that they are always present if their service were ever required. The fact that private security industry is increasingly replacing some of the regular police and military functions (Button & George, 2006), can be considered another factor behind such thinking which is influencing public's opinion into that direction. Furthermore, Button (2008, p. 89) argues that there was a common understanding of which security professionals should be coming from uniformed forces or at least possess some sort of armed background. Whereas, dated statistics may have supported this claim as the majority of SMs who came into security management, were mostly from uniformed backgrounds, it was also reported that the numbers were declining gradually (Button, 2008, pp. 89-90). Nevertheless, Gill (2014) and McGee (2006) argue that former police or military personnel might have some advantages comprising of pre-existing capability and security knowledge,

contacts and networks, experience and judgment in contingency planning, demonstrable pedigree and investigation skills.

However, being ex-armed personnel despite the period or positions held does not necessarily make someone a security expert (Gill, 2014). *As it can be argued that practitioners are trained to act but not necessarily to think.* Hence, some SMs who come from those backgrounds might be perceived incompetent to communicate in business language (Gill et al., 2008, p. 19). Whereas, “a security manager is first a business manager, and second a security manager,” as he or she performs many functions beyond the presumed orthodox security notions (Smith & Brooks, 2013, p. 49) of 'guns, gates and guards' (Control Risks, 2014). Additionally, the traditional view of security has shifted towards the evolving and dynamic concept of ‘providing resilience’ rather than just ‘protection of assets’ (Talbot & Jakeman, 2009, pp. 16-17).

On that note, Vail (2008) argues that people selected for managerial roles often bring the technical knowledge, what they often do not possess is the training or experience as a manager. Which can be related to the argument that security practitioners coming from uniformed backgrounds have not chosen security management as their primary profession, therefore, often have the ‘second career mentality,' of which they primarily work to supplement their pensions (Button, 2008). Consequently, having little or no interest in building their capacity and improving their skill-sets. Despite the considerable number of universities globally, which are offering academic courses on security risk management

(Wakefield, 2014) as well as other relevant and useful educational degrees. Therefore, the insufficient security risk management degree holders can be considered as one of the reasons why security management falls behind other managerial specialisations (Button, 2008). As most if not all the other fields are dominated by professionals, who have started their careers in their industries by investing time and effort through education and training to reach their current positions (ibid.). Although, the lack of scholarly developed theories and literature can be considered as the major factor behind the delay of professionalising security management in general (Smith & Brooks, 2013; Wakefield, 2014).

These arguments may very well apply to the humanitarian context, considering that “Aid organisations are too narrowly focused on recruiting professionals with police or military backgrounds who favour ‘system-based’ strategies to address the security needs” (Bollettino, 2008, p.276). That is perhaps why a regular INGO staff would probably describe an SM as “someone who resembles an intense military commander from movies …—gruff, hard to like, intense, but committed and undoubtedly will save the day” (Thacker, 2016). Thus, security’s role similar to the military, police or private security’s functions. Resulting in SMs often being stigmatised to be ex-armed personnel even if they never were, hence, assuming they are the protectors and the guardians. Such thinking is firstly disparaging and prejudice which would debatably result in non-security INGOs’ staff at any level to permit themselves to argue and question the SMs on the stands that constitute the very core principles of safety and security. Merely because they may think that security is not a ‘rocket science’ and everyone has a say on it; as it requires muscles not brains *per se*. Whereas, any INGO staff would probably think more

than twice before having similar arguments on topics related to finance, logistics, administration, human resources or programmes with the respective managers that are presumed experts in their fields. Secondly, such mentality might enfold serious security risks, with staff neglecting their and organisation's safety and security just because someone holds that title. Whereas the SMs are not bodyguards, plus within the majority of INGOs, they hold an advisory role—in-house consultant—which has no or limited decision-making authorities in a country setup. The ultimate security decision-making responsibilities remain with the country directors (HPN, 2010). Lastly, and probably the worst, not considering SMs as social workers or policy experts (Bollettino, 2008; Nakano et al., 2009); which has debatably influenced in shielding SMs, hence, not being considered as aid workers, rather the 'necessary evil'. However, INGOs and their staff shall not be exclusively blamed for such pretext; as some security practitioners might be to an extent nourishing such fallacy, through:

- Having a limited understanding and appreciation of the humanitarian principles and ethos (Renouf, 2011).
- Possessing the 'us versus them' mentality (applies to SMs and non-security aid workers alike). What is meant by this, is the type of thinking where 'we (you) know better' thus 'we (you) protect your (our) interests' (Eimicke, 1974; Sykes, 1999).
- Operating similarly to the military and police which are based on a hierarchical or autocratic system (Gill, 2014).
- Possessing a 'militaristic behaviour' or being prone to violence (Horowitz & Stam, 2014).
- Not adapting to or adopting aid workers' mindset (Renouf, 2011).

- Over-reliance on protection and deterrence strategies (Button, 2008), whereas, acceptance and transfer are considered the core security strateies for most INGOs (Bollettino, 2008; HPN, 2010; Fast et al., 2013; Van Brabant, 2010).
- Being reactive rather than proactive (Button, 2008)

Nonetheless, it was reported that the sector is flourished with uniformed backgrounds undertaking many activities, not just security; although, it was claimed that the quotas have been somewhat changing for security (Bollettino, 2008; Nakano et al., 2009; Renouf, 2011). However, there might be no available empirical data to conclude that whether the SMs with uniformed backgrounds or without, are more competent, effective and efficient in the INGOs. Therefore, the dilemma of which type of SMs are more favoured, is yet unknown, as the INGO itself, as well as the context, may probably dictate the preference (HPN, 2010).

2.6 INGOs' Staff (Aid Workers)

INGOs became a quite competitive marketplace (Worth, 2009). Therefore, to become an international aid worker, one should initially understand, appreciate, respect and accept the humanitarian history, values, principles and the structure of the sector, a particular skill or profession alone is not enough, rather a combination of skills, competencies and educational degree are required (Toal, 2013; Renz, 2010; Worth, 2009). One of the first major attempts to identify a set of competencies of contemporary humanitarian aid workers was undertaken by the Consortium of British Humanitarian Agencies (CBHA) [now Star Network], that have produced the Core Humanitarian Competencies Framework in 2010,

then published a revised version in 2012 (Russ, 2012). The CBHA's revised framework has identified six competency domains concerning all staff as indicated in Table 1 (Russ, 2012). Since their release, the CBHA's frameworks have been adopted and endorsed within various publications by different organisations and individuals, in an attempt to professionalise the aid sector through capacity building and training. The most popular works might be of Rutter (2011) through CBHA; Russ (2012) through ELRHA (Enhancing Learning and Research for Humanitarian Assistance); and Context (2012). Despite the reported scarcities, the frameworks claim and aim to produce distilled behaviours that are suitable for all humanitarian positions (Rutter, 2011, p. 5). Similarly, Brière, Proulx, Flores and Laporte (2015) attempted to identify some of the characteristics of INGOs' expatriate project (programme) managers. Consequently, they have identified eleven core competencies and provided details for each competency as presented in Table 2.

Considering the inclusivity of both frameworks, a reasonable overlap does exist between the two. Yet, what cannot be left unnoticed, is that the former cynically lacks mentioning training and capacity building, that can be somehow linked to organisations' upholding their claims in that sense. While the latter might be reflecting a pervasive syndrome within aid workers, which is lacking the operating safely and securely. Therefore, both studies shall be considered collectively to obtain a holistic perspective of what are the characteristics that aid workers should possess (ideally). Fundamentally, in theory, and practice these concepts may and should as well apply to the SMs as they are aid workers indeed. Therefore, INGOs' SMs should reflect a considerable proportion of the mentioned

competencies. Moreover, through translating Smith and Brooks' (2013, p.49) previously mentioned argument to the context of INGOs, concludes that INGOs' SMs are aid worker first, only then security practitioners.

Figure 1: CBHA Core Humanitarian Competencies Framework



Core Humanitarian Competencies Framework

Keeping crisis-affected people at the centre of what we do

cbha

Competency Domains	Understanding humanitarian contexts and applying humanitarian principles	Achieving results	Developing and maintaining collaborative relationships	Operating safely and securely at all times	Managing yourself in a pressured and changing environment	Demonstrating leadership in humanitarian response
Outcomes	Understand operating contexts, key stakeholders and practices affecting current and future humanitarian interventions	Be accountable for your work and use resources effectively to achieve lasting results	Develop and maintain collaborative and coordinated relationships with stakeholders and staff	Operate safely and securely in a pressured environment	Adapt to pressure and change to operate effectively within humanitarian contexts	Demonstrate humanitarian values and principles, and motivate others to achieve results in complex situations, independent of one's role, function or seniority
Competencies and Core Behaviours for all staff in humanitarian response, informed by skills and knowledge	**● Understanding the humanitarian context** > Demonstrate understanding of the phases of humanitarian response including preparedness and contingency, Disaster Risk Reduction, response and recovery. > Apply understanding of the political and cultural context and underlying causes of the humanitarian crisis. > Demonstrate understanding of the gender and diversity dimensions of humanitarian situations. > Take into account the needs, skills, capacities and experience of crisis-affected people and apply these in the response. **● Applying humanitarian standards and principles** > Ensure that programme goals, activities and staff behaviour uphold key national and international humanitarian frameworks, standards, principles and codes which your organisation has committed to. > Use your power responsibly,	**● Ensuring programme quality and impact** > Demonstrate understanding of agency project cycle management. > Actively participate in the design and implementation of effective projects and programmes. > Maintain focus on delivery of timely and appropriate results using available resources. **● Working accountably** > Be answerable to crisis-affected people for your actions and decisions. > Collect, analyse and disseminate relevant and useful information and feedback with crisis-affected people and other stakeholders. **● Making decisions** > Demonstrate flexibility to adapt in situations of rapid change, always informed by a focus on crisis-affected people. > Demonstrate understanding of when a decision can be taken and	**● Listening and creating dialogue** > Actively listen to new and different perspectives and experiences of crisis-affected people, stakeholders and team members. > Establish and maintain clear dialogue with crisis-affected people or other stakeholders. **● Working with others** > Contribute positively in the team to achieve programme objectives. > Share useful information and knowledge with colleagues, partners and crisis-affected people as and when appropriate. > Actively participate in networks to access and contribute to good practice. > Challenge decisions and behaviour which breach the International Red Cross and Red Crescent and NGOs / individual agency Codes of Conduct.	**● Minimising risk to communities, partners and stakeholders** > Pay attention to the safety of crisis-affected people and other key stakeholders Identify and communicate risk and threats and mitigate these for you and your agency. > Take measures to 'do no harm' and to minimise risks for your partners and the crisis-affected people you work with. **● Managing personal safety and security** > Build and sustain acceptance for your work in line with humanitarian principles and standards. > Reduce vulnerability by complying with safety and security protocols set by your organisation and adapt them to the local context. > Champion the importance of safety and keep the safety of colleagues and team members in mind at all times.	**● Adapting and coping** > Remain focused on your objectives and goals in a rapidly changing environment. > Adapt calmly to changing situations and constraints. > Recognise personal stress and take steps to reduce it. > Remain constructive and positive under stress to be able to tolerate difficult and challenging environments. **● Maintaining professionalism** > Take responsibility for your own work and its impact on others. > Plan, prioritise and perform tasks well under pressure. > Maintain ethical and professional behaviour in accordance with relevant codes of conduct. > Demonstrate personal integrity by using one's position responsibly and fairly. > Be aware of internal and external influences that affect your performance.	**● Self-awareness** > Show awareness of your own strengths and limitations and their impact on others. > Demonstrate understanding of your skills and how they complement those of others to build team effectiveness. > Seek and reflect on feedback to improve your performance. **● Motivating and influencing others** > Communicate humanitarian values and encourage others to share them. > Inspire confidence in others. > Speak out clearly for organisational beliefs and values. > Demonstrate active listening to encourage team collaboration. > Influence others positively to achieve programme goals. **● Critical judgement** > Analyse and exercise judgment in challenging

Source: CBHA, (2012). See appendix A for the complete framework.

Table 1: Competencies of INGO Programme Managers

Competencies	**Details**
Adaptability	Logistic Aspects Cultural Differences Tools Used
Span of abilities	General Areas of Expertise Project Management International Development Intercultural
Management Skills	Project Financial Work Organisation Information People
Communication	Writing Listening Oral Expression Dispute Resolution
Personal Qualities	Working Capacity Coping with Stress Humility Patience Thoroughness Intuition Engagement
Interpersonal Skills	Team Work Negotiate Establishing a Sense of Trust
Leadership	Engage Strategic Vision Understanding One's Environment
Ethics	Management Practices Individual Requests Personal Behaviours
Networking and Local Knowledge	Local Experts Stakeholders Networks
Capacity Building	Local Organisations Staff Training
Change Management	Strategies

Source: Brière et al., (2015)

2.7 Characteristics of Security Managers

Button (2008) argues that there has been a considerable literature covering security management, in contrast to SMs themselves which have received very little attention. Thus, 'human factor' within security remains under-researched, although: "the success or failure of a Security Risk Management program is largely dependent on people who design, implement, manage, use and work with the processes and technologies" (Talbot & Jakeman, 2009, p.71). Button's argument may very well apply to the humanitarian context, as the majority of the (aforementioned) humanitarian security management publications can be counted as general guidelines. However, they come short in identifying a perspicuous framework highlighting the characteristics of humanitarian SMs in terms mindset, attributes, skills and knowledge nor exemplifying what would constitute a competent, effective and efficient SM. Within the private security literature, on the other hand, Tyska and Fennelly (2001) have suggested a list of fifty capsules that would shape a security professional, comprising:

1. Understanding people
2. Coaching.
3. Communications
4. Leadership when there is no one else around
5. Developing the star
6. Internal Memos/communication
7. Reality shock
8. Power and influence
9. Dealing with high Performance employees
10. Dealing with hard lessons as a first time Supervisor/manager
11. Becoming a supervisor/manager
12. Assisting and supporting new supervisor/manager
13. Retaining mid career management
14. Reflection of retention of managers
15. Micro managers
16. Mangers managing
17. Profile of supervisors/managers
18. Analyzing your influence style
19. The operational unit
20. Corporation philosophy
21. Working women
22. Exercising authority
23. Setting the stage as a manager

24. Coping with stress
25. The corporate manager
26. Making the system work
27. Methodology to implement change
28. Myths of a “perfect” manager of mentors
29. Having a on-on-one work relationship
30. Creative managers
31. Action Plans
32. Leadership and organizational behaviors
33. The right or wrong influence
34. Managing the “new” office technology
35. Organizational priorities
36. Budgets/financial goals
37. Research and development
38. Career opportunities
39. Risk
40. Fundamental of motivation
41. Bad attitudes
42. Decision making and problem solving
43. Delegating
44. Hiring and firing
45. Time management
46. Motivation
47. Discipline
48. Goal setting
49. The out-of-touch manager
50. Timing

Similarly, Kovacich and Halibozak (2003, pp. 68-69) have proposed eleven skills that would constitute a professional SM in the corporations’ world:

- Technology and computer savvy.
- Good communication skills—written and verbal
- Good understanding of how business works
- Understanding of global business environment
- College or university general education supplemented by one in security (ideally), criminal justice, sociology, communications, or human relations.
- Strong analytical skills
- Ability to work with and lead project teams
- An interest in experiencing different roles and responsibilities
- Some international experience, preferably business
- Experience with, or an understanding of, other cultures and languages

Furthermore, *ibid* (p. 91) noted some areas of expertise that the corporate SMs should focus on and continue to learn about, including:

- Leadership
- Management
- Customer expectations

- Dealing with executive management
- Dealing with peers
- Dealing with office politics
- Representing IWC [a fictitious corporation] in the community
- Establishing a security department
- Identifying security duties and responsibilities
- Dealing with the news and media

(ibid. p. 91)

Although the suggested skills and the areas of expertise proposed by Tyska and Fennelly (2001) and Kovacich and Halibozak (2003) are somewhat dated, they might still be valid as well applicable, considering that they somewhat overlap with more recent studies. However, they come short in proposing a comprehensive framework that can serve as a basis for identifying the core qualities, skills and attitudes of SMs. More critically, both studies more or less were based on personal experiences and knowledge; hence, an academically acknowledged methodology may not be adequately found. On the other hand, Borodzicz and Gibson (2006, p. 194) have reviewed the literature to examine the state of the security industry, thence, claimed that security is "driven by a combination of risk, criminology, terrorism, and management together with a host of external influencing disciplines." As a result, they emphasised on educating security professionals, by providing a skeleton framework for that purpose as indicated in Table 2. However, they admit that the framework may still need developing and adjustment, besides they do not clearly specify what constitutes a competent, effective and efficient SM.

Table 2: Suggested framework for a corporate security education

Internal drivers external influences	*Risk*	*Criminology*	*Terrorism*	*Management*
Sociology	Risk perception Risk awareness	Causation	Motivation	Organisation
Philosophy	Definitions			Purpose
Anthropology	Risk appetite			Communication skills Emotional literacy
Law & ethics	Legislation regulation			
International relations	Geo-political risk		Security sector reform	Globalisation
Technology	Progress	Counter-measures	BlastWMD	Knowledge management
Business management	ResilienceBCM	Fraud		Insurance Cost/risk/ benefit analysis
Maths/Stats/or/ modelling	Probability theoryRisk analysis			Risk management tools

Source: Borodzicz and Gibson (2006, p. 193)

Whereas, a survey of Chief Security Officers within Fortune 500 firms, utilising Lominger Leadership Architecture competency based approach has identified twenty-one essential competencies for security executives under three broad areas of 'strategic skills,' 'organisational positioning,' and 'personal/interpersonal skills,' comprising:

- Ethics and values
- Business acumen
- Integrity and trust
- Comfort around higher management
- Strategic agility
- Written communications
- Customer focus
- Decision quality
- Dealing with ambiguity
- Organizational agility
- Building effective teams
- Managing vision and purpose
- Presentation skills
- Managerial courage
- Motivating others
- Problem solving
- Composure
- Interpersonal savvy
- Listening
- Political savvy
- Developing direct reports and others

(Larson, 2015)

Similarly, a report by Control Risks (2014) a leading global risk consultancy has highlighted the knowledge, skills and attitudes for risk leaders, and proposed a matrix as indicated in Figure 2.

Figure 2: Knowledge, Skills and Attitudes of Risk Leaders

	SECURITY AND RISK MANAGEMENT	BUSINESS	LEADERSHIP
KNOWLEDGE ("understands...")	… global security issues … security industry-related trends, standards and best-practices … security-related science, technology, engineering and math (STEM) … (enterprise) risk management	… business objectives and priorities … key business, financial and legal metrics … key business processes	… the impact of national and organizational cultures on employee (risk) behavior … how to engage diverse groups of people effectively … how to develop a vision
SKILLS ("can successfully...")	… make security-related decisions … identify and implement security goals that are related to business goals … develop and enforce security and crisis procedures	… speak the business, financial and legal language of business executives … analyze and understand stakeholder interests … align risk approach to business priorities	… prioritize … coach people … express thoughts verbally in a succinct, logical manner … communicate with others to persuade them to act on risk-related issues … empower others to help them achieve the agreed objectives
ATTITUDE ("enjoys...")	… data-driven processes … applying security approaches to reduce risk	… data-driven processes … learning and developing new ideas … engaging with colleagues in other parts of the organization	… working with other people to achieve objectives … staying calm and in control when under pressure … learning and developing new ideas

Source: Control Risks (2014, p. 18)

The Apollo Education Group, the University of Phoenix in partnership with the ASIS Foundation started to develop the Enterprise Security Competency Model (see Figure 3) in 2013 (CareerOneStop, n.d.), which was later endorsed by the United States Department of Labour in 2015 (ASIS Foundation, n.d.). The framework was based on Employment and Training Administration (ETA) Competency Model Clearinghouse (Ennis, 2008), thus, claims to "promote and maintain a common understanding of skill sets and competencies essential to educate and train a globally competitive security workforce" (ASIS Foundation, n.d.). Worth highlighting, this framework can be considered as a pragmatic product resulting from a successful partnership between academia and industry (ASIS Foundation, n.d.). More importantly, compared to the previous models and

studies, it is structured and categorised thematically to reflect different tiers of competencies using a holistic approach (Ennis, 2008).

Figure 3: Enterprise Security Competency Model



Source: CareerOneStop (n.d.)

Whereas, it should be well noted that all these models were fundamentally based on reflecting and addressing the private sector, rather than the specific humanitarian context of INGOs, although many similarities might arguably exist. As, Van Brabant (2001, p. 9) highlighted that “comprehensive safety and security management requires diverse knowledge and skills, including practical, technical

and interpersonal skills, gender and cultural sensitivity and some anthropological understanding, the ability to carry out political analysis, and leadership qualities." Anywise, he utilises broad terms, thus, does not provide further details that can assist in encapsulating the desirable knowledge and skills. Similarly, the GPR8 (2010, pp. 112-113) have portrayed the SMs skills as 'soft' and 'hard', of which soft can be related to academic backgrounds and hard to uniformed experience, then provides some brief examples for each skill. Yet, it separates the two skills by categorising individuals based on their backgrounds whether they have served in the armed forces or they just did not.

However, the distinction should not be instituted around the backgrounds, rather its impartially crucial to focus on the performance and impact of the individuals' (Armstrong, 2006) who are assuming the roles of security risk managers. Firstly, because evaluating or recruiting individuals merely based on their backgrounds can be perceived as excessively unethical, stereotypical, and discriminative (Van Brabant, 2001). Secondly, different people behave differently even in similar situations (McKenzie et al., 2003). Thirdly, personality traits maintain a considerable impact on performance (Comfort & Franklin, 2011; Hassan, Bashir & Abbas, 2017; Quinn, 2015). Consequently, it is considered critical to gather primary data regarding what makes a competent, efficient and effective INGO SM. Ideally, to attempt answering the long-standing questions of "what range of competences is required for safety and security management?" (Van Brabant, 2001, p. 8) also "what skills are required, and hence what background and experience are desirable?" (HPN, 2010).

2.8 Conclusion

INGOs have witnessed a significant proliferation as humanitarian relief is increasingly required to decrease the negative impacts of human-made crises and natural disasters. Simultaneously, the risks facing aid workers have mushroomed, leading to establish dedicated security departments in many INGOs. Therefore, many publications attempted to systematise security risk management, in the humanitarian realm by proposing general guidelines that address its design, application and implementation. Anywise, security as a concept and a function is understood differently by different people, which may lead to conflate security's function within humanitarian sector with security's functions in other sectors (i.e. military, police, private security industry). Although, INGOs' security practitioners should be distinguished from their counterparts in other sectors, as they are aid workers first then SMs. However, the literature is scarce when it comes to studying SMs' in general and particularly INGOs' SMs. Therefore, this dissertation continues through gathering empirical data to tackle this gap in the literature. The next chapter (methodology) outlines how the data will be gathered and analysed.

Chapter 3: Methodology

3.1 Introduction

This chapter begins with reiterating the overall aim of this dissertation and outlines the objectives for achieving it, then justifies why primary data was considered. From there, it goes on to discuss and provide a rationale for the research approach and the design strategy that was deemed most appropriate. Therefrom, it examines the method used for data collection as well as the sampling and participants' recruitment processes. It continues to articulate the framework for data analysis process. Whereas the research involved collecting primary data, ethical issues will be highlighted as well as some mitigation measures. Finally, it highlights some of the limitations of the design and potential biases but also describes the methods utilised to overcome the difficulties.

3.2 Aim and Objectives

INGOs is a phenomenal world; its security practitioners should be distinguished from their counterparts in other sectors. Therefore, this research was established with the aim to attempt exploring what would constitute a competent, effective and efficient SM, specifically within INGOs operating in demanding environments plagued by a challenging and dynamic security landscape? Furthermore, it was demonstrated through the extensive Literature Review, the scarcity of research, specifically concerning SMs in general (Button, 2008) and INGOs' SMs in particular, which further encouraged proceeding with this dissertation. Consequently,

the aim remained persistent, but another objective (six) emerged, comprising:

1. Conceptualise INGOs' role in the delivery of aid to outline the (in)security status quo that led to systematising security risk management.
2. Observe the dilemmas surrounding security and SMs.
3. Highlight the core competencies of aid workers as well as the SMs.
4. Determine the role of security and SMs within INGOs at the field level.
5. Explore the main characteristics of a contemporary INGOs' security professional.
6. Formulate a profile of an INGOs' SM that embodies the job description and a framework which demonstrates the main characteristics.

Whereas, the objectives one, two and three were considerably addressed throughout the literature review. However, the objectives four and five take this research into another phase, through collecting and analysing primary data obtained from the context of INGOs. Furthermore, by comparing the data findings against the Literature Review, enables the researcher to form a wider comprehension of the characteristics of an INGOs' SM. Subsequently, facilitating the fulfilment of the objective six.

3.3 Research Strategy

The empirical research in this dissertation was concerned with an in-depth study to explore the main characteristics of INGOs' SMs, operating in complex environments. Therefore, a qualitative approach was deemed the most appropriate which may facilitate the studying of the proposed topic. Considering that qualitative research studies "things in their natural settings, attempting to make sense of, or interpret, phenomena in terms of the meanings people bring to them" (Denzin & Lincoln, 2005, p. 3). Concurrently, Miles and Huberman (1994, p. 10) argued that qualitative data is convenient to encapsulate peoples lived experiences. In addition, Silverman (2016) argued that qualitative data is congruent for research questions that excavate the what and how; which this research firmly does. Whereas, gathering data from different perspectives goes in line with the interpretative, in contrast to the positivist and critical epistemologies, that were proposed by Orlikowski and Baroudi (1991). Which led to endorse the claim that:

> the ontological assumption associated with interpretative/ constructivism that multiple realities exist that are time and context dependant, they [the researcher] will choose to carry out the study using qualitative methods so that they [the researcher] can gain understanding of the constructions held by people in that context.
>
> (Mertens, 1998, p. 161)

Subsequently, Grounded Theory (GT) was concluded to be the most suitable strategy to guide the design of this research, compared to the case study strategy which was initially considered but later abandoned. Because

GT infers “the discovery of theory from data—systematically obtained and analysed in social research—can be furthered” (Glaser and Strauss, 1999, p. 1). Also, it corresponds to the realities of an area, which will make sense and be understandable to the people working in the substantive area (ibid.). Therefore, a constructivist approach to grounded theory was preferred, as it interprets data analysis as a construction reflecting researcher’s thinking to the data in time, place, culture and context (Charmaz, 2002). Worth highlighting that the defining components of GT include:

- Simultaneous involvement in data collection and analysis
- Construct analytic codes and categories from data, not from preconceived logically deduced hypotheses
- Using constant comparison method, which involves making comparisons during each stage of the analysis
- Advancing theory development during each step of data collection and analysis
- Memo-writing to elaborate categories, specify their properties, define relationships between categories, and identify gaps
- Sampling aimed toward theory construction (theoretical sampling), not for population representativeness
- Conducting the literature review after developing an independent analysis

(Charmaz, 2014, p. 7-8)

3.4 Data Collection

This dissertation has decided on the use of qualitative approach guided by GT. Correspondingly, interviews were deemed as the most appropriate method to obtain the primary data. Because, Interviews facilitate the incorporation of the lived experiences and provide a realistic as well as practical reflection (Bell, 2005, p. 6). In addition, “grounded theorists may invoke each strategy [method] but typically use intensive interviewing” (Charmaz, 2014, p. 57). As a result, the concentration of the empirical data

was substantially directed at INGOs' SMs, yet, data was also gathered from CDs to obtain a holistic overview. The consideration of the two groups was based on their overall security duties (and responsibilities), experience and their positions' seniority, researchers' hunger for comprehensive data, deficiency in the literature, the professional status of international (expatriate) staff, and dissertation requirements. This composition has assisted the researcher by allowing cross-comparison and fostered the opportunity to explore the opinions of two different but inter-related populations. Moreover, elicited a genuine understanding of how security and its managers are being perceived through de-composing different views from diversified dimensions. Alternatively, to achieve objectives 4 and 5. Therefore, it was decided to utilise semi-structured interviews with open-ended questions as the most suitable style to gather rich data (see Appendix B for a list of proposed questions for the SMs and the CDs). Subsequently, provided the flexibility for expanding on topics that were considered of relevance and interest during the interviews. Although, it was rather time-consuming to transcribe and analyse the enriched data, yet, worthwhile.

The initial recruitment was commanded through cluster sampling as described by Biggam (2015, p. 164), yet, later utilised convenience sampling only to approach two INGOs which were already covered under the criterions of the cluster sampling. The cluster sampling was based on a research conducted through Humanitarian Outcomes by Stoddard, Haver and Czwarno (2016). The list contained fourteen major INGOs, of which

their annual budgets exceed 200 million dollars. Furthermore, most of the INGOs maintain global operations including some in arguably high-risk areas (e.g. Syria, Afghanistan, South Sudan, Yemen, Somalia, Iraq, Libya and South Africa). Hence, deeply concerned about security and risk management. The interest, however, was never steered to evaluate the respective INGOs, rather absorb some of the knowledge of their senior staffers. Therefrom, the list of INGOs (excluding two) was sent to a gate keeper with a forward of the research; who then introduced the researcher by email to twelve security focal points (SFP) at the headquarters (HQ) level from nine out of the twelve INGOs. The SFPs from eight INGOs replied agreeing to assist. Which has persuaded the researcher to supplement another group to the population, namely SFPs at the HQ. Later, the SFPs were emailed individually and asked if they agree to be interviewed as well as to nominate two interviewees within their INGOs, that are currently assuming the role of an SM and a CD at one (any) of the perceived high-risk countries. The emails included the attachments of 'participant invitation letter' (see Appendix C for sample), 'participant information sheet' (see Appendix D) and the 'consent form' (see Appendix E for sample). From those nine SFPs, only two maintained emails' chain. The other seven SFPs were reminded with another email but never replied. Hence, they were not recontacted, as the research participation was entirely voluntary. Regarding the other two INGOs, it was convenient for the researcher, as he used to work in one (as a national staff) and had 'established' contacts with the other. Which was an insurance for him that the dissertation will obtain a relatively adequate number of participants that may fulfil the aim and objectives of the dissertation. Eventually, the decision turned out to be

fruitful as the initial cluster sampling received four interviews only. Eventually, he was left with just nine participants representing four INGOs, comprising of four CDs, four SMs and one SFP (see Appendix F for information about the participants).

Considering, that the proposed interviewees were scattered around the globe, conducting face to face interviews was not a feasible option. Therefore, it was decided that the interviews would be undertaken over Skype. The questions were initially designed and followed Charmaz's (2014, p. 66) recommendations. The interviews were conducted between June – July 2017, lasting 34 – 77 minutes. The interviews were recorded (after obtaining consent) with a paid software (Ecamm Call Recorder) which was already owned by the researcher. The interviews were later transcribed and analysed simultaneously.

3.5 Framework for Data Analysis

The design of this research admittedly was highly influenced by Charmaz's (2014) interpretation of the GT; same applies to the data analysis and data description (findings). Although GT was originally proposed by Glaser and Strauss in 1967 (ibid.). Nonetheless, the core concept of GT which arguably scholars seem to agree upon is the constant comparative data analysis (Charmaz, 2014; Glaser & Strauss, 1999; Lacey & Luff, 2009). Therefore, this research conducted data analysis simultaneously with data collection; which arguably somehow blurred the distinction between the two phases

(Silverman, 2016). Nevertheless, the data analysis was roughly comprised of two phases, as highlighted by Charmaz (2014) and indicated in Figure 4. First, in-depth reading of the transcripts, then assigning codes (initial conding). Second, compared codes with each other to identify probable patterns (focused coding) which later produced the concepts. Whereas, the codes and the transcripts were constantly reviewed, until the point which the researcher believed that a theoretical saturation has suffecintly occurred. That is only when a theoretical category has begun to emerge.

Figure 4: A visual representation of a GT



Source: Charmaz (2014, p. 18)

Charmaz (2014, p. 18) envisages the process of data analysis perfectly as:

> In practice, grounded theory research is not linear… A pivotal insight or realization of analytic connections can happen any time during the research process. Grounded theorist stop and write whenever ideas occur to them.

3.6 Ethical Considerations

This research followed the British Society of Criminology's (2015) ethics guidelines, which ensured that the participants were not exposed to risks resulting from this research. The data remain protected under the Data Protection Act 1998 and abides to the University of Portsmouth's (UoP) regulations. Hence, may never be revealed outside the research team unless required by a regulatory entity. Consequently, ethical approval was obtained by the Ethics Committee at the UoP before conducting the data collection (see Appendix G, for Ethics Self-Assessment Form). Subsequently, the researcher promised a full confidentiality and anonymization of any revealing data. Hence, Appendix F (information about the participants) uses pseudonyms (chronologically assigned), a range of total years of experience (including time spent in INGOs) and some of the countries that they have worked in (may or may not include their current duty stations). Also, the gathered data that contained identifying information were saved under an encrypted folder in a password protected computer. The participants were provided with an information bundle prior to the interview (see Appendix C and D for samples), and their questions were addressed before, during and after the interviews. Besides, they were given the opportunity to review the interview transcript and offered a copy of the dissertation (after being approved by UoP). Written consents were obtained from all the participants (see Appendix E for a sample). The role of conflict and bias, however, will be addressed in the subsequent section.

3.7 Limitations and Mitigation Measures

The researcher has done the Literature Review, before data collection as a requirement for the master's course, which essentially contradicts with a component of GT. However, the research question can be retracted long before the master course, as the researcher constantly pursued it as a mean for personal development, yet, failed to find a comprehensive answer. What made the GT more convenient, was it assisted the researcher to be detached not just from the Literature Review during the data analysis phase. Rather, more importantly, the pre-conceived knowledge, that would have led to increased bias. Therefore, to further minimise the bias issues and validity implications, the recommendations of Asselin (2003) were strictly followed. On the other hand, being conceived as an insider arguably had more advantages compared to the reported disadvantages, regarding the richness of data and the openness of interviewees, as it was highlighted in the literature by Kanuha (2000), Asselin (2003), and, Brannick and Coghlan (2007). During the time of the interviews the researcher was not employed but only a student, thus, he made (makes) no claim to be a member of the researched population. Another shortcoming was the time constraint, which may not have warranted a full application of GT compared to other knowledgeable researchers who had more time at their disposal. However, the analysis was not halted until the researcher confidently believed that a theoretical saturation point was reached; hence, no significant codes further emerged (Charmaz, 2014). Also, it should be highlighted that both sampling techniques did not result in a balanced gender representation (only two females). Collectively, it had the researcher to question the validity and reliability of the research before anyone else did. Whereas, reliability was maintained and

demonstrated through a detailed documentation in an honest and transparent manner. Additionally, by being reflexive throughout the dissertation has consolidated “the quality of descriptions, interpretations, and theorizing” (Gilgun, 2015, p. 742). The validity, however, was not as straightforward. Although, the researcher strictly followed an academically approved research strategy and technique, yet, he makes no claims that the samples were representative of a wider population. Anywise, the GT prioritises ‘theoretical usefulness’ over the quest for ‘meticulous accuracy’ (Charmaz, 2014, p. 19). Nonetheless, after finishing the data analysis, the researcher became interested in co-relating what was highlighted in the Literature Review with the findings from the empirical data, to further ensure the validity of the research. As a result, data triangulation was considered, because it ensures “that an account is rich, robust, comprehensive and well-developed” also may further validate the data presented (Qualitative Research Guidelines Project, 2006). Ultimately, resulted in embracing the ‘embryo’ of objective six.

3.8 Conclusion

The use of qualitative approach and semi-structured interviews enabled the researcher to scrutinise the topic and obtain invaluable on-ground information from highly concerned and matter-knowledgeable experts. Whereas, it may not have turned similar if another approach or methods were to be used. On the other hand, GT navigated the research and ensured that bias, if existed, was to the minimum. In brief, this chapter shed light on how the research was conducted, through outlining the design, methods and techniques used to collect then analyse the data. The next chapter will incorporate the research findings.

Chapter 4: Grounded Theory Findings – Description, Analysis and Synthesis

> "The form in which a theory is presented does not make it a theory; it is a theory because it explains or predicts something."
>
> (Glaser & Strauss, 1999, p. 31)

4.1 Introduction: Starting the Journey

This chapter reveals the findings of the GT, as described in the Methodology chapter. The research aims to explore what constitutes a competent, effective and efficient SM, within the INGOs sector. Therefore, semi-structured in-depth interviews were conducted with nine participants, including four CDs, four SMs and one SFP. All of whom, assume overall security duties and responsibilities. This research was guided by the GT, which was approached in a very structured manner, starting from data collection and constant comparative analysis. However, in presenting the findings, this research contradicts the 'purist' approach to GT. Where the theory will naturally appear after data presentation, however, it is not unusual for researchers to do otherwise by providing a preview of major findings for matters of clarity (Suddaby, 2006). Therefore, it was decided that it is better to employ a traditional way, and highlight the theoretical category first. Then going in details and outlining the emerged concepts. However, it should be noted that the concepts, consequently the theoretical category actually emerged from the data itself, and later relevant literature was consulted and included where deemed appropriate.

Therefore, this chapter starts by outlining the emerged theoretical category which attempts to illustrate the current status of SMs in the INGOs' and identify what type of SMs are valued the most, hence what it takes to current status. From

there it goes to the first concept, (resisting) the change, which revisits why dedicated security departments were established in the INGOs' sector according to the participants' experience, then underpins the controversial arguments surrounding security within INGOs. Which introduces the second concept, namely the dichotomy. This concept, highlights a disconnect from the side of SMs in terms of understating INGOs' and their perception of risk and security. It also attempts to further articulate the disconnect by relating to the aid workers' side of the equation, which leads to the final concept, that is the burden. The final concept tackles the prevailing reality that security departments might be often considered as the unnecessary cost and time consuming.

4.2 INGOs' SM: 'A Jack of All Trades, a Master of One (not none)

This research has concluded that INGOs' SMs should understand and accept the reality that the sector has operated without their services for many years. Therefore, some aid workers may not appreciate SMs or understand their purpose unless an incident has already occurred. Consequently, SMs should account for this dynamic and be prepared to deal with the resistance that comes with it. However, just dealing with the resistance may not improve the security's status within any INGO, rather SMs should go a step further to wash out the pretext, of which SMs are an obstacle to conducting activities, even though if they were needed and required. Nonetheless, most of this misconception can be to an extent attributed to the SMs themselves. Subsequently, SMs shall step-up and aim to become and make security risk management an indispensable functional component in the cycle of the INGOs operations. Although the adviser's status may not change, yet, SMs should not just sit back and agree to

be the '*in-house consultants*' or the '*inside-outsiders*' who do not add any real value. Not at all, SMs should not wait for aid workers around them to consider them value added, they should prove this themselves. Conversely, it is their duty to educate non-security aid workers about safety and security so that staff would better appreciate security and be enabled to do their work in the safest manners. Otherwise, SMs will continue being 'the jack in the boot (trunk),' which might be useful for a short period and for one specific duty, then thrown back into the boot, and ignored until the next time is needed, if needed. Consequently, for SMs to be able to excel in their jobs within INGOs and change the misconception directed at them, they should be well-versed and skilled around many disciplines not only hardcore security folks. Most importantly, SMs should understand how INGOs go around and deliver aid, so they can adapt security risk management strategies accordingly. To achieve that SMs should possess the right mindset and manifest some attributes that will enable them to do their work. Therefore, resulting in SMs to blend-in within the INGOs' realm and no longer be conceived as the obstacles. Collectively, the SMs that are valued the most by many INGOs these days are '*the jack of all trades and a master of* one (not none).' Therefore, a detailed profile of a contemporary INGOs' SM will be outlined in the next chapter.

4.2.1 (Resisting) The Change

All the participants have endorsed that nowadays a dedicated security department is necessary for INGOs–consequently an SM–as a 'need' as well as a 'requirement.' However, as much the two terms might seem colliding, they enfold different meanings, resulting in different interpretations of security's

function, leading to different mirroring of security in any INGO as a culture. Security being 'needed,' can be viewed from both personal and organisational point of views. Personal, can be related to the argument that security departments can help in mitigating the evolving threats and hazards in the operational environments (P2; P3; P5; P6; P7), that are leading to the increased risks facing aid workers (DG ECHO, 2006; HPN, 2010; Neuman & Weissman, 2016). For example, P2 stated:

> I don't know if things are different or what, but I think we [aid workers] are much more targets now… we are going to need security [managers]; this is not a thing of the past… having a security advisor there [anonymised country], which we didn't, would have been great, to teach us [aid workers] how to deal with criminality.

Whereas, from the organisaional point of view, 'need' can be related to the argument that security can be, or alternatively *should be* a facilitator 'to stay and deliver' (UNOCHA, 2011). Where SMs help in accessing the beneficiaries and delivering programmes in a safe and secure manner (all participants). On that note, P8 have articulated:

> Security [manager] is [can be] a necessary enabler [facilitator] to reach these communities [beneficiaries], specially in medium and high risk countries. Honestly, these days, legitimate INGOs, not the cowboys, but these days you [aid workers] can't do this kind of work [humanitarian relief] without [a] security [manager].

On the other hand, security being 'required' can be viewed from the organisational point of view. Relating to the fact that some INGOs have been sued in courts by their former employees and found guilty, under the accusation of no or inadequate security in place (Neuman & Weissman, 2016). Hence, P4 noted:

> Obviously, there have been a number of very well-publicised incidents. With outfits like some INGOs, where they were sued by former members of staff. Who claimed that they have not been properly briefed on the security risks, or that the organisation in question didn't have proper security protocols in place. And as of a direct result of that, a lot of INGOs have suddenly woken up to the security risks that their staffs are exposed to. And as result, [INGOs] has [have] put security systems and safety policies in place.

Consequently, need and requirement may have resulted in magnifying the Duty of Care concept within INGOs. Eventually, becoming the major factor for establishing and continuing to have dedicated security departments in most INGOs (Kemp & Merkelbach, 2011). Which leads to the conclusion that security department might be considered as an imposed obligation, and in fact a change. Change on the other hand might and often times do disrupt the 'homeostasis' within a group, therefore, resistance should be expected but also accounted for (Marquis & Huston, 2000). Simply because, change without resistance may not be real or definite rather an 'illustration' (Harvey, 1995). However, establishing security departments is arguably a change in the social status. Whereas, a social change which is not consistent with established norms of an organisation, will probably face more resistance than any other change (Curtis & White, 2002). Therefore, it is crucial to understand where does security departments currently fit within INGOs, and, how does SMs influence the organisational security equation?

It should be noted, however, that answering these questions can be quite complicated but also to a degree subjective. Simply because, the dilemma of 'what is security' or 'how to define security' was and might always remain a hot topic for debate (Manunta & Manunta, 2006). Which became concrete while

conducting the interviews and particularly during the simultaneous comparative analysis, whereas each participant had his or her own understanding of security as a concept and a function. Nonetheless, Baldwin's (1990, pp. 13-17) dimensions "Security for whom? Security for which values? How much security? From what threats? By what means? At what cost? In what time period?" Can be noted in the INGOs' context when discussing, planning, implementing and managing security. Although, the participants were not asked about the dimensions directly, however, it was later noticed that the interviewer's questions and participants' responses included comprehensive notions of some of these dimensions. That is maybe why, the terms 'balance' and 'depend' were often observed. Subsequently, affirming that different variables exist, when it comes to security, thus, P6 noted "…it [security] is a trade-off." Affirming, that different aspects and dimensions must be weighed against each other when determining security. Moreover, the data from this research revealed two more dimensions that can be added to Baldwin's (ibid.) list, which decidedly influence security risk management within any INGO. The two additional dimensions are, security by whom? Security in which geographical culture? However, all the participants repeatedly emphasised that security as a function in any INGO and whichever context, heavily depends on the SM as an individual, who is managing (advising) security department. This consensus implies that 'security by whom' would dictate how the other dimensions would be conceptualised. However, it was rather surprising (as this finding has fundamentally challenged a good proportion of the preconceived knowledge), whereas, good security or bad security culture in any INGO, ultimately depends on the SM individually. Such perception leads to centrelise the individual SM as the main cause of resistance to change, rather than the change itself or the implementation process (Meston & King, 1996).

Consequently, not subjecting the same significance to staff, management or even the INGO's emphasis, value or definition of security.

All the participants mentioned that security departments and SMs are new phenomena in the INGOs' sector. For instant, P4 stated: "back in the days, security wasn't even a concern for INGOs. Simply, it wasn't something that they [aid workers] necessarily even considered." Similarly, P6 illustrated that:

> Ten years ago, I [CD] never heard about any security person working in the humanitarian field, or for [I]NGOs at least. We [aid workers] didn't have them [SMs]. We didn't know we needed them, but perhaps we did.

Concurrently, all the participants have highlighted that security is not yet well-integrated within many INGOs as a function, which can be related to the resistance to change argument. Moreover, and irrespectively, SMs are often conceived as the obstacle to conducting activities, be it programmes or recreational. That is maybe why, security departments and the SMs have a *de facto advisory role* with limited or no decision-making authority under any circumstances (all participants). Hence, the overall security responsibility rests with the CDs for most INGOs (HPN, 2010).

Nevertheless, the focus here is not whether SMs holding an advisory status is good or bad. Rather, the question should be, why it was and still deemed most appropriate to approach security risk management in such a manner within many INGOs? The simple answer might be, by not granting SMs any decision-making

authority, senior management upholds the elasticity to operate in contexts, where the SMs may deem unsafe or risky. That is maybe why P4 have stated that:

> the reality remains far too often, where the security protocols are felt to be preventing them [aid workers] from doing their core activities [programmes and recreational], they [aid workers] often find a way to water down or circumvent the rules.

Therefore, SMs should be aware of this dynamic, embrace it, and most importantly prepare to deal with the resistance that comes with it. On the other hand, however, and more critically SMs should avoid becoming a source that encourages that resistance, or worse, SMs resisting to emerge within INGOs. Consequently, they should ensure that they are on the same page or at least account for what senior management needs from them so their advices would be relevant and contextual. Otherwise, they will be disregarded, ignored and even surpassed, after all in reality they hold an advisory status with no decision-making authority. P2 have articulated this reality “of course, I can over-ride him [or her] anytime I want as a CD. It is whether I want to take that risk? Sometimes I do, sometimes I don't.”

4.2.2 The Dichotomy

The previous concept exemplified a driving wedge between the SMs and non-security aid workers in general. Which relates to one of the very first codes that was often repeated by all participants, namely SMs not possessing INGOs’ experience. Therefore, having limited or no understanding of the humanitarian ethos (Renouf, 2011). Leading SMs to often ‘copy past’ or apply whatever they have learnt during their previous occupations. Ironically, most of their security knowledge would be considered irrelevant to humanitarian work (all participants).

Leading SMs to being conceived as the outsiders who know nothing except hard-core security. Concurrently, all the participants stated that the majority of the SMs within humanitarian aid sector arrive from uniformed backgrounds–mostly military–that lack the experience, knowledge or maybe even the appreciation for INGOs necessarily. Therefore, when they were referring to the SMs, often spoke from that stand. Worth highlighting, four out of five of the participants (security people) had uniformed experience, three of which in the military, one from intelligence services and only one with no uniformed background. Although, this might not be statistically representative, but could be indicative of the proportions, considering that all the participants have also endorsed it as an on-ground reality.

All the participants were asked "how would you describe a contemporary INGOs' aid worker?" and they have highlighted some characteristics of aid workers in general. On the other hand, some features of INGOs' SMs were repeatedly observed during the interviews and analysis. Although, it should be noted that these characteristics were mostly representative and referring to the SMs from uniformed backgrounds. Nevertheless, those features of both groups were compared against each other to see if a correlation existed. What came as a shock, was that nearly all the characteristics of aid workers were met with a completely opposite characteristic for the SMs (see Table 1). Which amplified P4's statement:

> Obviously when you are looking at the specific security end of things, then you tend to see a lot of ex-military. Particularly in places like X [anonymised country], and they are often almost the exact opposite in terms of personalities from many of the people [aid workers] that are directly supporting [the beneficiaries].

Table 3: Comparison between aid workers and SMs' features

Aid workers' features	SMs' features
Adventures (risk-taker)	Over-cautious (some)
Idealistic (somewhat)	Unknown
Unexperienced and Young	Long uniformed experience and older
Motivated to see a change	Motivated to have a paying job
Well-educated	Often do not have a (university) degree
Outgoing (sociable)	Not engaging (isolated)
Flexible and adaptable	Rigid
Hardworking	Unknown (probably hardworking too)

Source: constructed from the data for the dissertation.

Nevertheless, experience in the uniformed domain can be sometimes beneficial (Gill, 2014; McGee, 2006), especially military service within conflict zones. For example, P1 stated:

> It [military experience] helps, it certainly helps. Because in the military you get a lot of training when it comes to weaponry and explosives and what have you. So, your awareness of that in conflict zones is naturally going to be higher.

Similarly, P6 mentioned that "it doesn't hurt to have someone with a background from the military," and P2 followed "it is better if they have that [military] experience." Anywise, all the participants were concerned that some ex-uniformed SMs might be somewhat rigid, and may possess a militaristic and authoritative approach to security (Gill, 2014). Where everything is either "yes or no" (P4), "black and white" (P8) or "we [SMs] do it, or we don't do it" (P9). That is maybe why, P3 stated: "the worst thing that you [SM] can ever do is telling staff: no, you [referring to aid workers] cannot! Because I [SM] said so." Therefore, SMs should comprehend that security within INGOs' sector is a different business compared to other sectors, and specifically quite the opposite to the uniformed domain. As P6 stated: "[I]NGOs' security is not a military function."

Therefore, “They [SMs] have to unlearn what they have learnt and they have to learn again” (P5). Hence, being open-minded, innovative and creative will allow the SMs to look at things from different perspectives, consequently, suggesting various and multiple solutions. This view was explicitly endorsed by all the participants and even tackled in the literature (Renouf, 2011).

This leads to the assumption that there is some sort of misunderstanding between SMs and the rest of staff in terms of what is security and what should security do, or how it should be done? P9 articulated this assumption:

> I have seen folks [SMs] with security background working in INGOs, there seems a dichotomy between what they think they are doing and what the staff needs them to do. I think that [lack of understanding] is part of what makes it difficult for former military folks to come in [and adapt to INGOs’ sector], because they are used to commanding a unit, and that is not what we [aid workers] need their role to be, in the work that we do.

As a result, it is crucial for SMs to digest that INGOs often work in “grey” (P8) which requires a high level of flexibility and adaptability (all participants). Hence, “[doing] security [within the INGO itself] has to be negotiated, it is not as simple as saying, don't do this don't do that” (P9). Therefore, its critical for SMs to understand and accept that aid workers take risks to conduct programmes and access beneficiaries. Simply because that is the nature of their work considering the contexts they operate in (DG ECHO 2006). Besides, most if not all INGOs are fundamentally concerned about the *impact*, which is the key expectation and the core reason for their ultimate existence in the humanitarian relief (Hofmann, Roberts, Shoham, Harvey, 2004). Taking risks was crystalised, as P6 stated: “we [aid workers] work in risky environments; we have to understand those risks, and

we take those risks, we are risk takers, everyone needs to know that." Similarly, P9 continued "

> In order to fulfil our commitment to our beneficiaries and our donors, sometimes there can be a level of bending [in terms of security]… We have to take certain risks. Like, certain risks are inevitable, due to the nature of the work that we do.

Thus, SMs might be considered over-protective or attempting to avoid all risks, of which P4 underpinned that by saying "security personnel are obviously trying to protect people from the potential of risk." P3 have also endorsed this and stated:

> Sometimes I think you [SM] are over-cautious, not necessarily on purpose trying to hold back programmes. And from my point of view, sometimes they [staff] want to get done with it [deliver their services], you know. And they just [think], you [SM] are holding them back.

These statements, highlighted that risk similar to security is conceived differently by different people (Johnson & Tversky, 1984), because:

> Risk is a strange mix of seeming contradictions. It is both calculable and indeterminate, objective and subjective, visible and invisible, knowable and unknowable, predictable and unpredictable, individual and collective. (Althaus, 2005, p. 582)

As a result, 'risk taking' may and cannot be avoided, considering that it has introduced humanity to some significant innovations (Sunstein, 2005), where they could not have been achieved if humankind pursued the absolute security (Ddahl & Lindblom, 1963). Similarly, INGOs could not have helped in alleviating the suffering and saving millions of lives, if they did not take and continue taking

certain risks. However, this does not authorise taking risks then hoping for the best results, of which Kahneman (2012) has encapsulated the concept of 'hindsight' and its outcomes comprehensively. Consequently, SMs should understand that taking risk can be considered good as well as bad, of which may lead to significant or in contrast catastrophic results. Therefore, risk identification and analysis are a fundamental process of having a comprehensive risk statement for understanding risks components and their interrelationships (Power, 2014). That can be considered as the ultimate duty of the SMs towards their respective INGO and staff (all participants). That is maybe why P6 stated:

> It [security] is a combination of keeping staff and resources safe, but you can do that by staying at home. So, while security is about helping people stay safe; it is helping people to stay safe within that specific context. And again, not dictating what people should or should not do. It is understanding the context, effectively explaining the context and then facilitating discussions so that managers, with support from security staff, and certainly considering their opinions, can come up with ideas on: Should we go to a new location? If we do what are the risks? How can we do it most safely? If the risks are too high, let us not go? Are they reasonable risks? How can we reduce them? It is being part of that general discussion, that general debate. Again, it is advising and facilitating; it is not deciding.

Hence, P9 have highlighted that "the most important thing for someone in security role should be asking the right questions. So, asking challenging questions," which will allow SMs to gather relevant contextual information from various sources, then advise accordingly (all participant). Eventually, enabling SMs to "coordinate with programmatic, operational staff, in order to devise ways to operate in those [risky] locations safely, or specify exactly why those areas cannot be accessed" (P1). Resulting in SMs not being conceived as the obstacles to conducting activities no more, rather facilitators of operations, hence, being

value added. Therefore, being critical, analytical, logical and having intellectual curiosity, will fundamentally assist in conducting security risk assessments. However, these competencies should come with a great degree of humility and willingness to learn, as P8 stated “I would call it humility; if you [SM] don't immediately think that you already have all of the answers, that means you are open-minded enough to explore other options.” Being analytical and willing to learn, can be related to academia and education. Although, all the participants have explicitly stated that having a university degree is not essential. However, they all highlighted that it can be an evident that the SM has the intellectual curiosity and the willingness to learn. For example, when P1 was asked ‘do you think that it is required to possess a university degree or experience alone is sufficient? And why?’ the reply came:

> That is a really good one. I will put it this way; the simple answer is no with a very big but. And that very big is, it is very difficult to tell with people, even in the interview process and the hiring process, if that person has the intellectual capacity to engage the job. So, a degree can often time, but it is not a full proof; can often separate people who simply don't have that intellectual capacity from those that do. And those that do, have demonstrated it; because they studied for at least a few years in college, so any college, it is going to have and demand a certain amount of analysis and a certain amount of communication from the individual.

Collectively, the schism between the SMs and non-security aid workers might be another factor for encapsulating INGOs’ SMs into a bubble leading them to be considered as the ‘inside-outsiders’. Therefore, for SMs to be considered as part and parcel of the teams, they should be engaging, also approachable and “a pinch of humour is always helpful in stressful [and many] situations” (P7). However, SMs should always be cautious regarding their behaviour with and in

front of other staff members, as they should be respectful to be respected by staff.

> One [SM] who does not drink excessively. Sure, everybody likes a beer or whatever. But who is never seen drunk, [and] who is not seen raving over parties, you [addressing the researcher] know what NGOs parties are like?... One who can gain the respect of staff, so again a good listener. Who listens to people and take into account what they are saying. Who shows by example how we [aid workers] should be behaving. (P2)

On the other hand, the gap was even furthered, because non-security aid workers may lack the understanding, misunderstand or disagree with security protocols and procedures. On this matter, P4 stated:

> the average INGO worker or INGO international staff member, just simply has not been exposed to security systems and protocols enough… [whereas] a lot of INGO workers unless something has happened don't see the need [for security].

This type of thinking can also be related to the resistance to change argument, where “the old system [having no security system] was fine' plus 'I have to use the new system” (Curtis & White, 2002, p. 17). P2 gave a fascinating example that illustrated this reality:

> Programme staff need to realise, and I [CD] had to fight [for security]. Again, not in this country, though a little bit, [but] not as much as X [anonymized country]. The security officers are there for their [aid workers] safety and to aid in saving their lives. I literally had to say this to the young staff in X. ‘We put this to save your life’, [the reply was] ‘oh you [addressing the CD] don't care about our well-being.’ [the CD replied] ‘no, I don't want you to go there, it's dangerous.’ So, it is a matter of them [aid workers] realising that the role [SM] is there, for their own security and safety and not to block them having fun and partying until 2 or 3 in the morning.

This example demonstrates how management should support security and explain to staff why it is important. However, it is not a surprise that this issue might as well be with the senior management themselves, which will make the gap even wider resulting in security being further disregarded. As P7 outlined:

> Senior leaders or leaders on the ground who lack the understanding of benefits of security, and therefore, regardless of organisation's stated intent or strategy towards security, individual managers may see security as an unnecessary cost or a restriction to operations.

Whereas, P8 stated: "often times, it is funny when people push back, and I had senior managers push back on things that we do as requirements, like HEAT [hostile environment awareness training] training." The two previous statements have shed light on another critical issue, which is security being considered as a burden–the unnecessary cost and time-consuming–which became another concept.

4.2.3 The Burden

It is not something new for security departments to be considered as the unnecessary cost. In fact, the literature has repeatedly highlighted this issue to be prevalent (Button, 2008; Cabric, 2015; Challinger, 2006; Gill, 2014) and INGOs are no exception to this argument considering that some participants highlighted:

> Security still don't get the money compared to other support functions… After many years, I got successfully some money this year for security. So, I don't have to worry that much, if I needed a budget [money to spend on security]. (P5)

> To have security staff, to begin with, is a burden on the mission. Again I am looking at this from a very austere perspective. It [security department] is a burden on all the support functions; it is very time-consuming for HR and the very front end of employment… so that is very costly and at the end of the day how many measurable pieces how many metrics are out there for the success of security? (P1)

Then if security department is conceived unnecessary, why to have it to begin with? And, why to employ SMs if they often delay or become obstacles to conducting activities? This takes the argument back to the Duty of Care, which means security departments are there to stay unless the laws change, which is not likely to happen at least any time soon. That is maybe why "There is an attitude to security as a necessary tick-off. Like, you have to have something, and it is considered as a due-diligence in certain organisation" (P7). Nonetheless, there will always be an allocated budget for the department, no matter how little it was. Subsequently, the question should be how to change this perception of security also gravitate more budget for security departments? The answer to this question leads back to the role of SMs; and how capable they are to make their arguments with senior management in order to obtain more budget for their departments. On that note, P8 stated: "They [SMs} need to have business acumen they need to understand finance." Hence, SMs should possess finance and management knowledge. Yet, to be able to stand in front of senior managers and make the argument, SMs need a good degree of being empowered, ability to self-articulate but more importantly communication skills which includes listening, speaking and writing skills. For example, P2 stated: "to be able to stand-up to strong CDs, like mine. Who [SM] turns around and say, 'oh no I [SM] am

not doing that,' to be able to work with the CD and to learn about the [I]NGO." P1 added to this by saying:

> You [SM] have got to be able to bang of [write] an email that is diplomatic and friendly for those situations that are called for and informal. At the same time, you have to be able to draft emails that are formal. That sort of, to get the point across: 'I am documenting this, I am putting this in formal writing.' So that people would take you [SM] more seriously. And again, to tie that into a little bit of what we were talking about before, perceptions of security. The general perception is that most security people are capable of none or possessing any of the qualities that I have mentioned. And are not very capable of articulating themselves, or having a coherent original thought.

4.3 Conclusion

Security as a function within many INGOs' has not yet well-integrated, furthermore, SMs are often conceived as obstacles to conducting activities. There are many factors that feed into this issue, one might be security departments are novice in the INGOs, and never existed before, hence, greeted with resistance to change. Another factor might be that SMs lack the understanding of humanitarian world in general, and, they approach security similar to what they used to in previous occupations, as majority come from uniformed background. On the other hand, aid workers may lack the understanding or disagree with security's procedures and policies in place. Finally, Security as a function is considered a cost and a time-consuming process. However, much of these issues are attributed to the incompetence of

SMs, for not stepping-up and attempting to change pretext. Therefore, a profile will be suggested in the next chapter that attempts addressing this issue.

To sum this chapter up, P8's statement sounds comprehensive

> Security people need to be more knowledgeable about the world whether it is humanitarian work or it is geopolitical knowledge, I think it is time for security [managers] stepping up and be the sort of people who understand these dynamics… We [INGOs] want a leader in security that have that full range of skills… We don't care if our security people don't at least have a bachelor's degree or some sort of business acumen, so we pay the price for that when they don't inspire their teams through performance and they don't nurture their teams. Or because they don't have these skills or maybe because they come from a military background. I think we [SMs] got to step up, just like any other organisational informed function.

Chapter 5: A Profile of a Contemporary INGOs' SM

5.1 Introduction

The previous chapter has highlighted the theoretical category that emerged from the data, of which it is up to the SMs themselves to change the reality and become an indispensable functional part in the cycle of INGOs' operations. Therefore, they should possess a combination of skills and multi-disciplined knowledge, which would not come in use unless supplemented by certain attributes and the right mindset. Therefore, the data was further analysed to build a profile of a contemporary INGOs' security professional. Although, the task of profiling an individual can be quite complicated and indeed daunting (Bar-Yam, 1997). Nonetheless, this chapter goes to identify two aspects of which influence the SMs job. First, a proposed job description which outlines what the participants thought to be the main tasks of INGOs' SMs. Second, it goes to illustrate a framework that encapsulates the desired characteristics of a contemporary INGOs' SM including: mindset, attributes, skills and knowledge. Furthermore, it will demonstrate why this specific framework was utilised and how it actually emerged.

5.2 Job Description

The participants have emphasised that the mission of security department–consequently SMs–should be: *ensuring that operations and access are facilitated in a safe and secure manner*. Hence, SMs have many tasks to undertake, which ultimately depends on the INGO's overall vision, mission and values (HPN,

2010). Although, HPN (2010, p. 111) have suggested some general 'roles and responsibilities' for SMs to undertake and some may overlap with the ones that this study suggests. Nonetheless, the following tasks were highlighted by the participants and derived from the analysis:

1. Examine, analyze and follow the context in the operational area(s) to identify current and possibly predict future trends.
2. Continuously gather updated information from various sources that are relevant to the INGO's operations.
3. Conduct and review security risk assessments, to identify risks and mitigating measures for the existing and new areas of operations.
4. Identify and map-out different key stakeholders in the area.
5. Raise awareness and keep staff informed about the context and explain the risks.
6. Devise protocols, procedures and standards that will mitigate the identified risks.
7. Ensure physical security (e.g. offices, guest houses) and safety measures (e.g. fire prevention equipment, first aid kit) are in place.
8. Support in incident and crises management.
9. Recommend or procure the required safety and security equipment.
10. Conduct training and build the capacity of non-security staff.
11. Manage and oversee security budget, and make input into proposals.
12. Administration tasks (e.g. emails, meetings, reports, etc.).
13. Represent the INGO in the inter-agency forums and the community.
14. Supervise, support and build the capacity of security team, to enable them in undertaking some (or all) of the above tasks.

5.3 The Framework

After conducting literature review, it was concluded that ETA Competency Model Clearinghouse (Ennis, 2008) was a comprehensive framework that illustrates the competencies required by corporate SMs. The ETA, defines a competency as "the capability of applying or using knowledge, skills, abilities, behaviors, and personal characteristics to successfully perform critical work tasks, specific functions, or operate in a given role or position" (Ennis, 2008, pp. 4-5). However, by combining these aspects it was nearly impossible for the researcher to encapsulate the research findings in that framework without a clear definition which is which, hence, ETA was not used. On the other hand, the 'T-shaped professional' framework was navigated, and found to be simple, flexible but also inclusive. Leonard-Barton (1995, p. 139) describes the vertical stroke of the '*T*' representing a deep knowledge in a discipline, while the horizontal is knowing how the discipline interacts with others, see Figure 1. T-shaped framework has been used in many fields to describe, educate and enhance new professionals, for example in the computer industry (Iansiti, 1994), medical field (Donofrio, Spohrer & Zadeh, 2009), engineering (Donofrio, Sanchez & Spohrer, 2008) and Logistics (Mangan & Christopher, 2005; Tatham & Kovács, 2010). It was later found out that it does not account for 'mindset' which arguably makes humans 'who are who they are.' Nonetheless, this framework was further investigated to find out if it has been used in such a manner, yet, the efforts came out empty.

Figure 5: T-shaped professionals' framework



Source: Leonard-Barton (1995, p. 75)

However, an IBM power point slide (2012) have fostered the idea and influenced the researcher to modulate the 'T-shaped' framework (see Figure 2) to resemble a 'human-shaped' framework' that is capable to encompass mindset, attributes, skills and knowledge (MASK).

Figure 6: T-shaped professionals – depth and breadth



Source: IBM (2012)

Subsequently, before going any further, terminology needs to be clarified. This research defines mindset "as a mental frame or lens that selectively organizes

and encodes information, thereby orienting an individual toward a unique way of understanding an experience and guiding one toward corresponding actions and responses… [which] has downstream effects on judgement… evaluation… health… and behaviour." (Crum, Salvoey & Achor, 2013, p. 717). Mindset can be characterised as it embodies the traits and behaviours that are not openly noticed by others, and are (very) difficult to change. Attributes, on the other hand can be defined as an inherent characteristics or qualities ascribed to someone which can be expressed through actions, thinking as well as feelings (University of Victoria, n.d.; US Department of Interior, n.d.). Attributes are different from mindset, as they might be arguably altered in time and external factors, but also people can mark them in an individual to an extent. Whereas, skill refers to the ability of doing something well, which can be developed through learning and practice (Kitajima, 2016; University of Victoria, n.d.). Skills are qualities that can be acquired, therefore, debatably easily improved. Skills are important qualities to undertake tasks but should not be considered as tasks on their own, as they are useful in one's daily life as well. Finally, knowledge is the information that someone knows, including theories, facts and procedures, and the ability to apply this information in different situations (University of Victoria, n.d.). Knowledge can be acquired and learned but is different from skills as tasks are actually dictated by the knowledge domain whichever it was, meaning that there are certain standards and rules which should be followed. It should be noted that this framework divides knowledge into two separate sections comprising of job-specific knowledge and cross-sector knowledge. As the framework encompasses four aspects namely mindset, attributes, skills and knowledge the naming MASK Framework[1] seemed

[1] The MASK (Human-Shaped) Framework, the name and the design remains the intellectual property of the researcher, therefore, it is not permitted to be utilised or reproduced in any form by anyone or entity, without a written permission from the researcher himself.

convenient. However, it should be noted that the framework is in its crude form, which will admittedly need further refinement and amelioration. As it was noticed that there can be a form of confusion between ‘mindset and attributes’ or skills and knowledge’ as some might consider some characteristics correlated or even interchangeable. Therefore, the researcher is pragmatic and makes no claim that the output of this framework is perfect nor might ever be. Nonetheless it will be used initially to illustrate the findings of this research, see Figure 3. Subsequently, the researcher is open for criticism and suggestions. The data in the framework on the other hand, although might not be exhaustive, yet, it was completely derived from the data and was also observed in the Literature Review.

5.4 Conclusion

This chapter suggested a job description for the INGOs’ SM according to participants. On the other hand, the data revealed a combination of characteristics that an SM should possess in order to excel within INGOs, hence, a framework was suggested which derived from the ‘T-based professional’ framework. Worth highlighting, that the two components of the profile are complementarity one to another. Whereas, the tasks dictate what type of characteristics are need to undertake the task competently, effectively and efficiently. On the other hand, the framework encapsulates mindset, attributes, skills and knowledge. That may illustrate ‘a jack of all trades, a master of one (not none).’

Figure 7: 'Human-shaped' framework (MASK)



Source: constructed for this dissertation

Chapter 6: Conclusion and Recommendations

6.1 Introduction, Aim and Objectives

This chapter starts with restating the aim and objectives, then concludes how each objective was met. Then it provides some brief recommendations for SMs and INGOs, but also suggests future research studies. Finally, a small section about self-reflection. It is believed that this research was able to meet the overall aim, which was 'attempt exploring what would constitute a competent, effective and efficient SM, within INGOs operating in demanding environments plagued by a challenging and dynamic security landscape.' Through fulfilling the following objectives.

1. Conceptualise INGOs' role in the delivery of aid to outline the (in)security status quo that led to systematising security risk management.
2. Observe the dilemmas surrounding security and SMs.
3. Highlight the core competencies of aid workers as well as the SMs.
4. Determine the role of security and SMs within INGOs at the field level.
5. Explore the main characteristics of a contemporary INGOs' security professional.
6. Formulate a profile of an INGOs' SM that embodies the job description and a framework which demonstrates the main characteristics.

6.2 Conclusion

The first objective was met as the literature identified that INGOs have witnessed a significant proliferation as humanitarian relief is increasingly required. Simultaneously, the risks facing aid workers have mushroomed, leading to establish dedicated security departments in many INGOs. Hence, many publication proposed general guidelines that address the design, application and implementation to systematise security risk management, in the humanitarian realm.

The second objective was met as the literature highlighted that security as a concept and a function is understood differently by different people, which may lead to conflate security's function within humanitarian sector with security's functions in other sectors (i.e. military, police, private security industry). That may have led to SMs being stigmatised as to being ex-armed forces even if they never were.

The third objective have highlighted some competencies of INGOs' aid workers in general, which should be in theory and practice possessed by INGO's SMs as they are aid workers first, only then SMs. However, the scarcity of research specific concerning INGOs' SMs have led to turn toward the literature concerning private security's SMs in order to relate to the characteristics of INGOs' SMs. As a result, primary data was collected to attempt addressing this gap in the literature.

The fourth objective was met, as the empirical data revealed that security departments and SMs are new phenomena within INGOs which led them to be greeted with resistance to change. Hence, they are often considered as the obstacles to conducting activities. Besides, there is some sort of disconnect between what the senior management requires from security department versus what SMs identify as priorities.

The fifth objective was met as the data highlighted a driving wedge between SMs and aid workers in general in terms of personal characteristics, as most SMs are arriving from the unformed domain into the humanitarian world. Nonetheless, the analysis has identified some characteristics, which feed into the next objective.

The sixth objective was met as the data revealed the major tasks that the SMs are ought to undertake. Hence, some characteristics were identified then categorised according to mindset, attributes, skills and knowledge. Later, these characteristics were encapsulated in a graphical framework that was constructed for the purpose of this research.

6.3 Recommendations

6.3.1 SMs

1. SMs should understand INGOs programmes, so that they can advise and devise security policies and procedures accordingly that are value added.
2. SMs should accept that INGOs' security is not similar to what they may have been exposed to in previous occupations or other sectors.
3. SMs need to step-up and prove themselves to be value added to their respective organisations, otherwise they will continue be perceived as the obstacles.
4. The profile can serve as a self-check for SMs who are currently employed or aim to be employed by the humanitarian sector.

6.3.2 INGOs

1. Each INGO should have a clear definition of what is security and what it does, and make sure that all staff members are aware of it.
2. Each INGO should promote and approach security as an indispensable function of its operations, not just a legal obligation of Duty of Care.

6.3.3 Future Research

1. To what extent donors can influence or even enforce a better integration of security as a function within recipient INGOs?
2. What is the duty of security within INGOs: the perception of non-security field level (response) aid workers.

6.4 Self-reflection

Many master's students may find it hard to identify the topic, this was not an issue for the researcher not at all. However, deciding which research strategy best suits the proposed topic was the million-dollar question. Finally, GT was decided to be suitable to guide this research, yet, it was later found out that there are limited master's dissertations that used GT, most of them were PhDs theses. Which had the researcher to question his capability in using GT comprehensively. Therefore, master's students should decide from the beginning which research strategy they intend to utilise, make sure they understand it, for the researcher this is far more critical than the topic itself.

The researcher is pragmatic and makes no claim that this research adds anything new to the literature unless published. However, he may pursue with further research for a PhD as he strongly believes that conducting this research has fundamentally added to his personal knowledge and changed his perspective about the proposed topic. Furthermore, it indeed improved his research and writing capabilities.

To sum it up, ironically a dissertation might be quite similar to risk's definition which is a combination of seeming contradiction, therefore, students have to understand, embrace and deal with the ambiguity that comes with them. A master's degree is not easy neither it should be, it is a journey and students who have the privilege to undergo a master's course should be well prepared.

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Appendices

Appendix A: CBHA Framework

Core Humanitarian Competencies Framework

Keeping crisis-affected people at the centre of what we do

cbha
The Consortium of British Humanitarian Agencies

Competency Domains	Understanding humanitarian contexts and applying humanitarian principles	Achieving results	Developing and maintaining collaborative relationships	Operating safely and securely at all times	Managing yourself in a pressured and changing environment	Demonstrating leadership in humanitarian response
Outcomes	Understand operating contexts, key stakeholders and practices affecting current and future humanitarian interventions	Be accountable for your work and use resources effectively to achieve lasting results	Develop and maintain collaborative and coordinated relationships with stakeholders and staff	Operate safely and securely in a pressured environment	Adapt to pressure and change to operate effectively within humanitarian contexts	Demonstrate humanitarian values and principles, and motivate others to achieve results in complex situations, independent of one's role, function or seniority
Competencies and Core Behaviours for all staff in humanitarian response, informed by skills and knowledge	● **Understanding the humanitarian context** > Demonstrate understanding of the phases of humanitarian response including preparedness and contingency, Disaster Risk Reduction, response and recovery. > Apply understanding of the political and cultural context and underlying causes of the humanitarian crisis. > Demonstrate understanding of the gender and diversity dimensions of humanitarian situations. > Take into account the needs, skills, capacities and experience of crisis-affected people and apply these in the response. ● **Applying humanitarian standards and principles** > Ensure that programme goals, activities and staff behaviour uphold key national and international humanitarian frameworks, standards, principles and codes which your organisation has committed to. > Use your power responsibly, in line with accountability principles and standards. > Demonstrate understanding of your role and that of your organisation and others within the humanitarian system. > Demonstrate an understanding of coordination mechanisms.	● **Ensuring programme quality and impact** > Demonstrate understanding of agency project cycle management. > Actively participate in the design and implementation of effective projects and programmes. > Maintain focus on delivery of timely and appropriate results using available resources. ● **Working accountably** > Be answerable to crisis-affected people for your actions and decisions. > Collect, analyse and disseminate relevant and useful information and feedback with crisis-affected people and other stakeholders. ● **Making decisions** > Demonstrate flexibility to adapt in situations of rapid change, always informed by a focus on crisis-affected people. > Demonstrate understanding of when a decision can be taken and when to involve others. > Consider the wider impact of your decisions in order to achieve results.	● **Listening and creating dialogue** > Actively listen to new and different perspectives and experiences of crisis-affected people, stakeholders and team members. > Establish and maintain clear dialogue with crisis-affected people or other stakeholders. ● **Working with others** > Contribute positively in the team to achieve programme objectives. > Share useful information and knowledge with colleagues, partners and crisis-affected people as and when appropriate. > Actively participate in networks to access and contribute to good practice. > Challenge decisions and behaviour which breach the International Red Cross and Red Crescent and NGOs / individual agency Codes of Conduct.	● **Minimising risk to communities, partners and stakeholders** > Pay attention to the safety of crisis-affected people and other key stakeholders Identify and communicate risk and threats and mitigate these for you and your agency. > Take measures to 'do no harm' and to minimise risks for your partners and the crisis-affected people you work with. ● **Managing personal safety and security** > Build and sustain acceptance for your work in line with humanitarian principles and standards. > Reduce vulnerability by complying with safety and security protocols set by your organisation and adapt them to the local context. > Champion the importance of safety and keep the safety of colleagues and team members in mind at all times.	● **Adapting and coping** > Remain focused on your objectives and goals in a rapidly changing environment. > Adapt calmly to changing situations and constraints. > Recognise personal stress and take steps to reduce it. > Remain constructive and positive under stress to be able to tolerate difficult and challenging environments. ● **Maintaining professionalism** > Take responsibility for your own work and its impact on others. > Plan, prioritise and perform tasks well under pressure. > Maintain ethical and professional behaviour in accordance with relevant codes of conduct. > Demonstrate personal integrity by using one's position responsibly and fairly. > Be aware of internal and external influences that affect your performance.	● **Self-awareness** > Show awareness of your own strengths and limitations and their impact on others. > Demonstrate understanding of your skills and how they complement those of others to build team effectiveness. > Seek and reflect on feedback to improve your performance. ● **Motivating and influencing others** > Communicate humanitarian values and encourage others to share them. > Inspire confidence in others. > Speak out clearly for organisational beliefs and values. > Demonstrate active listening to encourage team collaboration. > Influence others positively to achieve programme goals. ● **Critical judgement** > Analyse and exercise judgment in challenging situations in the absence of specific guidance. > Demonstrate initiative and suggest creative improvements and better ways of working. > Demonstrate tenacity to achieve results.
Additional Behaviours for 1st level line managers in humanitarian response, informed by skills and knowledge Responsibilities typically include: • leading a functional team • managing operational delivery • line management • budget and resource management	● **Understanding the humanitarian context** > Assess and analyse key issues in the humanitarian situation and formulate actions to respond to them. ● **Applying humanitarian standards and principles** > Participate in the development of an organisational response based on an understanding of the operating context. > Respect International humanitarian law and relevant treaties. > Actively participate in disaster coordination and interagency cooperation, based on a clear understanding of your organisation's perspective and approach.	● **Ensuring programme quality and impact** > Set standards in your work and follow agreed operating procedures. > Clarify roles and responsibilities within your team to maximise impact. > Collaborate with stakeholders to avoid duplication and maximise resources. > Regularly provide feedback and information to achieve improved results. > Document lessons learned and apply them to future projects. ● **Working accountably** > Establish processes through which crisis-affected people can participate in the response and share their expectations and concerns > Ensure efficient and transparent use of resources in accordance with internal controls.	● **Listening and creating dialogue** > Ensure feedback from crisis-affected people, partners and other stakeholders is incorporated into programme design, implementation and learning. ● **Working with others** > Establish clear objectives with teams and individuals > Monitor work progress and individual performance. > Establish agreed ways of working at a distance with partners and staff. > Work with your team to build trust with communities and stakeholders. > Foster collaborative, transparent and accountable relationships through partners to formalise and implement partnering agreements. > Use negotiation and conflict resolution skills to support positive outcomes.	● **Minimising risk to communities, partners and stakeholders** > Undertake effective risk assessments with crisis-affected people and partners. > Demonstrate an understanding of wider UN/NGO security co-ordination and how your organisation participates in those mechanisms. > Develop contingency plans. ● **Managing personal safety and security** > Monitor security risks and ensure organisational protocols are understood and consistently followed by staff. > Take appropriate action and provide direction and support to team members in the event of a crisis.	● **Adapting and coping** > Help others to recognise and manage their own stress by modelling appropriate self care and prioritising your workload. > Promote well-being and a 'duty of care' culture. ● **Maintaining professionalism** > Set realistic deadlines and goals. > Enable others to carry out their roles and responsibilities. > Monitor commitments and actions transparently > Take time to learn from experience and feedback and apply the learning in new situations.	● **Motivating and influencing others** > Inspire others by clearly articulating and demonstrating the values, core purpose and principles that underpin humanitarian work. > Provide regular and ongoing informal and formal feedback. > Recognise the contribution of others. > Adapt leadership style to the time frame and changing situation. ● **Critical judgement** > Maintain a broad strategic perspective at the same time as an awareness of the detail of a situation. > Act decisively and adapt plans quickly to respond to emerging situations and changing environments. > Take informed and calculated risks to improve performance.

Appendix B: List of proposed questions for SMs and CDs

Semi-Structured Interview Proposed Questions

Sample A: Country Directors' Questions

Name: [will be anonymised]

Position: [will be anonymised]

Experience:

Countries that has worked in:

1. Ethical issues and courtesy (4 - 6 minutes):

a) Greeting and self-introduction.

b) Explain the research, briefly.

c) Describe the interview process.

d) Check if the participant has any questions on the consent form or the other documents.

e) Explain the confidentiality and data protection, Act 1988.

f) Explain that a copy of interview transcription and dissertation would be made available if wished and or required.

g) Thank the interviewee [irrespective of participation or not].

h) Explain the terminology, in terms security is about (both safety and or security), and a manager is (anyone who assumes overall safety and or security responsibilities in a country setup).

2. Humanitarian aid workers (5 - 10 minutes):

a) What do you think are the most common characteristics of humanitarian aid workers in general, working in International NGOs? OR, how would you describe

an INGO worker?

b) Please explain your perspective and share personal experiences if you wish, what is the most widespread perception towards security department within INGOs? For example, do programmes perceive it as other support functions similar to finance, logistics, admin and or human resources, or as an obstacle to conducting your programmes or maybe as the necessary evil or something else.

c) How do you describe the relation between security managers and the programme's staff? And, please identify the most common encountered issues including possible reasons and share personal experiences if you wish.

d) What do you consider to be the primary role of security department and its managers in the delivery of aid to beneficiaries? Why?

3. Security Managers (10 - 15 minutes):

a) In your opinion, what are the necessary requirements to recruit a security manager or advisor? In terms of experience, qualifications and education, in any INGO operating in a demanding environment plagued by a challenging and dynamic security landscape.

- How do you see the context influencing the recruitment process?
- Emphasis on your experience, do security mangers have to possess a uniformed background? Why? And what might be the other backgrounds that would be helpful?
- [if required] What do you consider to be the best education for a security manager?

b) What do you see as the priorities which senior management need from security managers? OR, what are the most necessary issues that security managers should address and achieve?

c) How would you describe an efficient, effective and competent security manager? In terms of attributes, skills and mindset. Feel free to share your personal experiences with various safety/security professionals.

d) How do you think an INGO security manager should behave? Concerning personality and attitudes. OR, what are the behavior traits that all INGO security managers should possess to be able to operate in the specific world of INGOs?

e) From your point of view, where do you see the future of security and its managers within INGOs?

f) What would be the areas of improvement concerning security managers within INGOs? And how it can be possibly done?

g) Is there anything you wish to add?

4. Ending (1 – 3 minutes):

a) Thank the interviewee for participation.

b) Check if the interviewee has any questions.

Sample B: Country Security Managers' and HQ or Regional Security Directors' Questions

Name: [will be anonymised]

Position: [will be anonymised]

Experience:

Countries that has worked in:

1. Ethical issues and courtesy (4 - 6 minutes):

a) Greeting and self-introduction.

b) Explain the research, briefly.

c) Describe the interview process.

d) Check if the participant has any questions on the consent form or the other documents.

e) Explain the confidentiality and data protection, Act 1988.

f) Explain that a copy of interview transcription and dissertation would be made available if wished and or required.

g) Thank the interviewee [irrespective of participation or not].

h) Explain the terminology, in terms security is about (both safety and or security), and a manager is (anyone who assumes overall safety and or security responsibilities in a country setup).

2. Humanitarian aid workers (5 - 10 minutes):

a) What do you think are the most common characteristics of humanitarian aid workers in general, working in International NGOs? OR, how would you describe an INGO worker?

b) According to your experience, what is the most widespread perception towards security department within INGOs? For example, do programmes perceive it as other support functions similar to finance, logistics, admin and or human resources, or as an obstacle to conducting their programmes or maybe as the necessary evil or something else. Please explain why do think this is the case.

c) How do you describe the relation between security managers with the programme's staff? And, please identify the most common encountered issues including possible reasons.

d) What do you consider to be the primary role of security department and its managers in the delivery of aid to beneficiaries? Why?

e) Some may argue that value for money (cost versus benefit) of safety staff is not very high since safety equipment, training and staff are costly. Would you agree with this statement and regardless, what do you believe your main value added is to an organization?

3. Security personnel (10 - 15 minutes):

g) What do you think should be the basic or minimum requirements to recruit a security manager or advisor? In terms of experience, qualifications and education for an INGO operating in a demanding environment plagued by a challenging and dynamic security landscape.

- Emphasis on your experience, do you consider uniformed backgrounds are more suitable to be INGO security managers? And why do you think so? Any alternatives backgrounds and why?
- Do security mangers have to possess a university degree, or experience alone is sufficient? Why?
- [Irrespective the answer] What do you consider to be the best education for a security manager?

h) As a security manager, what do you consider to be priorities in your position [as country security manager] that you ought to achieve?

i) How would you describe an efficient, effective and competent security manager? In terms of attributes, skills and mindset.

j) How do you think an INGO security manager should behave? Concerning personality and attitudes. OR, what are the behavior traits that all INGO security managers should possess to be able to operate in the specific world of INGOs?

k) From your point of view, where do you see the future of security and its managers within INGOs?

l) What would be the areas of improvement? And how it can be possibly done?

m) Is there anything you wish to add?

4. Ending (1 – 3 minutes):

c) Thank the interviewee for participation.

d) Check if the interviewee has any questions.

Appendix C: Participant Invitation Letter

Participant Invitation Letter

Researcher: Karokh Khorany

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Study Title: International NGO security managers: the attributes, skills and mindset of today's humanitarian security professional.

Dear Potential Participant,

I would like to invite you to participate in my research study.

I am an MSc student at University of Portsmouth (UoP) and was wondering if I could ask for approximately 30 minutes of your time over Skype, at your convenience, anytime during April. I am aware that you are very busy. However, the subject may be of interest, and the dissertation may reveal findings which would be of relevance and use. I have worked in the humanitarian aid sector, for an International NGO in Iraq, doing safety and security.

I am attempting to answer the question ‘what constitutes a competent, effective and efficient security manager in INGOs operating in demanding environments plagued by a challenging and dynamic security landscape?’ Therefore, it is hoped that this research will identify a set of characteristics of today’s humanitarian security professional, that should be adopted or developed by people who currently assume or seeking this role.

I would, therefore, be very keen also grateful to interview you to explore both your personal and professional experience, in order to fulfil the aims and objectives of this research.

I hope you can find the time to assist. So you are aware, your identity and any identifying information will be anonymized. Furthermore, data collected will be owned by the UoP and myself. Thus, it may not be used for internal matters within your respective INGO (e.g. evaluation). Therefore, if you decide to take part, please let me know, so I send you further details including required documentations, and to agree on a time for the interview.

Please do not hesitate to contact me of you have any queries.

[Signature]

Sincerely,

Karokh Khorany

Appendix D: Participant Information Sheet

Researcher: Karokh Khorany

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Participant Information Sheet

Study Title: International NGO security managers: the attributes, skills and mindset of today's humanitarian security professional.

I would like to invite you to take part in my research study. Before you decide I would like you to understand why the research is being done and what it would involve for you. You may want to talk to others about the study if you wish. However, please ask me if there is anything that is not clear.

What is the purpose of the study?

The aim is to conduct research on the International NGO security managers and attempt to answer the question 'what constitutes a competent, effective and efficient security manager in INGOs operating in demanding environments plagued by a challenging and dynamic security landscape?' It is hoped that it will identify a set of characteristics (attributes, skills and mindset) of today's

humanitarian security professional, that should be adopted or developed by people who currently assume or seeking this role.

Why have I been invited?
You have been invited to participate in this research because of your professional experience in the International NGOs as [different roles will be listed depending who the letter is being addressed to], of which you assume overall [security or security management] responsibilities towards staff and the INGO that employs you. Your input would go a long way besides other professionals in giving a critical analysis and overview of the researched topic to answer the question mentioned above.

Do I have to take part?
No, participation is entirely voluntary. However, your participation is very vital to the research, considering your professional capacity, your input will add invaluable information. That is why you are encouraged to participate. If you agree to take part, you will then be asked to sign the attached consent form, dated [dd/mm/yy], version number [V].

What will happen to me if I take part?
An interview lasting approximately 30 minutes, talking freely on the subject. The interview will be conducted over Skype (or other telecommunications applications), which will be audio recorded. Later, it will be transcribed to aid dissertation and research or publications. However, it will be ensured that revealing information will be anonymised. Consent to be sort for this, therefore the attached consent form to be signed upon agreement.

Expenses and payments
Participation in this study is completely voluntary. The expenses are limited to the internet and computer access, besides 30 minutes of your time. Unfortunately, the researcher nor the University of Portsmouth can compensate, although your participation is highly appreciated. Therefore, you may refuse to participate, refuse to answer any questions or even withdraw from the study at any time without giving any reason, up to the point of data being analysed. In any given case the researcher will remain discreet and will not inform anyone about such actions, in addition, your identity will remain confidential.

What will I have to do?
The interview will be semi-structured. Which means, I will have set of questions, however, depending on the conversation new questions may emerge.

What are the possible disadvantages and risks of taking part?
Depending on your responses, you might be evaluated by your employing organisation. Which may impact on your current and future status. Therefore, all the identifying information will be anonymised including (e.g. name, the

name of INGO, location, etc.). Your identity will not be revealed unless otherwise required by law or regulatory authority.

What are the possible benefits of taking part?
You may not receive direct benefits from participating in this research. However, your input may benefit the security of INGOs through the following ways:

- Construct an understanding of how aid workers perceive security managers including themselves.
- Identify the basic qualifications, experience and requirements that are considered during the process of recruiting a security manager.
- Compare actual needs of senior management versus what security managers often identify as priorities.
- Identify the main characteristics of today's INGOs security professional that should be developed or adopted in order to ensure best practice.
- Promote the role and importance of security department in the INGOs, in terms of sustainability and delivery.
- Assist security managers to integrate with the particular world of humanitarians.
- Evaluate the tricky relationship between experience and competency by describing what education is best for security managers and whether they have to possess a military background.

Will my taking part in the study be kept confidential?
The data will be made anonymous, then to be presented to others at academic conferences, published as a project report, academic dissertation, in academic journals and or book. It could also be made available to any commissioner or funder of the research. Anonymous data, which does not identify you, may be used in future research studies approved by an appropriate research ethics committee.

The raw data, which would identify you, will not be passed to anyone outside the research team without your express written permission. The exception to this will be any regulatory authority which may have the legal right to access the data for the purposes of conducting an audit or enquiry, in exceptional cases. These entities treat your personal data in confidence and confidentiality.

Your confidentiality will be safeguarded during and after the study. The procedures for handling, processing, storage and destruction of will data will be managed as following

- The data will be collected through Skype interview, which will be audio recorded then transcribed ensuring your anonymity.
- The data will be stored securely, in an encrypted password protected computer.
- The data will be retained for use in future studies and whether further REC approval will be sought (publically funded research e.g. ESRC increasingly requires data to be retained for future, REC approved research).
- Authorised persons such as (e.g. researcher, supervisors, sponsors, regulatory authorities & R&D audit, etc.) will have access to the

identifying data if deemed required (for monitoring of the quality of the research, etc.).

- To comply with University's data retention guidelines, raw data will be kept under Data Protection Act conditions for 10 years and Consent Forms will be retained for 30 years. All data will be encrypted and kept on password protected computer. The information provided in the research will be open for access by others for academic and research purposes.

You have the right to check the accuracy of data held about you and correct any errors. Please inform the researcher if you would like to proceed with this action.

What will happen if I don't want to carry on with the study?
At any time, you may withdraw from the study, without giving any reason if you do not wish to. If you do withdraw from the study after some data have been collected, you will be asked if you are content to share the data collected thus far, to be retained and included in the study. If you require, the data gathered will be destroyed and not included in the study. Once the interview has finished, and the data analysed, it will not be possible for you to withdraw your data from the study.

What if there is a problem?
If you have a query, concern or complaint about any aspect of this study, in the first instance you should contact me or my supervisor. The contact details for both the researcher and supervisor as bellow:
Researcher: Karokh Khorany
MSc Security Management
up836742@myport.ac.uk
kp.khorany@outlook.com
Supervisor: Prof. Mark Button
mark.button@port.ac.uk

If your concern or complaint(s) is/are not resolved by my supervisor or me, you should contact the Chair of Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences (FHSS)'s Ethics Committee (Dr. Jane) and or Head of Department (Dr. Phil), their contact details are as bellow:
Chair of FHSS Ethics Committee: Dr. Jane Winstone
ethics-fhss@port.ac.uk
Head of Department: Dr. Phil Clements
phil.clements@port.ac.uk

What will happen to the results of the research study?
The results will be analysed, then included in the research to fulfil the requirements of the Master's degree of the researcher. All identifying data will be anonymised then included. At this point, it is not known whether the research including the results of the data will be published or not outside the

University of Portsmouth, however, even if it was published your confidentiality and anonymity will remain intact. If you like, the research can be shared with you after its submission and a favourable approval.

Who is organising and funding the research?
This research is self-funded. Although, sponsored by the University of Portsmouth which provides proper supervision and insurance.

Who has reviewed the study?
Research at the University of Portsmouth is looked at by an independent group of people, called an Ethics Committee, to protect your interests. This study has been reviewed and given a favourable opinion by _____Ethics Committee.

Concluding statement
Thank you for taking the time to read this information sheet and for considering volunteering for this research. If you do agree to participate your consent will be sought; please see the accompanying consent form. You will then be sent a copy of this information sheet and your signed consent form, to keep.

Appendix E: Consent Form

Researcher: Karokh Khorany
MSc Security Management
Up836742@myport.ac.uk
Kp.khorany@outlook.com
Supervisor: Prof. Mark Button
Mark.button@port.ac.uk
Head of Department: Dr. Phil Clements
St Georges Building
141 High Street
Protsmouth, PO1 2HY
United Kingdom
phil.clements@port.ac.uk

Consent Form

Study Title: International NGO security managers: the attributes, skills and mindset of today's humanitarian security professional.

Name of Researcher: Karokh Khorany **_Please_ tick initial box**

1. I confirm that I have read and understand the information sheet date (DD/MM/YY), version (--) for the above study. I have had the opportunity to consider the information, ask questions and have had these answered satisfactory. ☐
2. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at any time without giving any reason, up to the point when data is being analysed. ☐
3. I understand that data collected during the study, may be looked at by individuals from [University of Portsmouth and or other entities], or from regulatory authorities. I give permission for these individuals to have access to my data. ☐
4. I agree to my interview being audio recorded. ☐
5. I agree to being quoted verbatim. ☐
6. I agree to the data I contribute being retained for future REC approved research. ☐
7. I agree to take part in the above study. ☐

Name of Participant: Date: Signature:

Name of Researcher*: Date: Signature:
(*person taking consent)

When completed: 1 for participant; 1 for researcher's file.

Appendix F: Information About the Participants

Pseudonym	Function	Total years of experience	Countries of previous work experience
P 1	SM	15 +	Nigeria, Pakistan, Libya, Jordan, etc.
P 2	CD	30 +	Liberia, South Africa, Haiti, Burundi, etc.
P 3	SM	25 +	Somalia, South Sudan, Afghanistan, Iraq, etc.
P 4	CD	20 +	Bosnia, Iraq, Lebanon, etc.
P 5	SM	10 +	Nigeria, Pakistan, Sudan, etc.
P 6	CD	35 +	Pakistan, Afghanistan, Serbia, etc.
P 7	SM	20 +	South Sudan, Pakistan, Afghanistan, etc.
P 8	SFP	25 +	Afghanistan, Somalia, Colombia, etc.
P 9	CD	10 +	Niger, Senegal, Haiti, Palestine, etc.

Source: constructed for this dissertation

Appendix G: Ethics Self-Assessment Form

Ethics Self-Assessment Form

Section 1: Student details and proposed research topic

Student name: Karokh Khorany

Student number: 836742

Proposed research topic: **International NGO security managers: the attributes, skills and mindset of today's humanitarian security professional**.

Section 2: Preparation and details of ethical issues identified in the proposed research

1. Student has read the *British Society of Criminology/or subject appropriate* ethical guidelines.

Yes [X] **No [ ]**

2. Student has participated in research ethics sessions (lecture/seminar/workshop/other on-line or face to face activity) provided by their programme of study.

Yes [X] **No [ ]**

3. Will the research involve the collection and analysis of primary or secondary data?

Primary data	Yes [X]	No [ ]
Secondary data	Yes [X]	No [ ]

Note: Secondary data is data that has already been collected by other researchers or an organisation for another purpose. Data may be in the public domain or available under the Freedom of Information Act (2000).

4. Does proposed research involve face-to-face contact with members of the community (including professionals and those held or 'looked after')?

Yes [ ] No [X]

5. Is access to personal or confidential data sought? **Yes [ ]** No [X]

6. Are you aware of the need to ensure anonymity and confidentiality of research participants?

Yes [X] **No [ ]**

7. Are there potential risks (to you and/or research subjects) in the research? (If 'Yes', then specify these risks in the spaces provided.)

Physical risks – to participants **Yes [ ]** No [X*]

*Not anything that the researcher is aware of at the time of writing, which can be related to the research or the topic being researched.

Physical risks – to yourself **Yes [ ]** No [X*]

*Not anything that the researcher is aware of at the time of writing, which can be related to the research or the topic being researched.

Psychological risks – to participants **Yes [ ]** No [X*]

*Not anything that the researcher is aware of at the time of writing, which can be related to the research or the topic being researched.

Psychological risks – to yourself **Yes [ ]** No [X*]

*Not anything that the researcher is aware of at the time of writing, which can be related to the research or the topic being researched.

Compromising situations – to participants **Yes [X]** No [ ]
Depending on the responses of participants, they might be evaluated by the employing organisation. Which might impact on their current and future employability status. Therefore, the participants will be anonymised including the names of organisations and any identifying information (e.g. location).

Compromising situations – to yourself **Yes [X]** No [ ]
Depending on the results of the research, some people or organizations might disagree. Consequently, may negatively impact on the employability of the researcher to a certain extent. However, this works contrary as well. Nevertheless, this risk is minimal; furthermore, the researcher is knowingly and willingly taking this calculated risk.

8. Do you believe you need to deceive research subjects? (e.g. by not being clear about the purpose of your research)

Yes [ ] No [X]

9. Is there any likely harm to participants involved in the research?

Yes [ ] No [X]

10. Is participation in the research entirely voluntary? Yes [X] **No [ ]**

11. Have you considered how you are going to obtain informed consent from research participants?

Yes [X] **No [ ]**

12. Is there any potential role conflict for you in the research? **Yes [X]**
No [ ]

There is no current role of conflict. However, some of the participants are previous supervisors, others might become potential future supervisors and or colleagues.

13. If you are using secondary data, is the data available in the public domain?

Yes [X] **No** [ ] Not using secondary data [ ]

14. If access to data outside of the public domain is proposed, have you consulted with your data protection officer?

N/A [X] Yes [ ] **No** [ ]

15. Are there any other data protection issues? **Yes [ ]**
No [X]

16. Are there *any other* potential sources of ethical issues or conflict in the proposed research (e.g. political considerations, the sensitivity of the topic, reputational issues for researcher, participants and or host organisation)?

Yes [ ] No [X]

I confirm that:

- the information provided is a complete and accurate record of my plans at present;
- I have read and understood the process for obtaining a favourable ethical opinion as contained in the document: 'How to Apply for Ethical Review'; and
- I shall resubmit an amended version of this form should my research alter significantly such that there is any significant variation of ethical risk.

Signed: Karokh Khorany, 7th April, 2017 Student

Signed: Mark Button, Dissertation/research supervisor/PI

Date: 10th April, 2017

Section 3: Ethical Narrative

As was determined in the self-assessment above, some compromising situations may evolve, to the participants and the researcher as well. The compromising situation to the participants will be mitigated by full anonymization of their identity as well as any identifying information. Their identifying data will not be shared outside the researcher and his supervisor unless otherwise required by the university or any regulatory authority, of which this will be made clear in the participant's information sheet and consent form for obtaining acceptance. In addition, these entities are required to maintain the confidentiality agreement, unless otherwise deemed by law. On the other hand, the compromising situation to the researcher may not be mitigated to the same degree; however, its likelihood is very low, although its impact maybe medium to high. That being said, the researcher has high confidence that the research would not have a negative impact on his career rather positive. Therefore, this risk is willingly and knowingly taken.

In addition, ethical narrative should address the following issues:

- Sensitivity of research topic:
  The sensitivity of research topic can be considered as minimal, because it mainly aims at identifying the attributes, skills and mindset of today's International NGO security manager

- Permission from host organisation/s:
  This research aims to interview individuals holding senior positions in various organisations to fulfil the aims and objectives of the research. Thus, it does not evaluate the employing organisation policies and or procedures, rather concentrate on the personal and professional

experience to answer the research question. In addition, all potential participants possess (to an extent) the authority to authorise such permission. In addition, they will be contacted through an organisation that has access to all these organisations directly. A letter will be sent to participants to agree on participation in the research. The letter will be using UOP logo and contact details. If the invited person agrees to participate, they will be sent further documentations which will explain the research and set out the risks and costs (e.g. use of office time, professional time, reputational issues, access to staff, internet, etc.) associated with research activity.

- Access to proposed participants:
  For the propose of this research, the INGOs and or interviewees will be approached through an organisation that works as a forum for the INGOs in terms of security. For this purpose, 'personal' email account and Skype will be used for communications.

- Reputational issues:
  There is no reputational risk that can be linked to the INGOs, their staff, UoP and or the researcher. However, the identity of all the INGOs and their staff will be anonymized. Furthermore, it will be insured by the researcher that there would be no harm to the reputation of the UoP, the INGOs, the participants and the researcher in any way.

- Anonymity and confidentiality:
  The identity of the participants and their employing organisations will be anonymised. However, if during the interview, it was found that they are conducting any illegal activity or behaviour, the confidentiality agreement can be terminated and relevant entities will be informed. This will be made clear in the information sheet and the consent form.

- Data protection and storage:
  The data will be protected by the data protection act (1998) and the regulations of the University of Portsmouth. To comply with the University's current data retention guidelines; raw data will be kept under Data Protection Act conditions for 10 years and Consent Forms will be retained for 30 years. All data will be encrypted and kept on password protected computer. The information provided in the research will be open for access by others for academic and research purposes.

- Role conflict:
  Some of the interviewees are former supervisors, and the others might be future supervisors or colleagues. However, it will be made clear from the beginning that this research is sponsored by the University of Portsmouth which provides indemnity, and the research is owned by the university and the researcher solely.

- Access to privileged data and privileged resources:
  No privileged data is deemed to be accessed.

- Risks posed by research:

There are no physical or psychological risks that can be associated to this research or the topic, of which the researcher is aware of at the time of writing. However, compromising situations may emerge to the participants and or researcher. Depending on the responses of the participants, they might be evaluated by the employing organisation. Which might impact on their current or future employability status. Therefore, the participants will be anonymised including the names of organisations and any identifying information (e.g. location). Similarly, some people or organisations might disagree with the outcomes of the research. Consequently, may negatively impact on the employability of the researcher to a certain extent. However, this works contrary as well. Nevertheless, this risk is minimal; furthermore, the researcher is willingly taking this calculated risk.

- Ownership of research data
  The data will be owned by the UoP and the researcher exclusively, and it may not be used for any internal purposes (e.g. evaluation of employees), this will be made clear in the invitation letter.

Section 4: Ethical Opinion Outcome Record

Please note: Staff, Visiting academics, PhD candidates and Professional Doctorate students (research phase) will be notified of a favourable ethical opinion in a letter from the Faculty Ethics Committee (ethics-fhss@port.ac.uk) which will include a REC number. (For further details of this see the document: 'How to Apply for Ethical Opinion' – Stage 2: The process for applying for ethical opinion.)

This section (below) will be completed by the ICJS Department Ethics Committee for: Undergraduate, Masters and Professional Doctorate [Stage 2,1. ART] research proposals and therefore this document **must be included in the Ethical Bundle when it is sent for ethical review to Jane Winstone (icjsethics@port.ac.uk)**

A copy of the outcome of ethical opinion will be sent to the student who is responsible for providing this to the dissertation/research supervisor. A copy will also be kept on record by the ICJS Ethics Committee.

ICJS EC Ethical Opinion Outcome Record*	
Favourable ethical opinion You can commence data collection with the agreement of your supervisor.	
Provisional favourable ethical opinion subject to requirements. **See 'Comments' on following page.** Once your supervisor is satisfied that you have met these requirements, you may commence data collection.	x
RISKS ASSESSED AS SIGNIFICANT and a favourable ethical opinion cannot be provided for the proposal in its present form. **See 'Comments' on following page.**	

*The ICJS EC default position is to reserve the right to refer any research proposal to the Faculty Ethics Committee where the proposal poses ethical issues beyond its remit to form an opinion upon.

Date complete ethical bundle received fit for review: ……11th April 2017

Date reviewed: ....24th April 2017.....……..

Signed: .....Stephanie Bennett..... (Member of ICJS Ethics Committee)